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ABSTRACT 
The use of technology in society moved from satisfying the technical needs of users to giving 
a lasting user experience while interacting with the technology. The continuous technological 
advancements have led to a diversity of emerging security concerns. It is necessary to balance 
security issues with user interaction. As such, designers have adapted to this reality by 
practising user centred design during product development to cater for the experiential needs 
of user - product interaction. These User Centred Design best practices and standards ensure 
that security features are incorporated within End User Programs (EUP). The primary 
function of EUP is not security, and interaction with security features while performing a 
program related task does present the end user with an extra burden. Evaluation mechanisms 
exist to enumerate the performance of the EUP and the user’s experience of the product 
interaction. Security evaluation standards focus on the program code security as well as on 
security functionalities of programs designed for security. However, little attention has been 
paid to evaluating user experience of functionalities offered by embedded security features.  
A qualitative case study research using problem based and design science research 
approaches was used to address the lack of criteria to evaluate user experience with 
embedded security features. User study findings reflect poor user experience with EUP 
security features, mainly as a result of low awareness of their existence, their location and 
sometimes even of their importance. From the literature review of the information security 
and user experience domains and the user study survey findings, four components of the 
framework were identified, namely: end user characteristics, information security, user 
experience and end user program security features characteristics. 
This thesis focuses on developing a framework that can be used to evaluate the user 
experience of interacting with end user program security features. The framework was 
designed following the design science research method and was reviewed by peers and 
experts for its suitability to address the problem. Subject experts in the fields of information 
security and human computer interaction were engaged, as the research is multidisciplinary. 
This thesis contributes to the body of knowledge on information security and on user 
experience elements of human computer interaction security regarding how to evaluate user 
experience of embedded InfoSec features. The research adds uniquely to the literature in the 
area of Human Computer Interaction Security evaluation and measurement in general, and is 
specific to end user program security features. The proposed metrics for evaluating UX of 
interacting with EUP security features were used to propose intervention to influence UX in 
an academic setup. The framework, besides presenting UX evaluation strategies for EUP 
security features, also presents a platform for further academic research on human factors of 
information security. The impact can be evaluated by assessing security behaviour, and 
successful security breaches, as well as user experience of interaction with end user 
programs. 
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
The first chapter will introduce the thesis following the outline as indicated below. 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
1.1.1 General usage of ICT in the work place 
Information Communication Technology (ICT) has become an integral component of all 
business sectors and homes. It is providing a platform for education, marketing, innovation 
and networking. Workplaces are driven by modern ICT devices and products as they have 
become readily available to most people and businesses. Devices include Tablet PCs, iPods, 
iPhones, PDA, PCs, etc. There have been tremendous technological advancements globally; 
however, this thesis focuses on Namibia. The Namibian industry is driven by ICT and the 
national agenda for vision 2030 and national development plan 4 (NDP4) focus on 
integrating ICTs in all schools. In order to realise this dream more devices are being deployed 
to schools (Isaacs, 2007).  Most jobs and communication now depend on information 
technology and are carried out with the aid of some end user application program.  
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1.1.2 Impact of better technology access and Internet Connectivity 
Advancements in both system design and communication technologies have presented an 
opportunity for all to be interconnected.  Interconnection provides educational, social and 
economic benefits to individuals, organisations and communities. Among the benefits are 
collaboration, resource sharing, convenience, high productivity, efficiency, availability, 
interaction, cost management and optimisation (Milligan, 2006). Employees are no longer 
office bound as they can access their workplace resources from home and deliver their work 
within stipulated times. This is enabled by the use of a variety of devices, some of which are 
mobile devices.  With the launching of the West Africa Cable System (WACS), it is 
anticipated that Internet connection rates will drop allowing more Namibians to connect to 
the Internet (Statistics, Internet World, 2011). According to Telecom Namibia, since 2012 
they have been doubling the bandwidth at the same rate, this has resulted in a 75% drop in the 
rates per bandwidth package (Laban, 2016). More information will be shared across the 
nation and globally. However, the same means of connecting to the Internet are also available 
to cybercriminals as they are to security novices and experts alike. This poses a security 
concern as cyber criminals are also going to find it easier to connect, and to access the shared 
information by manipulating easier targets (SANS, 2011).  
 
1.1.3 Overview of end user programs typically used in the work place 
End user applications are the programs that end users employ to perform daily tasks on their 
computers. The most popular end user programs, documented by Furnell, Jusoh, and 
Katsabas (2005) are web browsers (Internet Explorer), email client (Outlook Express) and 
word processors (Microsoft Word). In another study, Adobe PDF Reader, QuickTime, Adobe 
Flash and Microsoft Office were also identified as popular application programs (SANS, 
2011; SANS, 2011). Most of these popular applications have been identified as easy targets 
for cyber-attacks. This is achieved by means of influencing human behaviour through the 
application security. 
 
1.1.4 User experience 
User Experience (UX) is the field of Human Computer Interaction (HCI) that focuses on “a 
person's perceptions and responses that result from the use or anticipated use of a product, 
system or service” (ISO 9241-210, 2010).  Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) is concerned 
with the design, evaluation and implementation of interactive computing systems for human 
use (Hewett, et al., 1992). UX is the intersection of HCI, USec and user behaviour. There are 
three main UX approaches, as identified by Hassenzahl and Tractinsky (2006) namely: 
1. Beyond the instrumental: evaluates interaction /usability aspects focusing on 
behaviour and establishes link with non-instrumental needs. 
2. Emotion and affect: emotions as a consequence of interaction. 
3. The experiential: holistic view of UX in a temporal situational context. 
Each one is adapted to suit the given scenario. This study focuses on the perceptions and 
responses of users resulting from their interaction with end user application program security 
features.  The third approach appeals more in this context as it takes cognisance of the 
context of the UX. To have a holistic view of UX, it is important to consider yet another 
definition: “a result of user’s and product’s characteristics when they interact under particular 
circumstances” (Hassenzahl & Tractinsky, 2006).  
The question is: what characteristics does a product have and how do they affect the user? 
What characteristics does a user have that influence the experience with the features? Focus 
can be on how the environment, security culture and duties of users shape their emotions 
when confronted with a dialogue that requires them to act in a secure manner. In their design 
of usable security, are the designers considering these factors?  Hassenzahl (2004) developed 
a model of UX that describes both the designer’s and the user’s perspectives of product 
features discussed in Chapter 3 (Figure 3-3). A designer has an intended product character 
during development and makes use of guidelines for the user to follow in order to get the 
desired experience (Hassenzahl, 2004). However, the user has characteristics that shape how 
the end user perceives the product. Hence, the actual product character they encounter is 
different from that intended. In turn, this evokes different consequences. Frameworks of UX, 
including influencing factors, were developed and are defined in terms of the level of 
negative or positive emotions experienced in a specific context while or after using a product 
(Schulze & Krömker, 2010; Mathiasen & Bodker, 2008). The framework recognises the role 
played by human needs in an interaction. This can be used to evaluate the positive or negative 
emotions resulting from using a security feature and how it motivates future use. The 
evaluation helps us to determine how the interaction with security features can be guided to 
ensure a “degree to which specified users can achieve actual usability, safety, and 
satisfaction in use in a specified context of use” (Lew, Olsina, & Zhang, 2010).  
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This research considers UX with security features, as well as human behaviour towards 
security, in order to address security problems associated with end user program security 
features.  User behaviour is influenced by many factors such as a lack of knowledge, 
prioritizing their work targets and misconceptions regarding security threats, among others 
(Herzog & Shahmehri, 2007). To understand user behaviour, it is important to consider 
theories of human behaviour such as the theory of reasoned action that considers attitudes 
towards the action and subjective norms regarding the action (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). 
Attitudes and norms are affected by external factors like personality and demographic traits. 
Behaviour intention or motivation is a product of attitudes (positive or negative emotions 
about an act or behaviour) and subjective norms (individual perceptions) (Fishbein & Ajzen, 
1980). In 1991, Ajzen added self-efficacy as a third input to behaviour intention and came up 
with the theory of planned behaviour. Figure 1-1 depicts a framework developed by Minge 
(2008) showing the diverse components of UX and how they influence the appraisal of the 
product and subsequent usage behaviour. It summarises most of the aspects of UX discussed 
this far. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1-1: Components of user experience (Minge, 2008) 
How then can UX of an interaction with application security features in any environment be 
measured in order to understand the determinant of behaviour intentions?  
In order to evaluate the effect of a program’s security feature on UX, various criteria that 
influence the overall UX can be used. Some important aspects are security policies, usability 
(convenience, efficiency, understandability, visibility) (Furnell et al., 2005), user knowledge 
of security threats and solutions and/or mitigation strategies related to their application 
programs. UX metrics include being enjoyable, fun, helpful, entertaining, satisfying, 
rewarding, motivating, and pleasing (Hassenzahl, 2004; Schulze & Krömker, 2010). 
The end user is the key to information security; hence, it is critical to address their 
experiences (UX) with security feature interaction in order to address organisational security 
problems.  
1.1.5 End user program security 
Information Security is concerned with procedures, people, devices and the communication 
of information in an integral and confidential way (Whitman & Mattord, 2011).  To protect 
the end user’s information, developers of end user programs have embedded security features 
in the applications. Some of these features interact with users to protect their information 
while others run in the background (Furnell et al., 2005). The security features are designed 
to protect individual and organisation security from cyber criminals. However, users fail to 
use them in the intended manner and present themselves as easy targets for cyber-attacks 
(Whitman & Mattord, 2011; SANS, 2011).  Users cancel updates or disable alerts hence they 
remain with outdated and unpatched programs. 
Program end users regard security as an administrative function that must be handled by 
Information Technology (IT) technicians. Security related responsibilities are usually ignored 
owing to the complex nature of security and to the fact that it is not the duty of the users 
(Herzog & Shahmehri, 2007; Furnell, 2004, Furnell et al., 2005). However, users and 
technicians have distinct roles to play in securing information. The technicians do all the 
configurations and the end users act on messages displayed on their screens. There is a need 
for the end users to understand their responsibility in order to exercise it well, as security is 
not about administrators alone. In the case of home users it is often necessary for them to 
configure some of the settings, as well as to access rights (privileges) and policies (Furnell, 
2007). With the increased use and ownership of mobile devices (Internet of everything), users 
have multiple devices that they are using to store their information and each of these has its 
own security challenges. Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) is a trend that has been embraced 
by many organisations, so if users are not responsible for their own security, who will ensure 
InfoSec on these devices? Innocent actions performed by end users can result in poor 
security-related decisions (Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 2007). Consequently, this results in 
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vulnerable programs and devices which compromise information security at personal and 
corporate levels, as these are easily manipulated by hackers. The next section will present 
user behaviour with security. 
1.1.6 Usable security 
Usable Security (USec) also known as HCI security (HCI-S) is the field that deals with 
human issues and Information Security (InfoSec), focusing on the design of security that is 
usable (NRCNA, 2010; Mathiasen & Bodker, 2008). User centred design engineers for 
InfoSec focus on ensuring the safety of users while doing their work, without being diverted 
from their core business in using the computer. This approach has taken centre stage in the 
development of usable program security features to make the interaction secure (Cranor & 
Garfinkel, 2005). 
USec is also defined as “A set of attributes that bear on the effort needed for use, and on the 
individual assessment of such use, by a stated or implied set of users” (Herzog & Shahmehri, 
2007).  Whitten and Tygar (2003) emphasise that security software is usable if end users are 
fully aware of the security action they need to carry out, can easily find out how to carry it 
out successfully without making unsafe mistakes and are at ease with the interfaces to keep 
on using it.  The same should apply to security features embedded into the end user programs. 
A number of factors influence how end users behave. These include the individual as well as 
technological characteristics and the environment in which they are used (Abbasi, Lew, 
Rafique, & Li, 2012). Program security features have characteristics that influence the 
behaviour of users towards the execution or implementation of such features, as presented in 
Section 4.4 (Hassenzahl, 2004). Usable security ensures that the security characteristics do 
not influence the user negatively and that the behaviour intention is positive. However, this 
can only be true if they behave as stipulated by the designer. Metrics to enumerate the 
usability of security include: visibility, aesthetic minimalist design, learnability and 
satisfaction (Johnston, Eloff, & Labuschagne, 2003). 
In conclusion, there is a need to consider ways in which end users in general can minimise 
their vulnerability while using end user programs and being connected to the Internet. 
1.2 PROBLEM DESCRIPTION 
This section presents the research problem addressed by the thesis. 
1.2.1 Overview  
Literature studies have shown that there is considerable research on evaluating UX usability; 
however, considerably less on usable security, secure usable software and UX with security. 
There is limited literature on tools to evaluate user experience associated with usable security 
and secure user experience. Figure 1-2 is a model composition representing actual usability 
and actual UX. What is noticeable is the lack of a security element. 
 
Figure 1-2: Actual usability and UX model (Lew et al., 2010) 
To accommodate the missing element, Yeratziotis, Van Greunen, and Pottas (2011) modified 
Morville’s seven facets of UX: useful, usable, desirable, findable, accessible, credible, 
valuable by including an eighth facet – security. They focused on evaluating usable security 
in online health systems. Can this modification on UX elements improve end user behaviour 
with security features? Security interactions do not result in a positive user experience 
(Furnell, 2010). To establish the scope of the problem, a pilot study was conducted in the 
case site. 
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1.2.2 Motivation 
A pilot study was conducted at the Polytechnic of Namibia, a tertiary education institution in 
Windhoek. Semi-structured interviews were used in the pilot study.  Semi-structured 
interviews have major questions which are posed in a similar way to all participants, although 
the order and level of engagement changed during interaction necessitated by the fact that the 
researcher already has some idea of the situation and shares a collegial relationship with the 
interviewees (Crinson & Leontowitsch, 2011). 
The semi-structured interviews with five technical staff were conducted to obtain their 
perception of their users, security status and security awareness level in the population. They 
reflected that the users are mostly responsible for the problems as a result of poor behaviour 
and poor adherence to policies. Suggested solutions included centralising the software 
updates and network access. Active directory and single sign-on were suggested. 
In addition to the technical staff, five end users were interviewed to obtain their perspectives 
on the support they receive from the IT experts supporting them.  The results show that they 
do not enjoy security interaction; they feel that their work is disturbed and that the 
technicians should perform those functions. However, they do not want the technicians taking 
time on their computers as this disturbs their work. They seek help from friends and the 
Internet before calling the helpdesk. They do not really like interacting with security as one 
option leads to another choice and so on. These findings served as a premise for further 
studies to be conducted.  The pilot study is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. 
1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Based on the findings in literature and the pilot study, the problem statement for this research 
can be formulated as: 
There is a lack of user experience evaluation criteria (metrics) to assess the user 
experience of end user interaction with embedded security features in end user 
application programs. 
Researchers, such as Furnell et al. (2005), established that negative user experiences with 
security occur as a result of poor security related decisions and behaviour. The pilot and 
empirical studies confirmed that there are poor security-related decisions and behaviour with 
an overall negative experience with Information Security among end users, leaving 
application programs vulnerable to exploitation by cyber criminals.  End user information is 
not safe because they do not interact in a secure manner with end user program security 
features. They remain with negative and insecure emotions/feelings from their interactions; 
hence, they choose not to interact with the features in future.  
 
Program developers have realised that implementing user centred design approaches in the 
design of usable security features is not sufficient and have therefore automated many 
security tasks (Edwards, Poole, & Stoll, 2008). However, it is impossible to by-pass the 
human element in executing all security tasks; hence, there is always interaction of some sort. 
Although the features are designed to be usable, end users are still not using them 
appropriately. Current trends show that application program attacks are still top of the list of 
security threats with mobile apps leading (SANS, 2011; Lyne, 2014) 
1.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND QUESTIONS 
Primary objective: 
This research aims to design a framework that can be used to evaluate the user experiences 
(UX) of interacting with end program security features from a user’s perspective.  
Specific objectives: 
1. To measure the state of UX with end user programs’ embedded security features. 
2. To determine the suitable security criteria/ methods that can be used to evaluate UX 
of end user program security features. 
3. To determine UX metrics/evaluation criteria can be used to determine the UX of end 
user program security features. 
4. To determine the components and requirements of end user programs’ security 
features’ UX and use them to develop the EUPSFUX framework. 
Research Questions 
The main question to be addressed by this research as the objective is achieved is 
 
 
 
The following four sub-questions support the main research question: 
1. What are the factors affecting UX with embedded security features in end user 
programs? 
How can a framework be designed to evaluate the user experience (UX) of interacting 
with end user program security features from a user’s perspective? 
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2. What are the suitable security criteria/ methods that can be used to evaluate UX of 
end user program security features?  
3. Which UX metrics/evaluation criteria can be used to determine the UX of end user 
program security features? 
4. What are the components of a framework to evaluate UX of end user program 
security features? 
1.5 SCOPE AND DELINEATION OF RESEARCH 
A case study of the Polytechnic of Namibia was used to design a framework for user 
experience with end user security features. This study focused on specific end user 
application programs in use at the Polytechnic of Namibia, namely MS Word and Adobe 
Acrobat Reader; however, other programs are in use and were not considered owing to 
popularity of usage. Other active programs were found to be email clients (Pronto, 
Thunderbird and Outlook), web browsers (Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox), MS Excel, MS 
PowerPoint and ITS. The case site uses ICT for their day-to-day business activities. The 
diversity of professionals in the case calls for the use of a variety of end user programs in 
executing duties. Each of the programs used has embedded security features, and most or all 
use web browsers, email clients, PDF and MS Word.  Whether or not users interact with 
these features to protect their information depends on what they expect and how they feel 
about the interaction. Previous experiences of similar interactions define feelings and 
attitudes. It is necessary for end users to have secure and positive experiences in order for 
them to have positive feelings towards future interactions.  To evaluate experiences with end 
user programs, MS Word and Adobe Acrobat Reader were chosen for their adhering to user 
centred design principles and having a commitment towards positive user experience. A 
heuristics evaluation tool was designed to assess the identified features in the case programs. 
Experts and peers performed security tasks using the features and evaluating their 
performance against a usability, and security checklist. Findings can inform IT, IS and UX 
experts on what to change as a way of improving user experience of interaction, but better 
still, they form the basis for designing the framework as they validate the theoretical 
framework underpinning the study.   
1.6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
A qualitative research method following an interpretivist research philosophy using inductive 
reasoning was used to inform the design of an artefact using a design science research 
paradigm. The artefact in this case is a framework which is discussed in detail in section 6.2. 
The area of focus spans the InfoSec as well as UX, Usability and HCISec (USec) domains of 
HCI; hence, qualitative tools and procedures could address the multidisciplinary nature of the 
research. A problem based research cycle was followed in defining the research problem. To 
gather data, validate the theoretical framework and evaluate the usability, security and user 
experience of end user security features in MS Word and Adobe Acrobat Reader, a case study 
strategy was found suitable. The cases were purposefully selected because of their richness. 
Literature reviews, questionnaire surveys, heuristic evaluations and semi-structured 
interviews were used. Method triangulation was used to improve the quality of the study. For 
data analysis qualitative strategies such as text analysis, data reduction, coding and data 
display were used.  
Table 1-1: Research methods used to answer research questions 
Research question Research objective Method 
1. What are the factors affecting 
UX with embedded security 
features in end user programs? 
To measure the state of UX 
with end user programs’ 
embedded security features. 
Literature survey, case study, survey 
2. What are the suitable security 
criteria/ methods that can be 
used to evaluate UX of end user 
program security features?  
3. Which UX metrics/evaluation 
criteria can be used to determine 
the UX of end user program 
security features? 
4. What are the components of a 
framework to evaluate UX of 
end user program security 
features? 
To determine the suitable 
security criteria/ methods that 
can be used to evaluate UX of 
end user program security 
features.  
To determine UX 
metrics/evaluation criteria can 
be used to determine the UX 
of end user program security 
features. 
To determine components and 
requirements of end user 
program security features’ UX 
and use them to develop the 
EUPSFUX framework. 
From the surveys, literature review, 
heuristic evaluation and case study. 
Design science research 
methodology- stage 3 design and 
development 
Main Research Question: 
How can a framework be designed to 
evaluate the user experience (UX) of 
interacting with end user program security 
features from a user’s perspective? 
To determine components and 
requirements of end user 
program security features’ UX 
and use them to develop the 
EUPSFUX framework. 
Design science research- 
methodology- stage 3 design and 
development 
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Table 1-1 is a summary of the research questions, objectives and research methods that are 
employed in the study. 
1.7 ETHICAL CLEARANCE 
The country under which the study was undertaken does not have a procedure for ethical 
clearance; however, a written document was signed between the researcher and the security 
custodians of the case organisation. Despite this, all measures were executed to ensure that 
the study adheres to all ethical requirements.  Survey participants were not required to submit 
any personal information and participated on a voluntary basis. 
1.8 RESEARCH SIGNIFICANCE AND CONTRIBUTION 
This research makes a contribution to the body of knowledge by developing a framework for 
evaluating the user experience of interaction with end user application program security 
features. The framework can also be used to influence and maintain acceptable UX levels in 
institutions of higher education by focusing on human factors influencing interaction with 
technology. Metrics for establishing UX baselines and evaluating the impact of intervention 
were also developed. 
1.9 CHAPTER OUTLINE 
There are eight chapters in this thesis. Chapter 1 is an introduction to the thesis, outlining the 
background to the research, the problem statement, objectives, research questions and 
methodology plus the scope of the research. In Chapter 2 methods that were used to answer 
the research questions and to achieve the objective are discussed in detail. Chapters 3 and 4 
discuss the theoretical underpinnings of the study. Chapter 3 focuses on information security, 
usable security, end user program security features, including the metrics and evaluation 
methods applicable to each, whilst Chapter 4 discusses the human factor of information 
security, focusing on user experience (UX), user behaviour (UB) and HCI security culture, as 
well as heuristics and evaluation methods. Chapter 5 presents the case studies conducted in 
an academic institution using user studies, heuristic evaluation of usability, UX and security 
in MS Word and Adobe, as well as the findings. In Chapter 6 the framework design process 
and the resulting framework are presented. Chapter 7 presents the finalisation of the proposed 
framework and a presentation of contributions.  Chapter 8 concludes with reflections, lessons 
learnt, limitations, recommendations and possible future research. Figure 1-3 is a pictorial 
representation of the thesis layout. 
 Figure 1-3: Thesis layout 
 
  
CHAPTER 2: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The first chapter introduced the problem to be addressed in this research. This chapter sets 
out the methodology that was used to answer the research questions, to collect, analyse and 
interpret results in order to meet the research objectives. The chapter follows the order 
presented in the chapter map. Section 2.2 presents the research paradigms and the underlying 
philosophical assumptions, followed by an overview of research strategies in Section 2.3. In 
Section 2.4 the design science research paradigm and philosophical assumptions applicable to 
this thesis are presented; Section 2.5 presents data collection and analysis instruments. 
Section 2.6 discusses the ethical considerations for this research. Finally, the summary is 
presented in Section 2.7. 
 
2.2 RESEARCH PARADIGMS AND THE PHILOSOPHICAL ASSUMPTIONS  
Paradigms are sets of shared research assumptions or ways of thinking about a phenomenon 
(Oates, 2012; Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). Researchers have a personal or shared understanding 
of reality (ontology), ways of exploring knowledge (epistemology), the value of the 
knowledge (axiology) and procedures for acquiring it (methodology) (Vaishnavi & Kuechler, 
2004; Oates, 2012; Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). These four philosophical assumptions help in 
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describing and adopting the paradigms. The number of research philosophies and paradigms 
vary from discipline to discipline. There are two paradigms that are generally agreed upon; 
the positivist and the interpretivist paradigms. Other paradigms, such as critical science, 
development/ design science, pragmatism, functionalism, radical structuralism and radical 
humanism also exist (Oates, 2012). When applying the qualitative research choice, usually 
there are three choices for information systems, namely: critical science, positivism and 
interpretivism (Bhattacherjee, 2012; Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2009; Oates, 2012). 
When it comes to HCI three paradigms are common, namely: traditional science, design 
science and human factors engineering. Other HCI paradigms include phenomenological 
matrix and experience-centred design. According to Venable (2011) there are five research 
paradigms, namely: interpretivist; positivist; theoretical-argumentative; critical, and design 
science. This research is in the HCI domain and focuses on designing an artefact; as such, 
design science needs to be considered alongside the two popular paradigms. Table 2-1 
presents the Design Science Research (DSR) alongside two popular and generally accepted 
paradigms. 
Table 2-1: Research philosophies and associated reasoning (Oates, 2012; Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2005; Vaishnavi & Kuechler, 2004) 
 Research Paradigm  
Basic Belief Positivist Interpretivist Design Science 
Ontology Single truth, definite, 
probabilistic, external 
Multiple realities, socially 
constructed, dynamic 
Multiple, contextually situated 
alternative world-states, socio-
technologically enabled 
Epistemology  Objective, dispassionate, 
detached observer 
Subjective based on researcher-
participant interaction, reflexive  
Knowledge through building, 
iterative design, contextual 
construction, iterative 
circumscription 
Axiology  Hypothesis testing Exploration  Control, creation, 
improvement, understanding, 
artefact utility 
Methodology  Observation, statistical, 
quantitative 
Participation, hermeneutical, 
qualitative, dialectical 
Developmental, gauge artefact 
impact on composite system 
 
Research is an activity that enables the understanding of a phenomenon (Vaishnavi & 
Kuechler, 2004). With interpretivism the researchers study naturally occurring social events 
using subjective understanding of the variables involved (Myers & Avison, 2002).  On the 
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other hand, DSR creates part of or the whole phenomenon instead of it occurring naturally; as 
such, it is a science of the artificial (Simon, 1996). DSR is therefore applicable in designing 
the solution, as it is used to come with novel and innovative artefacts through an iterative 
process of building and evaluation with abstraction. Interpretivism was employed in this 
study. Participants were interviewed for their opinions and the responses were analysed 
qualitatively and variations were reconciled from the researchers’ independent perspectives 
(Bhattacherjee, 2012; Saunders et al., 2009).   
2.2.1 Research Paradigm and Philosophical Assumptions Applicable to this Study 
In this thesis an in-depth understanding of a phenomenon in context was sought through an 
interpretation of population views and these are dynamic as they are influenced by context in 
time. Ontologically multiple realities in context, which are socially constructed and dynamic, 
exist depending on end user characteristics; on the organisational security culture as well as 
on the product in use at any given time. Owing to the nature of this research, positivism will 
not be considered as it assumes that fixed realities exist that can be measured objectively. 
DSR and interpretivism offer multiple realities; however, they differ in that interpretivism 
offers dynamic realities while DSR has multiple static views of reality that are socio-
technologically enabled.  
From an epistemological point of view, user experience is subjective as it depends on 
technology and end user interaction.  
Methodologically, data is collected and analysed qualitatively in context through surveys. An 
artefact is built iteratively through reflection. 
From an axiological perspective, DSR creates utility and understanding while interpretivism 
offers contextual understanding. 
2.3 RESEARCH STRATEGIES 
 A research strategy is the complete approach that is used to answer the research question(s) 
(Oates, 2012; Saunders et al., 2009). There are several research strategies that can be 
employed and they vary according to the research approach (interpretivism/ positivism) and 
research choice (quantitative or qualitative) (Sekaran & Bougie, 2009). Case studies, focus 
groups, ethnography, action research, documents and artefacts (design and creation) are 
usually employed in qualitative studies that are more inclined to the interpretivist approach 
(Oates, 2012; Saunders, et al., 2009). On the other hand, experiments, testing, mathematical 
17 
modelling and simulation, as well as theorem proving are usually associated with quantitative 
studies using a positivist approach. Observations and surveys can be used easily with any of 
the research approaches (Sekaran & Bougie, 2009).  This research employed case studies, 
heuristic evaluation, and surveys, as understanding of a phenomenon was sought. Design and 
creation was used to design a framework. Having considered the multi-disciplinary nature of 
the research, case studies and surveys were the natural choice as it has been established that 
they can be used across disciplines (Creswell, 2013).  
The main objective of this research is to design a framework; it incorporates design science 
research (DSR), also known as design and creation, as it focuses on coming up with artefacts. 
DSR is a problem-solving strategy aimed at building and evaluating artefacts to address 
phenomena (Hevner et al., 2004).  
The DSR as a strategy is presented in Section 2.4, together with the application thereof in this 
thesis. 
2.4 DESIGN SCIENCE RESEARCH STRATEGY OVERVIEW  
Real world problems are usually addressed through innovative artefacts (Simon, 1996). Ellis 
and Levy (2010) developed a systematic way of identifying a research problem by following 
the problem based research cycle. When the problem has been identified, solutions are 
explored and, where necessary, a framework is designed to address the phenomena. The 
developed framework is applied to the context and evaluated for applicability in a specific 
domain. To develop a domain-specific framework, it is necessary to follow domain-specific 
guidelines. DSR is recognised as one of the methodologies applicable to HCI and IS, 
especially when addressing social problems(Vaishnavi & Kuechler, 2008).  
The design science research paradigm comprises the design of original or inventive artefacts 
and the study of the usage and/or behaviour of such artefacts to enhance and comprehend the 
behaviour of features of Information Systems. Design science research is an additional way 
of complementing the positivist and interpretivist philosophies for performing research in 
Information Systems (IS) (Vaishnavi & Kuechler, 2008). According to Weber (2010), DSR 
can either be a paradigm or a research approach; however, it can be used in either of the other 
paradigms as a complement. In this study it is used as a strategy to complement 
interpretivism. Philosophical paradigms are reflected in the research strategies employed in a 
study process.  
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DSR begins with awareness of the problem, followed by a suggestion of a design/ concept, 
development, and then evaluation, as shown in Figure 2-1. The steps can be iterated until an 
initial design is developed; then conclusions can be drawn (Vaishnavi & Kuechler, 2004). 
 
Figure 2-1: DSR Methodology adopted from (Vaishnavi & Kuechler, 2004; Vaishnavi & 
Kuechler, 2008 p.20) 
Each phase has an output linked directly to the products (outputs) as shown in Table 2-2, 
identified by Vaishnavi & Kuechler (2004). The next section presents DSR research products. 
2.4.1 Design Science Research Products  
Four commonly agreed on products exist, namely constructs, methods, models and 
instantiations. According to Vaishnavi and Kuechler (2004), artefacts can be algorithms, 
human computer interfaces and system design methodologies or languages. Products of DSR 
are shown in Table 2-2 (Vaishnavi & Kuechler, 2004). Vaishnavi and Kuechler (2004) 
proposed improved theories, whilst Hevner (2007) proposed phenomena/ new meta-artefacts, 
as well as experiences. 
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Table 2-2: Research Outputs of DSR (Vaishnavi & Kuechler, 2004; March & Smith, 
1995; Hevner, Ram, March, & Park, 2004) 
 Phase   Output Description 
1 Phenomena Real life problem under investigation 
2 Constructs The theoretical terminology of the fields of study (UX & IS) to characterise phenomena. Can 
form domain/ field of shared knowledge. 
3 Models A set of proposals depicting relationships among constructs 
4 Methods A set of steps taken to finish a goal-specific task – research design 
5 Instantiations The implementation of constructs, models and methods. 
6 Better theories Artefact development, combined with reflection and conceptualisation. 
 
2.4.2 Design Science Research Cognitive Reasoning Processes   
There are four cognitive reasoning processes in DSR, namely abduction, deduction, reflection 
and abstraction. Below are brief descriptions of the processes, based on Vaishnavi and 
Kuechler (2004): 
1. Abduction is based on existing knowledge, and the output is a tentative solution 
design that is termed a suggestion. The suggested solution may be inadequate in 
solving the research problem. 
2. Deduction is the process where the suggested solution is implemented and evaluated 
against theory. The evaluation results will reveal and infer (deduce) the inadequacies 
of the suggested solution and the outcome will then feed into the suggestion for 
improvements on the design. There is an iteration of suggesting, developing and 
implementing until a more suitable solution is achieved. 
3. Reflection is a creative process where the researcher reflects on the research process 
and learns from it.  
4. Abstraction is used in the conclusion to make a contribution to the body of 
knowledge by developing theories or operational principles. 
2.4.3 Design Science Research Methodologies  
The conceptual framework design process is guided by the adopted definitions of a 
conceptual framework, and its components, as well as by the guidelines, methodologies and 
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processes of DSR presented earlier. Several DSR applicable methodologies, approaches, and 
strategies exist. In this section three of these are described in detail. Worth noting are those 
developed by Vaishnavi & Kuechler, 2004; Hevner et al., 2004; Hevner, 2007; Peffers, 
Tuunanen, Rothenberger, & Chatterjee, 2008 and Jabareen, 2009.  
Jabareen (2009) presented a conceptual framework development process based on DSR 
methods and process, placing more emphasis on the problem identification and design phases 
by breaking down the phase into multiple steps. The three-cycle process by Hevner (2007) 
consolidates the phases into three steps that are cyclical and interrelated, as presented in 
Section 2.4.5. With this model a lot of detail on how to conduct the process is not used; 
hence, it can be complex for IS practitioners to apply to their contexts. Peffers’s model offers 
multiple entry levels into the process. However, as the research is problem based, the entry 
level will be the first one, and all steps are followed sequentially. Different phases followed 
by different framework development processes as proposed by different authors, based on 
Vaishnavi and Kuechler’s DSRM process. 
Focus is first put on seven DSR guidelines by Hevner, Ram, March, & Park (2004). The 
guidelines provide best practice principles that form the basis of conducting research in a 
specific domain. Table 2-3 presents DSR guidelines for problem-based research that are 
derived from the knowledge and understanding of a problem. The research solution is 
acquired in the development and application of an artefact. 
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Table 2-3: Research: DSR guideline adopted from Hevner, et al. (2004) 
Guideline Description 
Guideline 1 : Design as an Artefact DSR creates innovative, purposeful artefacts (construct, a model, a method, or 
an instantiation) 
Guideline 2 : Problem Relevance Develop domain-specific technology-based solutions to address identified 
problems. 
Guideline 3 : Design Evaluation To demonstrate rigorously the utility, quality, and efficacy of a design artefact 
using well-executed evaluation methods. 
Guideline 4 : Research Contributions DSR must deliver clear and verifiable, novel and innovative contributions 
effectively in the areas of the design artefact, design foundations, and/or 
design methodologies.  
Guideline 5 : Research Rigor DSR relies upon the application of rigorous methods in both the building and 
evaluation of the artefact. The artefact must be rigorously defined, formally 
represented, coherent, and internally consistent. 
Guideline 6 : Design as a Search 
Process 
The search for an effective artefact requires using available resources to get 
desired results while satisfying laws in the problem environment. 
Guideline 7 : Communication of 
Research 
DSR must be published effectively both to technology-oriented as well as to 
management-oriented audiences. 
 
Having presented the guidelines, the next step is to present processes and methods as 
proposed by the different authors. 
2.4.4 Design Science Research Process models by Peffers et al., 2008 
The DSR process model by Vaishnavi and Kuechler (2004) is presented in Section 2.4. 
Peffers et al., (2008) presented a DSR process with seven stages, as depicted in Figure 2-2.  
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  Figure 2-2: DSR Process by Peffers et al. (2008) 
The process is a derivative of the design process model proposed by Vaishnavi and Kuechler 
in 2004. However, the model offers multiple entry points into the artefact design process 
depending on the type of problem being addressed, unlike the DSRM.  Four entry points are 
offered to cater for problem-centred initiatives, objective-centred solutions, design- and 
development-centred initiation and client/context initiated. This research follows option1 
problem-centred initiation; hence, the process would begin from the start and follow all the 
steps sequentially. Peffers et al. ,(2008) adds two extra phases and consolidates two into one 
to  Vaishnavi’s and Kuechler’s five, resulting in six steps in total. Firstly, a design step is 
included which is about defining the solution objectives based on the problem definition and 
relevant literature. The suggestion and development phases are consolidated into one step. To 
demonstrate the applicability of the artefact, a demonstration phase is included before the 
evaluation and this can be equated to prototyping in software development projects. The final 
stage is named communication instead of conclusion. 
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2.4.5 A Three Cycle View of Design Science Research by Hevner, (2007) 
 
Figure 2-3: Three cycle view of DSR (Hevner, 2007) 
According to Hevner (2007), DSR can be viewed as a three cycle process based on the IS 
research framework by Hevner et al., (2004) as shown in Figure 2-3. The Relevance Cycle 
connects the research project’s contextual environment to design science activities. Thus, the 
relevance cycle defines the requirements for the research as inputs and the acceptance criteria 
that are used to evaluate the artefact. The evaluation output is fed into the relevance cycle and 
the process iterates until a befitting artefact (functionally) has been designed. The Design 
Cycle at the centre of the rigor and relevance cycles is an iterative process between the main 
tasks of constructing and assessing the design artefacts and the processes of the research. The 
Design Cycle iterates between artefact building and its evaluation. Inputs from the Relevance 
Cycle inform the design and the artefact is evaluated against the knowledge base forming the 
Rigor Cycle. The Rigor Cycle associates research project design science activities with the 
knowledge base of scientific foundations, experience, and expertise underpinning the study. 
Research rigor is demonstrated by the researcher’s ability to select and apply appropriate 
theory and methods skilfully for building and evaluating the artefact. 
All the presented DSR methodologies or processes emphasize the importance of evaluation; 
hence, it is presented in detail in the next section. 
2.4.6 Artefacts Evaluation in Design Science Research  
DSR invents and develops technologies and always includes an evaluation step to confirm the 
applicability of the new artefact to its purpose. Hevner et al., (2004) presented five methods 
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that can be used to evaluate the artefact using the presented criteria. The methods are: 
observational (using case and field studies), analytical (using static, dynamic and 
architectural analysis, optimization), experimental (with simulation or controlled 
experiments), testing (functional or structural) and descriptive (informed argument or 
scenarios). The methods are presented in Table 2-4. 
Table 2-4: DSR evaluation methods (Hevner et al, 2004) 
1. Observational            Case Study:  Study framework in depth in context of case site 
Field Study:  Monitor use of framework in multiple projects 
2. Analytical                   Static Analysis:  Examine structure of the framework for static qualities such as complexity  
Architecture Analysis:  Study fit of framework into technical information system architecture 
Optimization:  Demonstrate integral optimal properties of framework or provide optimality 
bounds on its behaviour  
Dynamic Analysis:  Study framework in use for dynamic qualities such as performance 
3. Experimental             Controlled Experiment:  Study framework in a controlled environment for qualities such as 
usability 
Simulation - Execute framework with synthetic data 
4. Testing                       Functional (Black Box) Testing:  Execute framework interfaces to discover failures and identify 
defects  
Structural (White Box) Testing:  Perform coverage testing of some metric (e.g., 
understandability) in the framework implementation 
5. Descriptive                 Informed Argument: Use theoretical information to build a convincing proof on the 
framework’s utility  
Scenarios: Create comprehensive scenarios around the framework to show its utility 
 
Prat, Comyn-Wattiau, and Akoka (2014) presented a hierarchy of general artefact evaluation 
that focuses on five systems’ dimensions and associated criteria. The dimensions are goal 
(efficacy, validity and generality), environment (consistency with people, organisations and 
technology), structure (completeness, simplicity, clarity, style, homomorphism, level of detail 
and consistency), activity (completeness, consistency, accuracy, performance and efficiency) 
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and evolution (robustness, learning capability). In the next section, framework specific 
evaluation methods are presented as part of the artefact that is being developed in this study. 
2.4.6.1 Framework evaluation methods  
Framework should be evaluated for rigor using established evaluation methods (Hevner, 
Ram, March, & Park, 2004). Criteria include functionality, completeness, consistency, 
accuracy, performance, reliability, usability, accessibility, aesthetics, entertainment, fitting 
with organisation, etc. (Oates, 2012; Prat et al., 2014; Hevner et al., 2004).  
Table 2-5: Selected framework evaluation criteria per domain 
Dimension  Criteria  Demonstrate / Method 
Goal  Validity  Transferability and credibility 
Confirmability 
Efficacy  Achieves the research goal 
Generality  Dependability 
Environment   
Consistency with people’s 
characteristics, roles and capabilities 
Utility Informed argumentation and use case 
scenarios 
Understandability 
Ease of use Peer and expert reviews, case study 
Ethicality Ethics code of conduct 
Side effects Case study 
Consistency with organisation Utility  
Fit with organisation 
Side effects 
Strategies 
Structure and culture 
Processes  
Consistency with technology Harnessing of recent technologies Compare to standards 
Side effects 
Structure  Completeness 
Simplicity 
Clarity  
Style 
Homomorphism 
Level of detail  
Consistency  
When it satisfies the requirements and 
constraints of the problem (complete) 
Activity   Completeness  
Consistency  
Accuracy 
Performance 
Efficiency   
 
Evolution  Robustness  
Learning capability 
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The evaluation presented will focus on framework evaluation criteria presented in Table 2-5, 
based on (Hevner et al, 2004; Prat et al., 2014). 
Framework evaluation can be practical (using controlled experiments or simulations, 
dynamic and static analysis or white/back box testing) or theoretical (using observations or 
descriptions in a field/case study or scenario analysis, and informed argumentation) (Oates, 
2012; Hevner, et al., 2004). 
To carry out practical evaluation effectively a longitudinal study is ideal as it allows for the 
artefact to be implemented and evaluated over time for meeting the needs of the situation 
successfully. However, time was not available to do this, hence alternative approaches were 
considered.  Descriptive theoretical validation using literature argumentation, peer and expert 
reviews and the use of case scenario analysis were applied.  
2.4.7 Quality of the framework 
Rigour of the research can be established through the demonstration of the validity and 
reliability of the research. Care was taken throughout the design phase to ensure that the 
process demonstrates construct validity, internal validity, external validity, objectivity and 
reliability. Construct validity requires the researcher to use the correct measures for the 
concepts being studied. Internal validity demonstrates that certain conditions lead to other 
conditions and requires the use of multiple pieces of evidence from multiple sources to 
uncover convergent lines of inquiry. External validity reflects whether or not findings are 
generalizable beyond the immediate case; the more variations in places, people, and 
procedures that a case study can withstand and still yield the same findings; the more external 
validity exists. Techniques such as cross-case examination and within-case examination, 
along with literature review, help to ensure external validity. Objectivity is the degree of 
independence from a researcher’s bias. Reliability refers to the stability, accuracy, and 
precision of measurement. The procedures used are well documented and can be repeated 
with the same results over and over again. (Yin, 2009; Dooley, 2002; Oates, 2012) 
2.4.7.1 Validity 
Validity is viewed as being either external, where the focus is on whether the research is 
generalisable to the construct;or  internal, which confirms whether  there is a relationship 
between cause and effect and whether it is causal or not. 
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According to Sekaran and Bougie (2009), there are methods of ensuring the validity of 
qualitative research, such as: 
1. Supporting generalisations by counts of events 
2. Ensuring the representativeness of cases and the inclusion of deviant cases 
3. In- depth description of the research.  
4. Triangulation that ensures confidence in the result by employing different methods/ 
sources to get the same results.  Multiple perspectives should be used to conduct 
research. Types of triangulation are (Sekaran & Bougie, 2009, pp. 384-5, Yin, 2009, 
Oates, 2012, pp.37): 
a. Method: several methods for gathering and synthesising data. For data 
collection interviews, surveys using questionnaires and expert reviews were 
used. 
b. Strategy: In this study, case study, surveys and design and creation strategies 
were used to conduct the research. 
c. Data: data is gathered from multiple sources and /or at different times. 
d. Researcher/investigator: several researchers gather/synthesise data. 
e. Theory: employ several theories or perspectives to analyse and report the data.  
f. Environment: varies in environmental factors (time, location) and evaluates 
the impact of the variation. Oates separates these into space and time. 
All these methods were incorporated at different stages of the study. The validity of a 
questionnaire was assessed on content validity, criterion-related validity and construct 
validity. Content validity is the degree to which the questions in the questionnaire give 
sufficient reporting of the phenomena under study. Criterion-related validity, also known as 
predictive validity, assesses the ability of the questions to make precise estimations by 
comparing the data to specified criteria. Construct validity refers to the ability of the 
questions to measure truly the existence of those constructs they were meant to measure 
(Saunders et al., 2009).  
 
The research paradigm followed in this research is interpretivism; hence, reference is made to 
how much trust can be placed in the in research. Trustworthiness is the level of trust that can 
be placed in the research based on the use of valid methods and techniques derived from 
literature to measure framework components.  
 
28  
1. External validity is difficult to demonstrate as multiple realities exist and they 
depend on variable factors; therefore transferability will be demonstrated. 
Transferability is the extent to which the research is generalizable to different 
environments, participants, and time, and depends on the representativeness of the 
sample studied (Oates, 2012, p. 294). However, environmental aspects such as 
organisational culture and personal dispositions make it impossible to apply the same 
process in a different context. Instead, focus is on transferability of the findings to 
other similar contexts. 
2. Internal validity is demonstrated by evaluating the credibility of the research. 
Credibility is the degree to which findings are precise, compare to reality and measure 
it correctly; however, in interpretivist research there are several created realities; 
hence, there is no benchmark for testing the results (Oates, 2012, p. 294). Instead, the 
focus is on the credibility of the research process. Triangulation of methods, strategies 
and data are used to demonstrate this aspect. 
2.4.7.2 Reliability  
Reliability ensures that the research process can be followed by other researchers and 
produce the same results under similar conditions. It can be classified into inter-rater/observer 
which demonstrates equivalence or parallel forms; or test-retest; these two both test stability 
and internal consistency which tests homogeneity (Sekaran & Bougie, 2009). The research 
was done by one researcher; hence, inter-rater/observer reliability is not applicable. The time 
horizon of the study was cross sectional; no multiple data collection/measures were done, so 
this rules out test-retest reliability in the study. A single case study was used making it 
impossible to compare data from a similar content domain, so this rules out parallel forms 
reliability. In this study internal consistency is demonstrated. A single measurement 
instrument is distributed to a number of people at the same time to evaluate.  
Reliability is usually centred on the repeatability of the study; however, when a social 
problem is studied it is bound to vary at different times as the influencing conditions evolve. 
As such, data collected at different times cannot be similar (Oates, 2012, p. 294; Hevner et 
al., 2004). Moreover, as the researcher’s involvement impacts on the outcome, therefore 
different researchers will produce different results. The dependability is demonstrated 
instead, as it speaks to the research procedure and data recording which allows an audit to be 
carried out successfully on the research process (Oates, 2012, p. 294; Saunders et al., 2009). 
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To demonstrate dependability, the following tools and methods were used: 
1. The questionnaire was pre-tested with the comments of seven people, and feedback 
was used to improve the tool.  
2. The questionnaires were self-administered to eliminate the bias to please of the 
participants answering the question  
3. Research methods and strategies are clearly documented in Chapters 2, 5 and 6. 
2.4.7.3 Objectivity 
According to the Merrian Webster dictionary, objectivity “relates to, or being an object, 
phenomenon, or condition in the realm of sensible experience independent of individual 
thought and perceptible by all observers:  having reality independent of the mind.” (Webster, 
2015). 
Objectivity cannot be demonstrated in this case because the researcher has personal 
experiences that can influence the interpretation of the collected data. Moreover, the 
researcher is a member of the community being studied and interacts with participants often.  
As such, focus is placed on the demonstrated confirmability of the findings. Given the 
collected data, summaries and the analysis, another researcher can draw the same 
conclusions. Another researcher should not necessarily be able to replicate the study, but 
should be able to assess in detail what was done, why it was done, and how conclusions were 
deduced (Meyers & Sylvester, 2006). 
To demonstrate confirmability, the following tools and methods were used: 
1. Clearly outlined methods and processes used for data collection and analysis 
2. Use of literature to confirm findings 
2.4.8 Design Science Research Strategy Application to this Thesis 
The DSR process model used for framework development, in particular to this study, is the 
DSRM process model of Peffers et al., (2008). The process model involves six phases 
presented in Section 2.4.4.  This research follows the nominal sequentially ordered process 
structure from activity one to six, as shown in Figure 2-4. 
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Figure 2-4: DSRM process for the EUPSFUX framework 
Each of the activities is summarised in Table 2-6 and the chapters that focus on each activity 
are shown in column 3. The table presents a general description of each phase. Phase 1 used 
literature and user studies in a case site to define the problem in line with problem-based 
research. Phase 2 is derived from literature studies, and findings from user studies in Phase 1. 
In Phase 3, the theoretical framework is derived from Chapters 1, 3 and 4 and evaluated 
against case study findings in Chapter 5.  The artefact is then developed in Chapter 6. 
Constructs for the conceptual framework are identified and verified. Phase 4 demonstrates the 
suitability of the framework through the use of user studies in the case site, the use of case 
scenarios and validation through literature. In Phase 5, the framework is evaluated through 
theoretical studies, as well as through expert and peer reviews. After incorporating feedback 
from the evaluation process iteratively to Phases 2 and 3, the final framework is developed 
and communicated for public commenting in Phase 6. 
 
31 
Table 2-6: Framework development process 
Activity Description Associated 
chapter 
Phase 1: Problem identification 
and motivation 
A definite problem as well as the application domain is identified 
and the value of the proposed solution is motivated.  
Chapter 1 
Phase 2: Define the objectives 
of a solution 
Objectives of the solution are inferred from the problem definition, 
user studies and literature. Objectives can be quantitative or 
qualitative, where a new artefact is created to support solutions to 
the identified problem. 
Chapter 1 
Phase 3: Design and 
development 
Identify and design the desired artefact, which is usually one of the 
DSR outputs presented in Section 2.4.1. The desired functionality, 
architecture and creation of the actual artefact are typical activities 
in this stage. Theoretical knowledge will be required as one of the 
resources plus contectual data collected from end users in the case 
site. 
Chapters 1,2, 3,4,5 
and 6  
Phase 4 : Demonstration The process of establishing that the artefact can solve the identified 
problem effectively. The demonstration can be an experiment, 
simulation, a case study or proof of concept. This stage requires 
knowledge of how to use the artefact to solve the problem.  
Chapter 3.4,5 and 
6 
Phase 5: Evaluation Measures the degree to which the artefact supports the proposed 
solutions to the identified problem. Successful evaluation requires 
knowledge of relevant evaluation metrics and analysis techniques. 
It involves a comparison of the solution objectives to results, 
artefact demonstration and sometimes to the artefact’s 
functionality, quantitative performance measures, or simulations. 
The results of this stage can inform the researchers whether it is 
necessary to iterate back to step 3 to improve the effectiveness of 
the artefact or to finalise the process in the communication phase.  
Chapter 6 
Phase 6: Communication Sharing information with different audiences about the problem, its 
significance and the artefact’s utility, novelty and design rigour.  
Chapter 7 
 
The next section will present each phase contextually in detail. 
Phase 1: Problem Identification and motivation 
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Design science research stage 1, in line with problem based research cycle stage 1 and 2, was 
used to define the problem that will be addressed by the framework. The problem is: 
There is a lack of User Experience evaluation criteria to assess the user experience while 
interacting with embedded security features in end user programs. 
Figure 2-5 is a pictorial representation of the problem identification process, which is 
presented based on the pilot study and literature review. 
 
Figure 2-5: Problem identification 
End user experience of EUPSF interaction influences the usage of the features as well as the 
security posture of the organisation. There is a need to identify suitable security and UX 
evaluation criteria applicable to EUPSF in organisations and implementation guidelines that 
can enable the implementation and evaluation of their application. A EUPSFUX evaluation 
framework is thus necessary as it can present the evaluation criteria and the implementation 
guidelines, as well as the evaluation criteria. 
Phase 2: Define the objectives of a solution 
To address the identified problem, the following research objectives needed to be achieved by 
answering specific research questions using DSR in a case study setup. Table 2-7 matched 
the research objectives of the solution and the corresponding research question that will 
address the objective. 
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Table 2-7: Research objective and corresponding questions 
Research objective Research question 
Main: To design a framework that can be used to 
evaluate the user experience of interacting with end 
user program security features from a user’s perspective 
How can a framework be designed to evaluate the 
user experience (UX) of interacting with end user 
program security features from a user’s perspective? 
To measure the state of UX with end user program 
embedded security features.  
What are the factors affecting UX with embedded 
security features in end user programs? 
To determine the components and requirements of end 
user programs’ security features’ UX and use them to 
develop the EUPSFUX framework. 
 
To determine the suitable security criteria/ methods that 
can be used to evaluate UX of end user program 
security features.  
 
To determine UX metrics/evaluation criteria can be 
used to determine the UX of end user program security 
features. 
What are the components of a framework to evaluate 
UX of end user program security features? 
 
 
What are the suitable usable security evaluation 
criteria/ methods that can be used to evaluate the 
usability of end user program security features?  
 
Which UX metrics/ evaluation criteria can be used to 
determine the UX of end user program security 
features? 
 
Phase 3: Design and Development 
Different key fields and domains established from a preliminary literature review are brought 
together to define the theoretical framework presented in Figure 2-6. Key domains are human 
factors, user experience, usable security, user behaviour and information security. To validate 
the importance of the components of the theoretical framework to the framework, an 
empirical study conducted is presented in Chapter 5. Based on findings of the case study in 
Chapter 5, constructs are verified and their components are identified. The components are 
then related to other components and relationships are modelled. Since the study is focusing 
on end users, this makes them a key stakeholder, as the framework will be evaluated for 
addressing their identified problem adequately. Other stakeholders involved are technical 
experts in the identified fields such as HCI, USec, UX and InfoSec, as well as IT technical 
support team. This section will be covered in detail in Chapter 6 that addresses the following 
sub-questions: 
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What are the factors affecting UX with embedded security features in end user 
programs?  
What are the components of a framework to evaluate UX of end user program 
security features? 
The identified components and relationships are put together to present a conceptual model. 
An implementation guideline is developed. This section will be covered in detail in Chapter 
6, which addresses the main research question: 
How can UX factors necessary for end user program security features’ UX 
evaluation be constituted into a framework? 
Phase 4: Demonstration 
This phase will establish whether or not the EUPSFUX framework can solve the lack of 
evaluation criteria for UX with EUPSF effectively. The demonstration can be an experiment, 
a simulation, a case study or proof of concept and requires knowledge of how to use the 
artefact to solve the problem.  
The application of the framework is thus demonstrated in Chapter 6 using theoretical 
validation, task scenario analysis and literature. According to Hevner et al. (2004), artefacts 
created in design science research are not often implemented in practice, but they describe 
innovatively the concepts, practices, practical competences and products which ensure 
effective and efficient IS use, design, analysis and implementation.  In light of this, task 
scenarios will be modelled and evaluated to demonstrate the applicability of the framework. 
During the development, as well as the evaluation of the framework, stakeholders were 
selected purposefully to evaluate the different stages. This section will be covered in detail in 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5, which address the following sub-questions: 
What are the suitable usable security criteria/ methods that can be used to evaluate 
UX of end user program security features?  
Which UX metrics/evaluation criteria can be used to determine the UX of end user 
program security features? 
In Chapter 6 the identified criteria are applied to the framework to evaluate the components. 
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Phase 5: Framework evaluation 
The purpose of this stage is to demonstrate the applicability of the developed framework to 
the problem domain. Utility, quality and efficacy of the framework is rigorously established 
using well-implemented evaluation methods (Hevner et al., 2004). The framework is assessed 
using implicit criteria that were explicitly presented in the literature review (output of the 
awareness of problem phase). Nonconformities to qualitative anticipations are documented 
and will be described tentatively. The analysis will explain the framework behaviour and will 
establish whether or not there is a need for iteration. This section is covered in detail in 
Chapter 6, which addresses the main research question: 
How can UX factors necessary for end user program security features’ UX 
evaluation be constituted into a framework? 
Phase 6: Communication (Finalising the framework)  
The process, framework and evaluation results will be shared with other researchers and the 
organisation where the case study took place. This will be detailed in Chapter 7, which is the 
framework finalisation. Reflection on the study process is provided. Findings from the study 
are published in peer reviewed conferences and journals. 
2.4.9 Cycles of the Design Science Research Process  
According to Hevner (2007), there are there cycles to follow: relevance, design and rigor. 
The relevance cycle comprises problem awareness, which is Phase 1 and 2 of the DSR 
methodology process, by Peffers et al. (2008). The environment is the Polytechnic of 
Namibia, and the application domain is characterised by end users, end user programs, end 
user program security features, organisational systems and UX problems. The second cycle, 
design, comprises framework design, suggestion, framework application and evaluation; 
Phases 3 to 5 of the DSR methodology process. The third and last cycle is rigor and it 
corresponds to Phase 6, communication, of the DSR methodology process. Figure 2-6 shows 
the iterations between the cycles. 
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Figure 2-6: DSR cycles applied to thesis 
2.4.10 Research Cycles to develop the framework 
In this section the research cycles are presented and are linked to research objectives. 
1. To measure the state of UX with end user programs’ embedded security features. 
2. To determine the suitable security criteria/ methods that can be used to evaluate UX 
of end user program security features.  
3. To determine UX metrics/evaluation criteria can be used to determine the UX of end 
user program security features. 
4. To determine the components and requirements of end user programs’ security 
features’ UX and use them to develop the EUPSFUX framework 
Research cycle 1 is the relevance cycle and it enables the achievement of research objectives 
1, 2, 3 and 4. A case study was used to identify and understand the problem based on 
literature review. 
Research cycle 2 is the design cycle and it enables the achievement of research objective 4 
and fulfils the main research objective. This process is iterative; the tentative framework is 
designed, tested and evaluated. The input is then used to refine the framework design. The 
cycle is repeated until the desired product has been achieved. 
Research cycle 3 is the rigor cycle. In this cycle the framework is evaluated for applicability 
and for meeting the main objective successfully. This is iterated as many times as the 
framework is redesigned and the output of each iteration process is recorded. 
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2.5 DATA COLLECTION METHODS  
Data collection methods applied in this research are presented in this section, in line with the 
research strategy and paradigm being implemented. The research uses qualitative, interpretive 
tools that support induction. 
 
Figure 2-7: Data collection process 
Figure 2-7 shows, in summary, how the data collection process evolved. Data collection for 
qualitative research can use individual interviews, focus groups, observations, 
questionnaires, documents and action research (Creswell, 2007; Saunders et al., 2009; 
Sekaran & Bougie, 2009; Oates, 2012). 
Interviews can be unstructured (the interviewer discusses a limited number of topics; they 
may base interview questions on the interviewee’s response); semi-structured or focused 
interviews (characterised by a number of open-ended questions based on the topic areas that 
the researcher wants to cover and allows opportunities for both interviewer and interviewee 
to discuss some topics in depth. It gives the researcher the freedom to guide the interviewee 
to elaborate on or to follow a new line of inquiry); structured, where the interviewer asks the 
respondent the same questions in the same way (Creswell, 2007; Saunders et al., 2009; 
Sekaran & Bougie, 2009). 
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Focus groups are used to collect information from a group rather than from individuals or 
when the phenomena under study needs a combined discussion in order to understand the 
circumstances, behaviour or opinions, as it allows for greater insights to be generated from 
the group. 
Observation takes place in natural settings with the researcher taking lengthy and descriptive 
notes of what is happening. Action research is when the researcher participates actively in the 
process, collaborating and making practical changes.  
The literature survey: literature is classified as primary, secondary and tertiary.  
2.5.1 Case studies 
A case study is used to understand phenomena in detail and involves collecting a great deal of 
information about a specific subject in context using multiple sources of evidence, especially 
when the boundaries between phenomena and context are not clear (Yin, 2009; Saunders, 
Lewis, & Thornhill, 2009). The use of case studies is most favourable in situations where the 
researcher needs to answer the how and why questions without controlling behavioural 
events, while focusing on contemporary events (Yin, 2009). The phenomena are investigated 
in their real life context using multiple sources of evidence such as direct observation of 
events, interviews of individuals participating in the events, documents and artefacts (Yin, 
2009). 
Case study research is the frequently-used qualitative research method in information systems 
research, and is appropriate for understanding the interactions between information 
technology-related innovations and organizational contexts. It is suited for the study of 
information system implementation, development and use within organisations (Myers & 
Avison, 2002). 
Four types of case study strategies can be chosen using two separate dimensions: 
1. Single case vs. multiple case, and 
2. Holistic case vs. embedded case (Yin, 2009).  
A single case study focuses on a unique, extreme or critical case. On the contrary, a multiple 
case study strategy investigates phenomena in more than one case. A multiple case study 
strategy is usually preferable as it allows for the generalisation of findings (Yin, 2009).  
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The second dimension talks about the unit of analysis. A holistic case is used when the 
research focuses on one unit as a whole (e.g. an organisation as a whole). In the embedded 
case, the researcher explores sub-units within one unit (e.g. centres and departments of one 
organisation). 
Dooley (2002) says that case studies can be methodology or strategy. As methodology, they 
are used to expand and generalise theories analytically rather than to generalise theories 
statistically (building and testing). As strategy, they hold together multiple methods for the 
purpose of fulfilling all the phases of research outlined below. However, as methodology they 
are usually not recommended for studies owing to the following reasons: 
1. There is a lack of scientific rigour. 
2. They provide little basis for scientific generalisations - multiple cases can be used for 
generalisations. 
3. They are time-consuming and laborious. 
4. They are non-experimental; hence, they cannot be used to generate causal 
relationships (however; they can complement experiments). 
Case study researchers such as Yin, (2009) have suggested techniques for organizing and 
conducting the research successfully, proposing six steps that should be used in order to 
attain methodological rigour, validity and reliability, namely: 
1. Determining and defining the research questions; 
2. Selecting the cases and determining data gathering and analysis techniques; 
3. Preparing to collect the data; 
4. Collecting data in the field; 
5. Evaluating and analysing the data; 
6. Preparing the report. 
On discussing the generalizability from the perspective of interpretive case study research, 
Walshman (1995) identifies four possible types of generalization: development of concepts, 
generation of theory, drawing of specific implications, and contribution of rich insight. These 
allow explanations of particular phenomena derived from empirical interpretive research 
which may be valuable in other settings and organizations as interpretations of phenomena 
but which are not wholly predictive for future situations (Walshman, 1995, p. 79). 
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Research Question 1 is focused on an awareness of the real world problem; case studies 
with survey strategies were used. Critical literature review was conducted in the different 
disciplines of the study area, namely InfoSec, HCI security and UX. Once a problem was 
identified, it became necessary to explore the extent of the problem. Semi-structured 
interviews gathered preliminary data on the case site. Based on the findings of the pilot semi-
structured interviews, a self-administered Internet-mediated questionnaire was developed and 
deployed using eSurvey pro tool. Questionnaires are good for descriptive or exploratory 
empirical studies as they allow the researcher to gather large amounts of information that 
would have been very difficult to achieve with interviews. An exploratory case study was 
used to evaluate the authenticity of the problem as it allows researchers to gather realistic 
data of the phenomenon being investigated (Creswell, 2007; Yin, 2009), and this is in line 
with Stage 1 and 2 of the design science method. According to Bhattacherjee, (2012), case 
research is a detailed inquiry of an issue in a case site over a period of time. This method is 
implemented in social and behavioural scientific research, to gain a detailed contextualised 
analysis of a social phenomenon within a site (Crinson & Leontowitsch, 2011). Data 
collection is done using interviews, surveys, literature reviews and heuristic evaluations. This 
data triangulation ensures that the data is validated. Analysed data was used for artefact 
building; in this case it is a framework.  
In order to understand the end users’ perception/attitudes of security, their behaviour and 
experiences, the survey gathered information on the user’s knowledge of security threats to 
which they are exposed ; their awareness of security policies; their usage of security 
technologies; their feelings about, experiences with and behaviour towards embedded 
security features in their application programs.  
Both open and closed questions were used as the open questions allow for capturing the 
feelings or attitudes underlying behaviour, while closed questions allowed respondents to 
choose an option closely describing them. Closed questions are usually: lists, categories, 
ranking, rating, quantity and matrix, depending on the type of information required. The 
questionnaire was pretested prior to full deployment in order to allow for redesign and 
convergence testing using the initial data. A cover letter explaining the purpose of the survey 
was broadcast to the population, together with a link to the online survey. 
The survey deployment can be: 
1. Paper based, which is costly and time-consuming for the users to fill in, or  
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2. Direct emailing that violates the anonymity of the respondents and presents difficulty 
in capturing and organising the data, or 
3. An anonymous online survey using tools such as Survey monkey, eSurvey Pro.  
The choice was an anonymous online survey. The advantages associated with this are:  
1. It is fast to deploy;  
2. Easy to analyse, and  
3. Maintains the anonymity of the participants. 
Research questions 2, 3 and 4 involve a critical analysis of usable security and user 
experience components through literature surveys. USec and UX evaluation criteria for end 
user program security features were developed by evaluating respective metrics. The outcome 
was used to come up with a suggestion of a model for evaluating secure UX, which is an 
output of Stage 3 of design research DSR process. 
The Main research question deals with the development of the artefact/framework for 
secure UX based on the theoretical framework of question 1 and a secure UX evaluation 
model from question 2. 
2.5.2 Data Analysis 
Qualitative analysis of qualitative data was used (interpretive text study) to describe the 
meaning of the data systematically (Schreier, 2012). This involves data prepation, data 
reduction, data categorisation; identify patterns and themes, data display and the 
drawing and verifying of conclusions. These steps are presented in more detail in chapter 5. 
The process followed 6 stages, where stage 1 was preparing the data for analysis. The data 
was prepared for analysis by coding the dataset and capturing the responses. Each question 
was uniquely numbered and each response uniquely coded. Secondly the data was checked 
for errors, correctness and completeness (Data cleaning/ reduction). Thirdly the data was 
categorised and missing values were cleaned up.  Numerically coded responses were 
graphically interpreted and qualitative meanings were inferred from literature. Fourthly 
qualitative responses were coded per question and patterns/themes were deduced. Out of the 
patterns, themes were generated describing what the participants said. In stage 5  
relationships and categories were formed using patterns originating from descriptions, the 
data was then displayed. Finally in stage 6 themes (insights, concepts and conceptual 
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relationships) were explained using literature allowing for conclusion to be drawn and 
verified. 
Data reduction is the procedure of choosing, coding and categorising the data, this was 
applied to all open ended questions. Data display is the way that the data is presented after the 
reduction process using charts, matrices, graphs, drawings and frequently used words 
(Sekaran & Bougie, 2009; Saunders et al., 2009). Initially, the study area was unambiguously 
described in the context of the case, the objectives and the actions to be taken (Dey, 2005). 
The context, in this case, is shaped by organisational security culture and support 
mechanisms in place. Thus, policing and adherence to policies plus security awareness was 
looked at. The process involves gathering data and analysing it. The gathered data is 
classified according to exhibited patterns or characteristics for effective analysis (Open 
coding) (Saunders et al., 2009). The classification was based on research aims/ objectives 
presented in research questions. Categories were derived from the collected data using 
frequently used phrases and terms. After classification connections were established among 
different categories (axial coding). The categories formed the concepts/variables for 
conceptual framework formulation and the relationships formulated the connections. 
Inductive propositions that emerged were tested on the data to identify other possible 
relationships. 
The analysis of free-flowing text includes: (1) word based analysis such as key-words-in-
context (KWIC), word counts, semantic network analysis; and (2) code-based techniques 
such as grounded theory, schema analysis, analytic induction, classic content analysis, 
content dictionaries, and ethnographic decision-making (Ryan & Bernard, 2000). Analysis 
depends on whether an inductive or deductive research approach was used. Inductive 
analytical procedures include data display and analysis; template analysis, analytic induction; 
grounded theory; discourse analysis and narrative analysis (Sekaran & Bougie, 2009). In this 
research analytic induction was adopted as it allows intensive analysis to establish the 
underlying cause of a phenomenon. Data was analysed for patterns (themes), and meanings 
were inferred logically using literature to eliminate bias from the researcher to affect the 
findings. Description, contextualisation, classification processing and linking were adopted. 
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2.6 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS  
2.6.1 Ethical consent 
The objectives of the study were presented to the respondents, who made an informed choice 
to participate voluntarily in the survey. 
2.6.2 Anonymity and confidentiality 
The users were kept anonymous and everything was done online. The only links that may 
exist were public IP addresses of the organisation under study. These will not trace the source 
because Network Address Translation (NAT) is implemented for Internet access. Findings 
were treated in a confidential manner ensuring that, upon reporting or publishing, no link can 
be made to the population studied. No personal information was gathered; therefore the 
privacy of participants was not violated. 
2.7 SUMMARY   
Chapter 2 described the methodology used to design this research. A discussion of the 
research paradigm applied in this research and the rationale for the researcher’s choices is 
also included. The population and participants, the data collection tools, data collection plan, 
and data analysis plans was incorporated. The researcher discussed framework evaluation and 
ethical considerations in reference to the current research study.  
The next two chapters will present background literature on HCI and Information security. 
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CHAPTER 3: HUMAN COMPUTER INTERACTION - USER 
EXPERIENCE 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter focuses on the area of Human and Computer Interaction (HCI), a field that deals 
with User Experience, Usability, Interaction design (known as user centred design UCD) and 
User Behaviour (UB) disciplines.  These disciplines will be used to develop UX with USec 
evaluation criteria. Models, frameworks and methodologies directly related to the study will 
be presented. Firstly, the chapter will outline what HCI is, then interaction, usability, UX and 
finally, user behaviour.  At the end of the chapter, the following research question is 
answered: 
 
 
The content will be presented following the structure presented in the chapter map. 
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Usability 
User Experience 
UX Criteria for EUPSF 
Summary 
Which UX metrics/evaluation criteria can be used to determine the UX of 
end user program security features? 
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3.2 HUMAN COMPUTER INTERACTION 
Human-computer interaction is concerned with the design, evaluation and implementation of 
interactive computing systems for human use and with the study of major phenomena 
surrounding them (Hewett, et al., 1992, p. 5). The human, in this case, will be the end user 
(EU) of an application program; the computer is any device that has an end user application 
program (EUP) installed on it; and interaction is the engagement of the EU with the EUP via 
an interface. HCI encompasses multiple disciplines such as: Computer Science (CS), 
Cognitive Psychology (CP), Sociology and Anthropology (SA) and Industry Design (ID). 
The roots of HCI are traced to the fields of Computer Graphics (Art), Operating Systems, 
Human Factors, Ergonomics, Industrial Engineering, Cognitive Psychology, Linguistics, 
Philosophy, Artificial Intelligence and the systems part of CS ( Hewett, et al., 1992, p.8; 
Carroll, 2014). The adopted definition helps us to define our study domain that covers 
Computer Science, Cognitive Psychology, UX and Industry Design. Figure 3-1 shows how 
the chosen domains interconnect into HCI. 
 
Figure 3-1: Disciplines of the HCI field modification of (Klemmer, 2012) 
There are five key aspects to HCI: Nature of HCI (N), Use and context of computers (U), 
Human Characteristics (H), Computer Systems and Interfaces architecture (C), and 
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Development process (D).All are applied to Project Presentation and examinations (P) 
(Hewett, et al., 1992) (Hewett, et al., SIGCHI, 1992).  
The nature of HCI focuses on models and frameworks of HCI applicable to UX.  The use and 
context of a computer focuses on human work and application areas. The user has a context 
or job where the computer and hence the application programs are used. The context 
determines the interaction type and, as such, can influence how the user behaves. As such, it 
speaks to the user experience, user behaviour and interaction disciplines of HCI. Human 
characteristics focuses on dialogue/communication success that depends on the end user’s 
ability to understand the language used during interaction with technology. It covers the user 
experience, user behaviour and interaction disciplines of HCI Computer systems; and 
interfaces architecture focuses on dialogue techniques presented to the user and their 
influence on UX with technology (security features) interaction. This affects the interaction 
and user experience disciples on HCI. 
The development process focuses on design and evaluation techniques. Interaction design 
determines the usability of a product (security feature) and, therefore, the UX of such use. 
Appropriate and relevant evaluation tools can be used to ensure that interaction design 
achieves successful usability; hence, according the user a good UX 
In summary, UX is a focus of all five aspects. The nature of HCI (N) which focuses only on 
UX and interaction are common elements for the key aspects use and context of computers 
(U), human characteristics (H), context (C) and development process (D). Furthermore, U 
and H also have UB in common, while D focuses on usability.  
From the summary there are two distinct focus areas: 
1. Human characteristics, use and context of computers 
2. Development process 
This research will focus on the first focus area: human characteristics, use and context of 
computers. It is clear that, in order to address UB, there is need to be aware of user 
experience of interaction with a particular technology in use and context. Similarly, to 
address usability issues in technology development, awareness of user experience with 
technology is important. Technology communicates with users in a way that appeals or 
frustrates users depending on their human characteristics, which in turn results in an 
experience. 
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Focus question:  
What are the user experiences with technology (security features) in the case site? 
The following sections will present the four aspects of HCI, starting with interaction, then 
usability, and finally, user experience. User behaviour is a broad subject that needs to be 
focused on holistically; hence, it will not be discussed. 
3.3 INTERACTION  
3.3.1 Interaction Design 
This is a field surrounded by a cascade of other disciplines such as HCI, UX, industrial 
design, human factors, architecture, visual and sound design. Lowgren (2014) defines 
Interaction Design (ID) as a designer action on digital things to characterise them for people’s 
use. The design is characterised by: altering circumstances by shaping and implementing 
artefacts; exploring probable prospects; outlining the “problem” simultaneously with making 
potential “solutions; discerning by drafting and other tangible illustrations; speaking to 
instrumental, technical, aesthetical and ethical aspects all the way. ID varies from traditional 
designers (product centred) of ICT products who focused on what the product should require, 
and only delivered on the desired functionality without consideration of human emotions 
(Lowgren, 2014).  Forlizzi and Ford (2000), proposed an early framework for interaction 
design that can be used to understand the UX which products evoke in end users. The 
framework has four components describing dimensions of experience, namely: sub-
consciousness (no effort to think), cognition (effort to think), narrative (formal or 
procedural), and storytelling. It is important for designers to have an understanding of the 
experiences they are designing for and the factors affecting them in order for them to create 
the right product experience. The framework of Forlizzi and Ford (2000), conforms to the 
definition of ID in that it focuses on the user perspective of technology; however, it does not 
prescribe how designers can use this knowledge to come up with a UX centred product.  
Later Forlizzi and Battarbee (2004) developed a framework for UX, related to the design of 
interactive systems. The framework informs the designing experience for interactive systems 
as it focuses on user product interaction and the resultant user experience. As research in the 
field progresses, Saffer (2010) offers a design strategy consisting of four user product 
interaction design stages: framing the problem; determining differentiators; visualization and 
visioning and project planning. Each aims to ensure that products are designed for user 
interaction. The ISO standard provides guidelines for coming up with interactive software 
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products. ISO Draft International Standard (D(S) 1307 (1997) is used for designing user 
centred interactive systems. According to Saffer (2010), there are four approaches to ID, 
namely systems design, activity centred design, genius design and user centred design. 
Clearly ID is about the user, creating the right user experience and considering user aspects 
throughout the interaction design process. To capture the nature of ID Saffer (2010) defines 
three key views to successful ID, namely technology-centred, behaviourist and social 
interaction design views. These views allow for context to be considered when designing 
solutions for given circumstances.  Shneiderman and Plaisant (2005, pp. 74-5) provide eight 
golden rules (principles) of Interface Design to guide  good interaction design especially for 
mobile, desktop, or web designers. The rules are: strive for consistency; enable frequent 
users to use shortcuts; offer informative feedback; design dialog to yield closure; offer 
simple error handling; permit easy reversal of actions; support internal locus of control; 
and reduce short-term memory load. So much has been said about designing for 
interaction; however, most programs used on computers are mass-produced. This means that 
they take limited cognisance of the context in which the interaction will take place. The next 
section will focus on designing product for usability and user experience through user 
involvement: user centred design (UCD). 
3.3.2 User-Centred Design/Human Centred Design 
UCD focuses on users and their tasks at the concept of the product design process through 
user involvement in the design process. Primarily, it should assist designers and developers to 
comprehend the needs of the people who will use the resultant products (Forlizzi & 
Battarbee, 2004). UCD aims to design highly usable products. According to ISO 13407 
(1999), “Human-centred design is an approach to interactive system development that 
focuses specifically on making systems usable." This is possible through the application of 
human factors/ergonomics and usability knowledge and techniques to the user-centric design. 
ISO 13407 is a best practice standard on user-centred design, making available guidance on 
design activities throughout the life cycle of the interactive products. The standard aims to 
ensure that the needs of all stakeholders are considered during the development and use of 
interactive systems. Other standards are also developed to address interaction, such as 
ISO/IEC10741-1, ISO 9241- 10,12,13,14,15,16,17 and ISO/IEC 11581. 
The ISO standard on Human-centred design for interactive systems ISO 9241-210 (2010) 
presents six user centred design principles: 
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1. Clear user tasks and environments understanding should be the basis. 
2. User’s involvement throughout design and development. 
3. User-centred evaluation drives and refines the product design. 
4. Iterative process. 
5. The whole user experience is addressed by the design. 
6. Design team is composed of multidisciplinary skills and perspectives. 
Focus is placed on principles and four activities of UCD, namely plan (identify need and 
specify context), analyse (specify requirements), design solutions and test (evaluate design 
and refine), shown in Figure 3-2. 
 
Figure 3-2: UCD activities (www.usability.gov) 
There are a number of tools that are used in the evaluation of user-centred design, mainly: 
personas, scenarios, and essential use cases. Scenarios and use cases will be applied in 
Chapter 6 to evaluate the research product that is developed from a user perspective 
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(requirements specification and testing) in line with Phase 4 of the framework development 
process. 
Studies conducted by Cranor and Garfinkel (2005), show that it is possible to realign security 
and usability with careful attention to UCD principles, and to make security usable. However, 
it important to note that UCD may result in products that are too specific for more general 
use; hence, they will not be easily transferable to other environments (Abras, Maloney-
Krichmar, & Preece, 2005). In the light of these, how can designers ensure human Computer 
Interaction Security (HCISec)? The next section presents HCISec. 
3.3.3 Human computer interaction security (HCISec) 
HCISec aims to improve the usability of security features in end user programs. HCISec 
focuses on the design, evaluation and implementation of interactive secure systems. 
“HCISec is the study of interaction between humans and computers, or human–computer 
interaction, specifically as it pertains to information security. Its aim is to improve the 
usability of security features in end user applications” (HCISecAdmin, 2009). According to 
Johnston, Eloff, & Labuschagne (2003), human computer interaction security (HCI-S) 
ensures that the security features of a graphical user interface can be more intuitive and user 
friendly to reduce the chances of users making mistakes or bypassing the security feature. 
These definitions will guide the literature review of HCISec. 
Literature has shown that it is a necessity to improve the usability of security features as a 
way of ensuring that end users can interact with them as intended by designers (Flechais, 
Mascolo, & Sasse, 2007; Furnell et al., 2005; Whitten & Tygar, 2005).  To address some of 
the concerns, Garfinkel (2005) developed six principles for aligning security and usability 
(i.e. least surprise, good security now, standardised security policies, consistent 
meaningful vocabulary, consistent controls and placement, no external burden). 
Concerns about secure interaction and the usability of security features shift the focus to user- 
centred design principles as a way of ensuring usability.  
Designers focus on both the technical and non-technical aspects that appeal to the user’s 
pragmatic and hedonic expectations while they interact with EUP. User-centred design of 
secure interaction ensures that the usability principles are incorporated. Yee (2002) 
established ten principles for designing security from a user-centred point of view, focusing 
on user interaction design in secure systems. The principles are: path of least resistance, 
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appropriate boundaries, explicit authority, visibility, revocability, expected ability, 
trusted path, identifiability, expressiveness and clarity. Products meeting these criteria are 
considered to be adhering to user-centred design. End user program designs follow these 
design principles and focus on giving the user a memorable experience. For instance, since 
Office XP, Microsoft has incorporated security controls in their applications to reduce attacks 
and to improve user experience with the program (Microsoft, 2013).  In order for security to 
be realised, the security controls must be usable. The next section will focus on the usability 
field of HCI. 
3.4 USABILITY 
Both UCD and HCISec aim at improving the usability of products. in particular security 
features.  Human error is identified as major cause of security breaches, especially because 
the system designs are not usable (Furnell et al., 2005; Whitten & Tygar, 2005). Unusable 
security systems encourage users to make mistakes which compromise security (Flechais et 
al., 2007). Usability is the degree to which a product can be used by specified users to 
achieve specified goals with effectiveness, efficiency, and satisfaction in a specified 
environment of use (ISO 9241-11, 1998).  Usable products are characterised by task 
efficiency and effectiveness plus user satisfaction. The focus is on what the users want to do 
with the product/feature (goals) and whether they can do it with little effort and without 
committing a lot of time. The expertise of the user plays an important role in determining the 
overall product usability.  
Usability is also defined as “the extent to which an end user is able to carry out required 
tasks successfully, and without difficulty, using the computer application system” (Ravden 
and Johnson, 1989). Since security is designed as a stand-alone tool or embedded within 
other programs, it is important that it is easy to use and does what the user expects. UCD 
principles aim at ensuring that the product is usable, when applied to information security, 
UCD can ensure the design of usable security. According to Ross (2008), “Usability is one of 
the most important yet hardest design problems in many secure systems. It was long 
neglected as having less tech glamour than operating systems or cryptographic algorithms yet 
most real attacks target the user”.  Poor usability is defined by Whitman and Mattord (2011); 
Furnell (2005) as the choice taken by end users when confronted to choose the official way of 
doing a job and the easier unofficial way; they will always prefer the easier one. They 
propose providing the right way, which is secure only as a solution. Integration of security, 
usability, training and awareness plus solid controls contribute to system security, while 
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allowing users to default to easier perceivably usable options will result in compromised 
security.  
This far, literature has shown that it is a necessity to improve security features as a way of 
ensuring that end users can interact with them as intended by designers (Flechais et al., 2007; 
Furnell et al., 2005; Whitten & Tygar, 2005). In his research, Furnell (2005) found out that 
simple is not necessarily secure.  Can security and usability be harmonised? 
Users need to be impressed or attracted to the features in order for them to make use of the 
features. Over the years research has focused on improving security design in application 
design; however, the security features prove not to be usable to the end user. A lot of research 
is being conducted in the area of usability engineering, a discipline that ensures that a 
developed software product is usable. Usable is a measure of how an end user can use the 
program to do their work effectively and efficiently; however, security is not the primary goal 
of end user programs.  
Based on the different approaches that the various authors use to tackle the issue of usability 
it can be observed that the human component of security is complex and therefore requires 
special attention to handle it. Usability can be viewed from the designer’s (product 
objectives) and the user’s (user needs) point of view. 
A user has needs when a program is used, and therefore expects a perceived output; however, 
when the product is designed, there is an objective to fulfil. Usability can be viewed from the 
user product perspective; user, product and context perspective; or user, product, context and 
designer perspective (Hassenzahl, 2004). The objective in most cases does not coincide with 
the user’s needs. 
From the designer’s point of view, a product is usable if users follow the guidelines as 
stipulated by the designer. However, because the users have their own characteristics they 
perceive the product differently and, as such, have their own varying encounters of 
interaction. Figure 3-3 shows how the designer and end user perspective vary and the impact 
on the contextual consequences of the interaction (Hassenzahl, 2004).  
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Figure 3-3: Elements of the model of interaction from the designer and user 
perspectives (Hassenzahl, 2004) 
To achieve security usability, models, frameworks and guidelines have been developed. The 
next section will present these guidelines. 
3.4.1 Security Usability guidelines: 
Various authors in the field have presented guidelines for USec; among them are those 
summarised in the following paragraphs. The guidelines were designed for USec designers, 
so that the designed products can exhibit the desired usability attributes/ characteristics 
presented earlier. 
Usability guidelines for GUIs include Shneiderman’s and Plaisant’s (2005) eight golden rules 
for interface design and Nielsen’s (1994) heuristics for successful human computer 
interaction. These should guide the design of interactive security features, which if applied, 
can ensure user-centred security features. The next paragraphs present USec authors and their 
respective guidelines.  
Whitten and Tygar (2003) presented four attributes of USec in their definition as users: 
reliably aware of the security task they need to perform; are able to figure out how to perform 
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those tasks successfully; do not make dangerous errors; are comfortable with the interface to 
continue using it. 
Johnston, Eloff, and Labuschagne (2003) present six criteria for successful security of HCI 
(HCI-Sec) as: convey available feature; visibility of system status; learnability; aesthetic 
and minimalist design; detailed and helpful error messages; satisfaction. These can be 
used for interaction design of security features for users. 
The six principles for aligning security and usability are: least surprise; good security now; 
standardised security policies; consistent meaningful vocabulary; consistent controls and 
placement; no external burden Garfinkel (2005).   
Katsabas, Furnell, and Dowland (2005) proposed ten preliminary guidelines for USEC and 
applied them to ten EUP including MS Word and Firefox. The guidelines are: visible system 
state and security functions; security should be easily used; suitable for advanced as well as 
first time users; avoid heavy use of technical vocabulary or advanced terms; handle errors 
appropriately; allow customization without risk to be trapped; easy to set up security settings; 
suitable help and documentation for the available security; make the user feel protected; and 
security should not reduce performance.  
Herzog and Shahmehri (2007) presented design guidelines for applications that set a security 
policy. “Security policy is a set of practices that regulate how an organisation manages, 
protects, and assigns resources to achieve its security objectives’ (Tipton & Krause, 2007, p. 
476). The guidelines are as follows: visible not intrusive security; encourage learning; give 
chance to revise hasty decisions; runtime rather than off-line; enforce least privilege; what 
has happened, how bad is it? What to do now? Spend time on icons; test and test more?  
Yee’s (2002) ten principles/ goals of secure interaction design are presented in the security 
usage section (4.8.1) of the next chapter. In summary they are: path of least resistance; 
appropriate boundaries; explicit authorisation; visibility; revocability; expected ability; 
trusted path; identifiability; expressiveness and clarity. 
Nielsen’s (1994) ten heuristics for successful HCI are presented in Section 3.4.2.5. Briefly 
they are: visibility of system status; match between system and real world; user control and 
freedom; consistency and standards; error prevention; recognition rather than recall; 
flexibility and efficiency of use; aesthetic and minimalist design; help users recognise, 
diagnose and recover from errors; help and documentation. 
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So much has been invested in advising designers on how to design user centred security. This 
guideline will be used to identify usable security criteria. The next section presents user-
centred security. 
3.4.2 Usable security 
Zurko and Simon (1996) defined user-centred security as “security models, mechanisms, 
systems, or software” that has usability as a main focus, not the design process and testing. 
Social, technical and production aspects were identified as key areas that can be used to 
address usable security issues through principles such as safe staging security user interfaces 
(Whitten & Tygar, 2003; Zurko, 2005). Human computer interaction share a number of 
commonalities such as evaluation methods, as both can be evaluated in a lab or in actual use 
through user studies and expert evaluations. For both, validity depends on user-product 
interaction to demonstrate utility (Zurko, 2005). Section 3.4.2.1 presents security usability 
problems. 
3.4.2.1 Security usability problems 
Standards such as common criteria (ISO/IEC 15408) are developed to certify whether a 
system is technically secure or not; however, there are other problems that arise from the 
interaction design. As such, security problems are classified according to whether they are: 
security critical (technical) usability problems or security- non critical (interaction) usability 
problems (Kaiser & Reichenbach, 2002). Most end user programs are checked and certified 
for technical issues; hence, for the purpose of this study focus is on the interaction issues. 
However, the core business of the applications is not security and for any program user who 
is a security novice challenges are also bound to be encountered with understanding the 
security. The combination of these two issues presents the user with security critical usability 
problems. The problems can be due to lack of knowledge regardless of security expertise; 
hence, there is the need to investigate in context.  The next section presents the usable 
security paradox. 
3.4.2.2 Usable Security paradox 
Cranor and Garfinkel (2005) identified that realigning security and usability with careful 
attention to user centered design principles, security and usability can be synergetic. A 
similar view is shared by many other researchers, including Flechais et al., (2007). Yee 
(2002) attest to the same view and says “a system that is more secure is more controllable, 
more reliable and hence more usable”; however, others feel that the two fields are inversely 
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dependent; improving one will compromise the other. Hertzum, Jørgensen, and Nørgaard 
(2004) say that usability improvements compromise security and security improvement 
compromises usability. 
In as much as conventional literature cites users as the weak link in Information Security 
(Siponen, 2006; Sasse 2005; Whitten & Tygar, 2003), some current studies pose evidence 
that shows the contrary. In business users were found to improve information systems 
security risk management when they were involved in the prioritization, analysis, design, 
implementation, testing, and monitoring of user-related security controls within business 
practices. In fact, user involvement increases organizational awareness of security risks and 
controls within business processes, resulting in more effective security control development 
and performance (Spears & Bark. , 2010) 
Johnson & Goetz (2007) documented the concerns of security experts at several Fortune 500 
companies. They reported that customers expect security to be usable and demonstrably 
effective. 
An international USec research workshop held in Washington DC in 2009 identified the 
challenges to advancing security and usability research as: 
1. Inconsistent terminology and definitions, including terms such as usable security or 
privacy; 
2. Limited data access -  the need for more and better empirical data; and 
3. Scarceness of expertise and un- familiarity with each other’s work—many are 
working in the field but in distinct and separate disciplines that don’t share 
information. 
Moreover, Muller (2006), and Kaiser and Reichenbachm (2002), categorise security and 
usability issues (problems) as follows: 
1. Usability issues do not compromise the security of the system (usability non-critical 
security) 
2. Usability issues that can place security at risk, regardless of the user type.  
3. Security critical usability problems - Usability issues owing to user’s security 
awareness 
4. Security critical usability problems – User-independent security problems 
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This research focuses on the third category of security problem in security applications: 
usability issues owing to user’s security awareness.  
As if inherent usability issues are not complex enough for users, security features which users 
can use to make security related decisions, differ from application to application, according to 
Herzog and Shahmehri (2007). Coupled with the following factors, this has led to emergence 
of the HCISec field: 
1. There is a misalignment between user goals, expectations and security features 
(Sieger, et al., 2011; Krieger, 2009; Herzog & Shahmehri, 2007). Security is hardly a 
user’s primary concern (No-one buys applications to use the security. (Vacca, 2009)) 
2. Security features are displayed on fewer occasions, and when these are displayed, the 
user feels that these features disturb their work. The resultant feeling is one of 
annoyance, impatience, frustration towards alerts, prompts and other required actions 
(Krieger, 2009; Herzog & Shahmehri, 2007); 
3. Users do not understand security messages and features. The lack of understanding 
compromises their information and the computer systems (Sasse, 2003; Herley , 
2009; Krieger, 2009); 
4. Users are not comfortable with making security decisions. (Sieger, Kirschnick, & 
Möller, 2011). 
5. Users reject security advice (Herley, 2009). 
These features invoke negative feelings in the users such as annoyance, impatience and 
frustration towards the feature. More on this was presented in Section 3.3.1 presented when 
interaction design is discussed. 
In this regard, USec can also be defined as “A set of attributes that bear on the effort needed 
for use, and on the individual assessment of such use, by a stated or implied set of users” 
(Herzog & Shahmehri, 2007). Issues related to usability and security are considered complex 
as they are independently regarded and both leave the user on the periphery. To deal 
successfully with USec the user should be at the centre and should influence the design of 
usable security. The security-usability threat model by Kainda, Flechais, and Roscoe, (2010) 
shows the most important aspects that should be considered when evaluating usability and 
security. The aspects are connected to usability or security or both from a novice user’s 
perspective.  Figure 3-4 is the threat model. Worth noting is the fact that knowledge and skill 
are the heart of user characteristics. 
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Figure 3-4: Security - usability threat model by Kainda et al. (2010) 
To ensure that designed security is usable, users must be knowledgeable and skilled to use the 
security. There is a need to measure the extent of security usability problems in end user 
programs. Section 3.4.2.3 presents criteria that can be used to evaluate security usability. 
3.4.2.3 Criteria for evaluating usability 
Usability is the degree to which a product can be used by specified users to achieve specified 
goals with effectiveness, efficiency, and satisfaction in a specified environment of use (ISO 
9241-11, 1998). This definition emphasises measurable attributes of a usable product, and 
these can be used as criteria to evaluate the extent to which the product is usable. The 
ISO9241 – 11 framework provides a basis for evaluating usability by showing the 
relationships among the different user-product interaction components. Emerging from 
extensive literature studies, Figure 3-5 presents a modification of the usability framework for 
this study. Components key to usable security, goals and criteria are presented. 
59 
 
Figure 3-5: Modified usability framework by ISO9241 -210.2010 
The product in this case is the security feature; the context of use is the end user program; the 
user’s intended task is the security task in a work or leisure environment using devices that 
support the program and the user (with variable competence, awareness, and expectation). 
Security features interact with the user in an environment to perform a task using some 
device and this defines the user- product context of interaction. The outcome is a measure of 
effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction with the interaction. Effectiveness is how well the 
users can achieve their goals (intended and imposed) and how usable the product is. 
Efficiency measures how much time and effort the user invests in the task to achieve their 
“goal” (security is not necessarily their goal in a EUP) as well as to what extent the product is 
usable. Satisfaction is the measure of how much the user enjoys using the product. 
Enjoyment is a characteristic of User experience with the product. 
According to ISO/IEC 9126 (2001), usability is “A set of attributes that bear on the effort 
needed for use, and on the individual assessment of such use, by a stated or implied set of 
users”. The attributes include learnability, understandability, operability, efficiency, 
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effectiveness, ease of use and user satisfaction (Faulkener, 2000; Nielsen, 2000). Do the end 
user programs have security designs satisfying these required attributes?  
The attributes can be used as the criteria to measure how usable a product is. Therefore 
learnability, understandability, operability and ease of use can be added to the list. 
The criteria for evaluating usability include models of usability and usability heuristics. 
Heuristics are the principles used to evaluate the compliance of security features to usability 
principles. Nielsen’s usability principles can be applied. These are trust, ease of use, 
terminology, ease of learning, feedback, errors, help and documentation. Similarly, 
criteria were presented by Yeratziotis et al., (2011) to evaluate two online heath systems.  
In total, 13 criteria have been identified as effectiveness, efficiency, satisfaction, 
learnability, understandability, operability, ease of use, terminology, feedback, errors, 
help and documentation. To apply the criteria successfully there should be methods in place 
that can be followed. Section 3.4.2.4 focuses on usability evaluation methods. 
3.4.2.4 Usability evaluation methods 
There are three classifications of usability evaluation methods, namely testing, inspection and 
inquiry (Campbell, 2000). 
Usability Testing (UT) involves selecting a sample of users to work on some representative 
tasks to demonstrate the extent to which the user interface enables users to perform their 
tasks. The following testing methods are used for UT: coaching methods, co-discovery 
learning, performance measurement, question-asking protocol, remote testing, retrospective 
testing, shadowing method, teaching method, and thinking aloud protocol. 
Usability Inquiry (UI) involves gathering information about the end users’ understanding, 
needs, likes and dislikes of the system through observations, conversations or interviews. 
Inquiry methods include: field observation, focus groups, interviews, questionnaires, logging 
actual use and proactive field study. In this study interviews were used for pilot studies and 
questionnaires for user studies. Field user studies allow for users to be evaluated in real time 
environments, on the other hand field studies can capture information on user behaviour, 
need analysis, heuristic evaluation and user satisfaction (Sharma, 2013). 
Table 3-1 summarises the methods, providing information about when the UI method is 
applicable, at what stage of the product lifecycle, who is involved, where they should be 
located and the usability issue being tested. Stages are design, code, test and deployment with 
usability issues stated as effectiveness (E1), efficiency (E2) and satisfaction (S). The design 
stage has limited activity; therefore it is not included in the table. 
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Table 3-1: Typical usability inquiry methods 
Inquiry Stage applied Personnel needs Remote  Usability 
issue 
 code test Deployment Usability 
experts 
Software 
developers 
users  E1 E2 S 
Field observation N Y Y 1 0 2 N Y - Y 
Focus group N Y Y 1 0 6 N Y - Y 
Interviews Y Y Y 1 0 2 N Y - Y 
Logging actual 
use  
N Y Y 1 0 6 Y Y Y - 
Proactive field 
study 
N N N 1 0 2 N - - - 
 
Interviews are also used at design stages. Proactive field studies can be used at requirements 
gathering as well as at design stages and with input from usability experts and users. Software 
developers have no role at this level. The tests are done with usability experts and end users 
only.  
Several questionnaires are used for usability testing. Standardised questionnaires are 
categorised according to whether they are post-study, post-task, web or other (Sauro & 
Lewis, 2012). Table 3-2 lists some of the standard questionnaires (Sauro & Lewis, 2012): 
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Table 3-2: Standardised questionnaires 
Acronym Instrument Reference 
QUIS Questionnaire for User Interface Satisfaction Chin, Diehl, and Kent, 1998 
SUMI Software Usability Measurement Inventory 
Kirakowski and Corbett, 1993; 
McSweeney, 1992 
PSSUQ Post-Study System Usability Questionnaire Lewis, 1990a, 1992  
SUS Software Usability Scale Brooke, 1996 
PUEU Perceived Usefulness and Ease of Use Davis, 1989  
NAU Nielsen's Attributes of Usability Nielsen, 1993 
NHE Nielsen's Heuristic Evaluation Nielsen, 1993 
CSUQ Computer System Usability Questionnaire Lewis, 1995 
ASQ After Scenario Questionnaire Lewis, 1995 
PHUE Practical Heuristics for Usability Evaluation Perlman, 1997 
PUTQ Purdue Usability Testing Questionnaire Lin, Choong, & Salvendy, 1997 
USE USE Questionnaire Lund, 2008 
 
Of the presented questionnaires, QUIS, SUMI, PSSUQ, SU, ASQ and USE are post-study 
usability testing tools. 
 
Usability Inspection involves usability experts or software developers, users and other 
professionals reviewing usability-associated features of a user interface. Inspection methods 
include: Cognitive Walkthroughs, Feature Inspection, Heuristic Evaluation, Pluralistic 
Walkthrough, Standards Inspection, Consistency Inspection and Perspective-based 
Inspection. Table 3-3 summarises the usability inspection methods, providing information 
about the stage of the product lifecycle where it is applicable; who is involved; where they 
should be located and the usability issue being tested. Stages are design, code, test and 
deployment with usability issues stated as effectiveness (E1), efficiency (E2) and satisfaction 
(S). The design stage has limited activity; therefore it is not included in the table. 
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Table 3-3: Typical usability inspection methods 
Inspection 
Method  
Stage applied Personnel needs Remote  Usability 
issue 
 Code Test Deployment Usability 
experts 
Software 
developers 
Users  E1 E2 S 
Cognitive 
Walkthroughs 
Y Y Y 1-4 0-2 0 N Y - - 
Feature Inspection Y Y Y 1 0 0 Y Y - - 
Heuristic 
Evaluation 
Y Y Y 4 0 0 Y Y Y - 
Pluralistic 
Walkthrough  
N N Y 1 1 2 N Y - Y 
Perspective-based 
Inspection 
          
 
Perspective based inspection, as applied by Zhang, Basili, and Shneiderman (1998) allows for 
usability inspection from a specific perspective at a time. Nielsen (1995) has three more 
inspection methods, namely standards inspection, consistency inspection and formal usability 
inspection.  Usability is inspected from the perspective of the novice, expert and error 
handling use,using task scenarios. 
3.4.2.5 Usability Heuristics are used to evaluate an interface or product for 
conformance to usability guidelines and whether or not a user can use it.  Nielsen (1994) 
has developed ten usability heuristics for interface design.  These are: 
 
1. Visibility of system status  
The system should always keep users informed about what is going on, through appropriate 
feedback within reasonable time.  
2. Match between system and the real world  
The system should speak the users' language, with words, phrases and concepts familiar to 
the user, rather than system-oriented terms. It should follow real-world conventions, making 
information appear in a natural and logical order.  
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3. User control and freedom  
Users often choose system functions by mistake and will need a clearly marked "emergency 
exit" to leave the unwanted state without having to go through an extended dialogue. This 
supports undo and redo.  
4. Consistency and standards  
Users should not have to wonder whether different words, situations, or actions mean the 
same thing. This follows platform conventions.  
5. Error prevention  
Even better than good error messages is a careful design that prevents a problem from 
occurring in the first place. It both eliminates error-prone conditions or checks for them and 
presents users with a confirmation option before they commit to the action.  
6. Recognition rather than recall  
Minimize the user's memory load by making objects, actions, and options visible. The user 
should not have to remember information from one part of the dialogue to another. 
Instructions for use of the system should be visible or easily retrievable whenever 
appropriate.  
7. Flexibility and efficiency of use  
Accelerators unseen by the novice user may often speed up the interaction for the expert user 
such that the system can cater to both inexperienced and experienced users. It allows users to 
tailor frequent actions.  
8. Aesthetic and minimalist design  
Dialogues should not contain information that is irrelevant or rarely needed. Every extra unit 
of information in a dialogue competes with the relevant units of information and diminishes 
their relative visibility.  
9. Help users recognize, diagnose, and recover from errors  
Error messages should be expressed in plain language (no codes), indicating the problem 
precisely, and suggesting a solution constructively.  
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10. Help and documentation  
Even though it is better if the system can be used without documentation, it may be necessary 
to provide help and documentation. Any such information should be easy to search, focused 
on the user's task, list concrete steps to be carried out, and not be too large. The next section 
discusses the user experience resulting from the interaction with systems designed for secure 
HCI. 
3.5 USER EXPERIENCE 
The field of UX has evolved over time.  Figure 3-6 shows how the literature has evolved 
since 2000 and the main authors. Trends from 2010 to date focus on UX models and 
frameworks for UX design in general, and much has been done in Web applications; 
however, the same cannot be said about security and, in particular, about EUPSF. 
 
Figure 3-6: UX research progress (http://www.slideshare.net/NorthernUX/evaluating-
user-experience) 
User experience (UX) is an individual’s perceptions and responses as a result (consequence) 
of the use or anticipated use of a product, system or service (ISO 9241-210, 2010). According 
to Garrett (2009), it is a combination of perception, action, cognition, and emotion. The UX 
dimensions are classified as external engagement (Perception: engaging the senses; and 
Action: engaging the body) and internal engagement (Cognition: engaging the mind; and 
Emotion: engaging the heart.) Wright , Wallace and McCarthy (2008) bring in another 
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dimension to experience called continous engagement and sense making. This dimension can 
be viewed as a combination of six processes, namely:  anticipating, connecticng, interpreting, 
reflecting, recounting and appropriating (Wright, et al, 2008). Wright et al. (2008) argue that 
experience is created by uninterrupted engagement with the world through actions of sense-
making at many levels, which can be captured in six processes. Anticipating is expecting an 
experience; connecting is relating to the situation or context of interaction; interpreting is 
when the user is describing the experience; reflecting (also referred to as immediate 
reflecting) is when the end user judges the experience; recounting goes beyond the reflecting 
to reflect it from the perspective of other users’ experiences; appropriating relates an 
experience to past and future experiences. 
The different definitions and comprehension of UX makes it even complex for novices in the 
field to understand and deal with it (Roto, 2007). To contextualise this research, the following 
user experience definition by Hassenzahl and Tractinsky (2006) is adopted: 
“a consequence of a user’s internal state (predispositions, expectations, needs, 
motivation, mood, etc.), the characteristics of the designed system (e.g. complexity, 
purpose, usability, functionality, etc.) and the context (or the environment) within 
which the interaction occurs (e.g. organisational/social setting, meaningfulness of the 
activity, voluntariness of use, etc.)”.  
Figure 3-7 shows UX as a product of the user’s internal state (values), and the characteristics 
of the designed system (product) in an organisational setup (context shaped by organisational 
values). It depicts the relationship between user experience, usability and human computer 
interaction in context. The context, in this case, is the organisation. The user has personal 
values which are inherent elements of their character and the organisation has values that are 
enforced through a number of policies and that reflect on their mission and vision. The UX is 
the outcome of the user’s interaction with the product in a specific organisation. Product 
refers to the user perspective definition of UX, which focuses on emotional and aesthetic 
experiences as well as the experience of meaning during the user-product interaction.  
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Figure 3-7: Simplified model of User Experience (Jetter & Gerken, 2007, p. 107) 
User experience facets model UX as an intersection of three elements emotion and affect; the 
instrumental and the experiential aspects. Therefore UX can only exist in the presence of 
elements of the three perspectives. The user has variable moods that are the result of many 
environmental factors. Depending on their duties and on the reason for using the application 
program, they have a motive and expectations. The environment can be at work or at home 
and the purpose can be business, social or miscellaneous. As such, the environment has 
characteristics that influence how the user interacts with product and the tone in which they 
do it. These and prior experience or influence, as well as values and culture determine how 
users interact with a product. In the use of end user programs the motive is to complete a task 
that has nothing to do with security; therefore, there is no expectation of security interaction. 
However, as there are embedded security features in the EUPs, when the need arises for them 
to be activated, dialogues that require interaction will be presented to the end users for their 
action. The dialogues have their own characteristics that can deter or encourage the user to 
respond to them.  Users can interact with their application security features while working, 
socialising or doing personal business, thus defining the context of interaction. 
The overall UX of end user-security feature interaction is influenced by the user’s cognition, 
by technical aspects of the EUP and by where or when the interaction occurs (Forlizzi & 
Ford, 2000). This presents a complexity to the designers as they have no way of controlling 
the human aspect, in particular. Product properties include quality, pragmatics and hedonics; 
these can be classified as instrumental (utility and usability) or non-instrumental (aesthetic, 
symbolic or motivational aspects). Owing to the complex nature of UX, different approaches 
and definitions are presented by authors and they vary according to perspectives.  
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Therefore, it is difficult to have the right assessment of UX by focusing on just one aspect as 
the overall UX is affected by all three. End users’ perceptions of product quality is based on 
their experience of interaction and of the product qualities giving rise to effective use and 
pleasure (Sutcliffe, 2009). 
Components of user experience (context, product properties and user attributes) presented by 
Minge (2008), determine interaction characteristics. The characteristics are emotional 
reactions, as well as instrumental and non-instrumental qualities, which create a perception of 
the product. Perceptions are mainly influenced by user awareness as it determines choice, the 
choice gives the 
first
 impression, and this impression determines the usage. If the experience is 
good, then the user can use the product all the time and the experience improves product 
awareness. However, the first impression can result in problems with product usage. This will 
give a bad experience and registers a negative impression of the product. The relationship of 
awareness, choices, impression usage, related problems and UX are shown in Figure 3-8. 
 
Figure 3-8: Awareness UX model 
3.5.1 UX models and frameworks 
UX models that are classified as structural establish relations (cause-and-effect) among 
concepts and enlighten the design of a system and measurement models to facilitate 
measurement of concepts in order to guide the assessment of a system (Law & van Schaik, 
2010). Honeycomb, by Morville (2004,) and the modified one by Yeratziotis, van Greunen, 
& Pottas, (2011) are basic UX models that inform our research. The two models demonstrate 
the need to address security. The next section presents models and theories of experience.  
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3.5.2 UX Design 
UX design is multidisciplinary as it cuts across HCI, industrial design, human factors and the 
ergonomics branches of sociology, physiology, cognitive science and philosophy; as well as 
architecture, computer science, and visual and sound design (Tariq, 2015). According to 
Garrett, (2009, p.1) “Experience design is the design of anything, independent of medium, or 
across media, with human experience as an explicit outcome, and human engagement as an 
explicit goal.”   
Human engagement is the goal of experience design, because the human is the most 
important part of any product design. Garrett (2009) defines engagement as a matter of a 
perception engaging the user’s mind and all his senses (sight, sound, touch, smell, and taste) 
and classifies it as external or internal to the end user. 
User experience design (UXD) focuses on the emotional aspects (internal engagement) of 
human experience such as happiness, although it is closely related to User-Centred Design 
(UCD) methods, which target human performance enhancement (Cummings, 2008). This 
approach is comparable to the holistic approach proposed by Wright et al., (2008).  The 
holistic approach focuses on the sensual, emotional, and compositional, as well as the spatio-
temporal aspects (Wright, et al., 2008). Since user experience comprises the overall end-
users’ perceptions (effectiveness, efficiency, emotional satisfaction, and quality of 
relationship with service entity) as they interact with a product or service (Kuniavsky, 2010), 
it is important that the design of EUP security features focus on embracing all these factors.  
End users’ perceptions of product quality are based on their experience of interaction 
(external engagement), and the product qualities giving rise to effective use and pleasure 
(Sutcliffe, 2010).  What UX evaluation methods exist? Section 3.5.3 presents some of the 
evaluation methods relevant to this research. 
3.5.3 UX Evaluation 
User experience evaluation can be summative (end product) and formative (design and 
development). To evaluate the effect of a program’s security features on UX, various criteria 
that influence the overall UX can be used. Some important aspects are security policies, 
usability (convenience, efficiency, understandable, visibility) (Furnell et al., 2005), user 
knowledge of security threats and solution/ mitigation strategies related to their application 
programs.  
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User experience (UX) evaluation means investigating how a person feels about using a 
system (product, service, non-commercial item, or a combination of them). It is complex to 
evaluate user experience and to come up with solid results, since user experience is 
subjective, context-dependent and dynamic over time (Law, Roto, Hassenzahl, Vermeeren, & 
Kort, 2009) 
Laboratory experiments may work well for studying a specific aspect of user experience, but 
holistic user experience is optimally studied over a longer period of time with real users in a 
natural environment. 
According to (Schulze & Krömker, 2010) UX is the degree of positive or negative emotions 
that influence future usage as a result of interaction in a particular context. This can be during 
or after interaction. Based on these and other UX definitions, three factors of interaction are 
identified as human (end user), product and the environment. HCI interaction is influenced by 
security feature properties, and user characteristics, as well as by contextual properties 
(Mahlke, 2008). Each of these factors can further be specified in context depending on the 
goals of the user and the product. The human factor has needs, perceptions, motives, goals, 
emotions, and competencies (Desmet & Hekkert, 2007). Product qualities are appeal, 
complexity, usefulness, efficiency, effectiveness, and behaviour sources, (Desmet & Hekkert, 
2007). UX goes through a cycle with three stages: expectation/anticipation (before use), 
momentary during use and reflection after use (Schulze & Krömker, 2010).  Yet the process 
of making sense of the experience can be considered as six different stages, as proposed by 
Wright , Wallace , & McCarthy, (2008): anticipating, connecting, interpreting, reflection, 
recounting and appropriating. Similarly, the senses can be viewed from the three stage cycle 
depending on when they occur in the stages of interaction.  
Measurement of UX can be during a session (observation, physiology, experiments), or after 
a session (questionnaires) (Sutcliffe & Hart, 2011). 
UX evaluation methods can be classified into five categories: all UX, method type, 
development phase, studied period of experience and evaluator / information provider (Roto, 
et al., 2012). Focus on the period of experience is important and that can be instant, 
occasional or complete UX (Roto, Vermeeren, Law, & Hoonhout, 2011). Periods can be 
classified relative to usage, as before usage (anticipated UX), snapshots during interaction 
(momentary/emotional), an experience/after use (of a task or activity- episodic) or long-term 
UX (cumulative) (Law E. L.-C., 2011; Roto et al., 2011) . The snapshots closely relate to the 
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UXEL framework, which presents UX from  designer, user and enviroment perspectives of 
the product. The snapshots of UX defined as designer, which equate to before usage 
experience; and actual experience, which can be momentary, episodic or overtime, are used 
to connect user, designer and the enviroment.  Figure 3-9 shows how users transit from one 
type of experience (snapshot) to another. 
 
Figure 3-9: Snapshots during interaction (Roto et al., 2011) 
Furthermore, evaluation methods can be classified according to type of evaluation context 
and type of data collected. Based on the CHI 2009 SIG classification, a choice was made to 
focus on approaches which consider evaluating UX jointly with usability, and user 
questionnaires for post-activity assessments, as well as expert evaluation using a heuristic 
matrix. 
3.6 UX CRITERIA FOR EUP SECURITY FEATURES (EUPSF) 
UX evaluation can be summative (end product) and formative (design and development) 
(Bevan, 2008). Since security features in end user programs are an end product, summative 
methods are the natural choice. To evaluate the effect of a program’s security feature on UX, 
various criteria that influence the overall UX can be used. Some important aspects are 
security policies, usability (convenience, efficiency, understandable, visibility) (Furnell et al., 
2005), user knowledge of security threats and solution/ mitigation strategies related to their 
application programs. Colabro (2012) states that end user behaviour is directly linked to 
emotional satisfaction; hence, it is an important aspect to evaluate. To answer the posed 
question: “Which UX metrics/evaluation criteria can be used to determine the UX of end user 
program security features?”, proposed criteria are presented as in Table 3-4. The  listed 
criteria is a result of extensive literature studies on UX metrics for security in general  
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Table 3-4: Proposed criteria 
Criteria Author 
Awareness/expected Herzog & Shahmehri, 2007; Krieger, 2009 
Motivating Hassenzahl, 2004; Hassenzahl & Tractinsky, 2006;  Herzog & Shahmehri, 
2007; Cranor, 2009; Krieger, 2009; Sieger, et al., 2011; Lew, et al., 2010; 
Preece, 2002, 2002; Desmet & Hekkert, 2007; Schulze & Krömker, 2010 
Comfortable Herzog & Shahmehri, 2007; Krieger, 2009; Moller, 2009; Cranor, 2009; 
Sieger, Kirschnick, & Möller, 2011; Whitten and Tygar (2003) 
Useful Morville , 2004; Yeratziotis, 2011; Desmet & Hekkert, 2007 
Desirable  Morville , 2004; Yeratziotis, 2011 
Accessible  Morville , 2004; Yeratziotis, 2011;  Rubin & Chisnell , 2008; Lew, et al., 
2010 
Visible / readily 
displayed/ findable 
Nielsen, 1994; Yee, 2002; Johnston, Eloff et al., 2003)Furnell et al., 2005; 
Morville , 2004; Katsabas et al., 2005Yeratziotis, 2011; Cranor, 2009; Herzog 
& Shahmehri, 2007; Krieger, 2009 
Valuable/ impact of use Morville , 2004; Yeratziotis, 2011 
Usable  Morville , 2004; Lew, et al., 2010; Yeratziotis, 2011 
Supported  Shahmehri, 2007; Cranor, 2009; Krieger, 2009; 
Understandable/comple
xity/ learnable 
Shahmehri, 2007; Cranor, 2009; Krieger, 2009;  Rubin & Chisnell , 2008; 
ISO 9241-210, 2010; Lew, et al., 2010;  Desmet & Hekkert, 2007 
Long term experience/ 
memorability   
Moller et al., 2009, Nielsen, 1993; (Ravdev & Johnson, 1989) 
Security/ safety Lew, et al., 2010; Yeratziotis, 2011; Lew, et al., 2010; Preece, 2002 
Efficient Nielsen, 1994; Faulkner, 2000; Furnell et al., 2005; Desmet & Hekkert, 2007; 
Kuniavsky, 2010; Rubin & Chisnell , 2008; ISO 9241-210, 2010; Lew, et al., 
2010; Yeratziotis, 2011; Sharma, 2013 
Effective Nielsen, 1994; Faulkner, 2000; Desmet & Hekkert, 2007; Kuniavsky, 2010; 
Rubin & Chisnell, 2008; ISO 9241-210, 2010; Lew, et al., 2010; Yeratziotis, 
2011; Sharma, 2013 
Satisfaction Nilsen, 1994; Lew, et al., 2010; Rubin & Chisnell , 2008; Preece, 2002; (ISO 
9241-11, 1998) 
Exciting/perception/ 
emotion 
Herley, 2009; Desmet & Hekkert, 2007 
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3.7 SUMMARY 
This chapter presented human computer interaction, interaction design, user-centred design, 
human computer interaction security, usability, usable security and user experience. 
Technology is designed for people; however, people can use it effectively if the field of HCI 
has design principles that ensure that the technology is usable. Interaction design principles 
produce user-centred products. Usability of products influences user experience and 
behaviour. Security can be designed to be usable by applying usability and HCISec 
principles. 
User experience is a measure of emotions, enjoyment and other feeling associated with an 
interaction. In summary, a lack of tools to evaluate UX exists coupled with a lack of metrics 
for application security features to measure awareness levels of case subjects. In the next 
chapter literature on InfoSec is presented. 
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CHAPTER 4: INFORMATION SECURITY FEATURES 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This chapter focuses on the end user program security. The field falls within two disciplines, 
namely Information security and User experience (UX), a subsection of Human and Computer 
Interaction (HCI). Firstly, information security is presented; thereafter, the concepts of usable 
security can be comprehended, end user programs’ security features, security awareness, security 
metrics, security evaluation methods and finally, the summary will be presented.  The goal is to 
establish literature on security usability, and how end user program security fares. The outline in 
the chapter map will be followed. 
What are the suitable security criteria/ methods that can be used to evaluate 
UX of end user program security features? 
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4.2 INFORMATION SECURITY 
Information in computers is processed data that is stored or transmitted on computer systems. 
Information security (InfoSec) is a process that includes protecting information integrity, 
confidentiality and availability on computers and shared over networks (Ciampa, 2011). InfoSec 
has the following goals: confidentiality, availability, authenticity, nonrepudiation, integrity, 
privacy, authenticity and trustworthiness, reliability, auditability and accountability on devices 
that store, manipulate and transmit the information through people, products and procedures 
(Cherdantseva & Hilton, 2013; Ciampa, 2011; Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 2007; Stalling & Brown, 
2008; Whitman & Mattord, 2011).  
USec aims to improve the usability of security features in end user programs, focusing on the 
design, evaluation and implementation of interactive secure systems. Good security for an 
organization has multi-layers in place to achieve all the security goals (Whitman & Mattord, 
2011; Ciampa, 2011). The layers are physical, personal, operations, communication, network and 
information security. An information security breach comprises a threat, carried out by an 
attacker who exploits/takes advantage of security loopholes/weaknesses or vulnerabilities to gain 
entry (Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 2007).  Lately there has been advancement in attack mechanisms 
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used by cyber criminals in their attempts to breach information security. Top of the list is social 
engineering, especially phishing attacks. Both of these attacks target the human factor of security 
that has been cited as the reason for breaches (Whitten & Tygar, 2003). Security can also be 
viewed from a business perspective. The business model of information security comprises 
people, technology, process and organisational aspects. They interact to ensure the objectives of 
security (von Roessing, 2010). The different aspects are linked by dynamic indicators, namely 
human factors, culture, architecture, governing, and emergence, as well as through enabling and 
support, as shown in Figure 4-1. 
 
Figure 4-1 Business model for information security (BMIS) (ISACA, 2009) 
The research focuses on human factors as dynamic interconnectors between people and 
technology (highlighted in red) and would like to propose a process that influences security 
culture, emergency and provide enabling support. To do so, there is a need firstly to understand 
the security challenges for humans. 
A threat is defined as a potential violation or breach of security. Examples of threats are 
unauthorized disclosure of information that violates the confidentiality goal of security, 
deception, disruption and usurpation (Stalling & Brown, 2008, p. 15). These can also be 
classified as interception, interruption, modification and fabrication (Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 2007, 
p. 7). When a threat is carried out successfully, it is an attack or security breach. 
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In recent times it has become difficult to defend against attacks because:  
1. The number of devices on the Internet has increased tremendously (Ciampa, 2011; 
Statistics, Internet World, 2011); 
2. The speed of attacks is high; there has been an advancement of attack mechanisms 
(Whitman & Mattord, 2011);  
3. The attack tools are easy to access and not complex to use (Whitman & Mattord, 2011); 
4. The attack tools are as available to black hackers as they are to security professionals 
(Long, 2012); 
5. The detection of vulnerabilities is faster by black hackers compared to white hackers 
(Long, 2012). 
The increase in attacks is also attributed to delays or the absence of patching, updating and 
upgrading of application software (Shackleford, 2011). As a result of this attackers are now using 
social engineering to gain entry into systems by manipulating vulnerable programs running on 
client side machines which, for the purpose of this research, will be defined as end user 
application programs (EUP) (Ciampa, 2011). Information security is designed for users to secure 
their electronic information. The next section discusses user security. 
4.3 END USER PROGRAM SECURITY FEATURES 
Information Security is focused on procedures, people, devices and communication of 
information in an integral and confidential way (Whitman & Mattord, 2011).  To protect the end 
user’s information, end user program developers have embedded security features in the 
applications (Furnell, 2005). The security features are designed to protect individual and 
organisation security from cyber criminals. They offer end user program assurance, which is 
defined as “the application of technologies and processes to achieve a required level of 
confidence that software systems and services function in the intended manner; are free from 
accidental or intentional vulnerabilities; provide security capabilities appropriate to the threat 
environment; and recover from intrusions and failures” (Mead et al., 2010). 
In practice, every designed program has threats, vulnerabilities and attacks specific to its 
operational domain and, as such, security features are designed to assure security within the 
program context. Some of these features interact with users to protect their information while 
others run in the background (Furnell et al., 2005).  Interaction can be updating the application, 
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deciding on a security action or even configuration. In most cases the security features seldom 
prompt the users for their input; because of this, the user does not know how to handle the rare 
occurrences appropriately. As a result of improper interaction, users present themselves as easy 
targets for cyber-attacks (SANS, 2011; Whitman & Mattord, 2011).  
Security features include alerts, dialogue boxes, security agents, office assistant, update features, 
permissions and encryption, among others. These features are designed to be suitable and 
effective for the programs; however, security of the systems depends on the users using the 
security (Furnell, 2004). 
4.4 PROGRAM SECURITY CHARACTERISTICS 
Program security has characteristics that influence the behaviour of users towards the 
execution/implementation thereof. According to Herzog and Shahmehri (2007); and Whitten and 
Tygar (2005), the features include that: 
1. Security is not the primary responsibility for the user; hence, they do not have the 
commitment to learn and understand it. 
2. Security is regarded as a bother/abstraction from the primary task as they are usually 
required to respond or interact with a number of dialogue boxes to complete a single 
security task. 
3. Security features (alerts, dialogue boxes) are rarely displayed. 
4. It is complex for users to understand and implement. 
5. Sometimes options presented to the users do not lead them to making the right security 
choice for the user. 
Research in the area of HCISec has established that the mentioned features make application 
security unusable, as in the following examples: Firewall by Johnston et al (2003), Wool (2004); 
Zone  by Katsabas et al. (2005); Internet Explorer by Furnell (2006); Mozilla Firefox by 
Katsabas, et al. (2005);  Microsoft Word by Furnell (2005); and Katsabas et al. (2005), Outlook 
Express by Furnell (2006); encrypting email by Whitten & Tygar (1999); Login systems by 
Sasse (2003) and several others. Software developers have designed necessary and effective 
security in their programs. For the security to be effected it depends on the user to use it 
appropriately (Furnell, 2004). Embedded security design does not answer user questions, but 
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instead follows in-built rules that were determined by the program designers. The user questions, 
according to Baecker et al., (1995 p.670) cited in Herzog and Shahmehri (2007) are: 
1. Informational: What can I achieve with this application? 
2. Descriptive: What is this? What can it do? 
3. Procedural: How do I do this? 
4. Interpretive: What is happening? Why? What does it mean? 
5. Choice: What can I do? 
6. Guidance: What should I do? 
7. History: What have I done? 
8. Motivational:  Why use the feature? What is the benefit? 
9. Investigative: What else should be known? 
 
Question 8 is very important, specifically when considering security as a secondary task for the 
user (Herzog & Shahmehri, 2007). Research has shown that users are strongly motivated to 
protect their information and are aware of security threats. However, they do not understand the 
security features to implement them correctly. Furnell (2006) gave the reasons as: the use of 
technical jargon, unclear functionality, the lack of feedback and forcing uninformed decisions 
(owing to lack of knowledge). One way of improving security is by answering the question, 
whilst an understanding of the typological setup of organisational culture can help achieve this. 
The next section addresses what an organisational security culture is and its components. 
4.5 END USER SECURITY 
User security deals with procedures and policies to ensure that a user can achieve personal 
security of their information. User-centred security speaks of “security models, mechanisms, 
systems and software that have usability as primary motivation or goal” (Zurko & Simon, 1996, 
p. 27). 
A user is a person or device that uses a computer system to perform some task. The users can be 
classified as procedures that trigger some action on the machine, an expert/technical user who 
develops, maintains or administers the system and an end user who uses applications running on 
the machine to do their work. The human users have varying levels of knowledge and 
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appreciation of security features and programs running on their machines, and are vulnerable to 
different breaches. For example, developers are exposed to buffer overflows and other 
programming coding errors, while end users can experience phishing, viruses, inconsistent 
errors, etc. 
User categories are also based on aspects related to (Beisse, 2004): 
1. The environment: home or corporate. 
2. Skill level: experts, scientists, novices, average, advanced, designers, cybernut, 
programmer, engineer, and administrator. 
3. Location: internal, external, guest, or remote. 
4. Application: word processing, accounting, databases, email, publishing, and so forth. 
5. Frequency of use: frequent, occasional, and persistent. 
 
User security can thus be defined as technologies, mechanisms and processes that protect the end 
user, regardless of their category. End users mainly encounter security at three levels while they 
interact with computers. The first one is the operating system related security, for instance, they 
might be required to boot up with a password; logon with a password to the local machine or to 
the domain. Once they have logged on the computer, they can encounter security systems 
running on the system. The security system can be a firewall, intrusion detection/ prevention 
system, or the most common one - an antivirus. The first two security systems usually run in the 
background popping up alerts only when user intervention is necessary; however, because many 
attacks at this level involve malicious codes, more prompts from the antivirus and interaction are 
common. The end user uses application programs to accomplish their work-related tasks on a 
daily basis. This brings us to the frequent and third security that they encounter, program security 
features. End user program security features are part of the programs used to do work on a 
regular basis and to protect information processed by the program. The next section presents end 
user program security features. 
4.6 ORGANISATIONAL SECURITY CULTURE 
Organisational culture is “a pattern of shared basic assumptions that was learned by a group as it 
solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration that has worked well enough 
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to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to 
perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.” (Schein, 2004, p. 17). The behaviour of 
employees is influenced by the corporate culture eventually contributing to the organizational 
effectiveness (Thomson & von Solms, 2006). A corporate culture should, ideally, incorporate 
InfoSec controls into the daily practices and employee behaviour (Thomson & von Solms, 2006). 
According to Schein (2004), there are three levels of culture: artefacts; espoused beliefs and 
values, as well as underlying assumptions. Artefacts consist of the visible and audible elements 
of culture that can be easily interpreted by employees, customers and the public (Schein, 2004). 
Values and beliefs at conscious level that are based on prior learning support artefacts as they 
guide behaviour (Schein, 2004). These are mostly established by management in order to 
monitor and control how employees behave in the organisation.  These can include ethics, code 
of conduct and communication. 
Basic assumptions in reality represent and capture an organisation’s culture as perceived by 
employees (Schein, 2004). These basic assumptions include the basic assumptions of members 
of a group or organisations as a result of shared learning experiences (Schein, 2004, p.22).  
Culture is dynamic and is influenced by environmental, internal and external factors to the 
organisation as humans bring in their own individual cultures. There are seven dimensions to 
culture, as presented by Schein (2004). Since security is about interaction with technology, of 
interest is the nature of human activity and the nature of human nature that focuses on the 
character and appropriateness of human behaviour. 
Interviews, questionnaires, or survey instruments can be used to study a culture's values, norms, 
ideologies, charters, and philosophies (Schein, 2004). Open-ended interviews can gather feelings 
and thoughts, but questionnaires and surveys limit the information collected as they specify 
bounds through the type of questions posed. A deeper study through intensive observation, 
concentrated questions, and user studies of purposefully selected motivated members of the 
group can reveal underlying assumptions that define perceptions, thoughts, feelings, and 
behaviour (Schein, 2004). These will enable a richer understanding of a phenomenon under 
study in context. 
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The BMIS positions culture as the dynamic interconnector between the people and the 
organisational security strategy as depicted in Figure 4-1(von Roessing, 2010). As the focus is on 
the organisation security strategy, it is important to understand its security culture. Models and 
frameworks of InfoSec culture have a basis in organisation culture literature, as presented by 
Detert, Schroeder, & Mauriel, (2000). However, different authors have different views on 
whether InfoSec culture  should be incoporated in oganisational culture or should stand alone. 
The framework  by Joo, Chang, Maynard, and Ahmad (2009) demonstrated that it is highly 
beneficial to incoporate InfoSec culture into organisational culture. 
According to von Solms (2000), information security culture is part of the third wave of InfoSec: 
institutionalisation. The third wave is characterised by InfoSec standardisation, InfoSec 
Certification, cultivating an InfoSec culture  and  implementing metrics that always measure 
Infosec aspects (von Solms, 2000). As a culture, Infosec can be the natural way of operation by 
employees. This can infer that it is a component of orgnisational culture. Like culture, security 
culture is learned; therefore security learning models can aid organisations to create their own 
cultures. 
Alfawaz, Nelson, and Mohannak (2010) developed a conceptual framework of InfoSec, which 
models how knowledge, skills and values influence InfoSec practices. They classified the 
practices into four modes which speak to different organisational cultures. Mode 1 is infancy, 
where nothing is in place, or technical requirements are in place, but not communicated to the 
end user, i.e. Von Solms’s first wave is in place and may be a part of the second wave also. 
Mode 4 is the ideal situation and speaks to the third wave; culture has been intitutionalised. The 
four modes and their descriptions are shown in Table 4-1: 
In this study there will be no enumeration of the level of organisational security, but will use the 
modes to identify the state of the institution under study. With this understanding it will be 
possible to position the InfoSec culture needs and their impact on user behaviour and experience 
with InfoSec features. 
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Table 4-1: InfoSec behaviour modes adopted from Alfawaz et al., 2010 
Mode  Name Description  
1 Not Knowing- Not Doing End users do not know the organisation's requirements for information 
security, such as policies in place and their requirements; they also are 
not educated on security.     Consequently they do not behave 
correctly with regard to set security standards and best practices.  
2 Not Knowing- Doing End users do not know the organisation's requirements for information 
security, such as policies in place and their requirements; they also are 
not educated on security.     However, they behave as expected. 
3 Knowing- Not Doing End users know the organisation's requirements for information 
security, such as policies in place and their requirements; they are also 
educated on security. However, they do not follow the requirements.   
4 Knowing- Doing End users know the organisation's requirements for information 
security, such as policies in place and their requirements; they are also 
skilled on security behaviour and they follow the requirements.      
 
According to Chia, Ruighhaver, and Maynard (2002), investing in state of the art information 
security infrastructure and, at the same time, lacking a security culture to support end-user 
security, will be unprofitable for an organisation. Having looked at culture as one influencing 
factor, there is a need to consider technical aspects also. The next section presents end user 
behaviour towards security. 
4.7 END USER BEHAVIOUR TOWARDS SECURITY 
Furnell et al. (2005) carried out a survey to identify the challenges of understanding end users.  
They observed that the manner in which users are presented with security related decisions 
usually complicates the processes, resulting in them being unable to use the security aspects that 
they prefer or that are required of them. They targeted Microsoft Word, Outlook and Internet 
Explorer and their findings expose some complex areas, in which standard security features were 
poorly used by many of the sampled users (above average IT literate). Based on their findings 
they recommend better security functionality presentation to enable users to protect themselves. 
Recommendations include user training on: application security and how best they can use it,as 
well as security threats that they are exposed to when they connect to a network and how to 
manage them. They recommended further research in usability and security areas. To implement 
some of these recommendations there is a need to understand program security, since program 
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security has its own inherent complexity. This chapter set out to answer the question: “What are 
the suitable security criteria/ methods that can be used to evaluate UX of end user program 
security features?”, the next section presents security product evaluation methods and criteria. 
4.8 SECURITY PRODUCT EVALUATION METHODS AND CRITERIA 
From a technical perspective, security product evaluation methods and criteria examine relevant 
security parts of a program or system for compliance with security frameworks and 
methodologies. Current evaluation standards outlined in literature include Information 
Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC) used by the European Union (EU); Trusted 
Computing Security Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) used by the United States (US); Common 
Criteria (CC) - Hybrid of ITSEC and TCSEC, is a framework useful as a guide for the 
development, evaluation and/or procurement of (collections of) products with IT security 
functionality. INFOSEC Evaluation methodology (IEM) is used to assess vulnerability in 
systems and to validate the actual INFOSEC posture of those systems. INFOSEC Assessment 
Methodology (IAM) is a standardized baseline for the analysis of the INFOSEC posture. 
However, this is not applicable to features incorporated in non-security programs (Saint- 
Germain, 2005). Security Product Evaluation Methods and Criteria examine security relevant 
parts of a program or system for compliance with security frameworks or methodologies. 
Evaluation frameworks or methodologies and programs establish confidence in the security 
product vendor from the customer. They can assist security professionals in developing, 
implementing, and monitoring as well as in the maintenance of security programs (von Roessing, 
2010).  “Although there are no frameworks dedicated to information security at this time, there 
are many risk frameworks that may be of use” such as OCTAVE, COBIT, ITIL and ICIF (von 
Roessing, 2010). OCTAVE is a risk framework while ITIL is a management framework; on the 
other hand, COBIT and the international control integration framework have governance and the 
management of IT as their focus. 
Usability metrics measure usability dimensions such as effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction 
(Sharma, 2013). According to Sauro and Kindlund (2005), (as cited in Sharma, 2013), metrics 
for measuring usability are: task completion, error counts, task times, and satisfaction scores.  
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It is evident that there are no models, criteria and frameworks to evaluate EUPSF. In pursuit of 
our goal to come up with evaluation criteria for EUPSF, the next section focuses on security 
usage in general. 
4.8.1 Security usage 
The security features of any program that are configured and implemented by end users; the 
success significantly depends on the user’s interaction with the information presented by the 
feature, the choices of program users, and the impact of their actions. According to Adams and 
Sasse (1999), inadequate security communication with end users during design results in security 
mechanisms that present overheads, or oblige unworkable user behaviour; hence, many users 
have a tendency to circumvent such mechanisms. Security mechanisms and policies that are not 
user-centric and do not focus on users’ work performance, organizational strategies, and usability 
can result in security breaches and poor security (Adams & Sasse, 1999). 
Yee (2002) established ten principles for designing security from a user-centred point of view 
focusing on user interaction design in secure systems. If security is designed with users in mind, 
then the interaction with the features should fulfil the usability metrics (principles). Table 4-2 
presents Yee’s ten design principles for secure system interaction 
In this study, it is assumed that program security features meet these criteria. Heuristic evaluation 
will be used in Chapter 5 to investigate and validate the usability of the security features.  
Assuming that these principles hold true, the next section will discuss metrics for security 
evaluation.  
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Table 4-2: Design principles Yee, 2000 
Number  Principle Description 
1.  Path of least resistance  The most accepted way to complete any task should also be the most secure way. 
2.  Appropriate boundaries The interface should uncover, and the system should apply, distinctions between 
objects and between actions along boundaries that matter to the user. 
3.  Explicit authorisation A user’s privileges must only be made available to other actors as a result of an 
clear user action that is understood to imply permitting. 
4.  Visibility  The interface should allow the user to review any active actors easily and to 
privilege relationships that would impact security-relevant decisions. 
5.  Revocability The interface should permit the user to withdraw privileges easily that the user 
has granted, wherever withdrawal is possible. 
6.  Expected ability The interface must not give the user the impression that it is possible to perform 
impossible actions.  
7.  Trusted path The interface must provide an unspoofable and faithful communication channel 
between the user and any entity trusted to manipulate authorities on the user’s 
behalf. 
8.  Identifiability  The interface should enforce that distinct objects and distinct actions have 
unspoofably identifiable and distinguishable representations. 
9.  Expressiveness The interface should provide enough expressive power (a) to describe a safe 
security policy without undue difficulty; and (b) to allow users to express 
security policies in terms that fit their goals. 
10.  Clarity The effect of any security-relevant action must be clearly apparent to the user 
before the action is taken. 
4.8.2 Security metrics 
Metrics are the result of a process. They are conceptual data repositories used to define and to 
standardize information. Metrics do not organise information into knowledge; they record 
observations.  People are responsible for knowledge generation (Hayden, 2010). Unlike metrics, 
a measurement is observing and collecting data to gain concrete understanding of the phenomena 
under investigation (SANS, 2012). Security metrics provide information about IT security 
including costs and risks (asset value, threat and vulnerability are elements of overall risk) and 
must be based on a rigorous approach for security measurement and applied understanding 
seeking information security (Hayden, 2010). 
Worthwhile metrics reflect the degree to which security goals are being achieved and they 
motivate actions taken to advance the security program of an organization. They can also 
pinpoint the risk levels of not implementing certain actions and can be used to improve the levels 
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of awareness within the organization (Payne 2006). According to Hayden (2010), security occurs 
as a result of human activity. Dimensions of vulnerability include the level of understanding of 
security concerns by computer users.  
Jelen (2001) in SANS (Payne, 2007) defined metrics as derivations of comparing two or more 
measurements taken over time, while a measurement is a single point of view of specific, 
discrete factors.  Useful metrics reflect the degree to which security goals such as data 
confidentiality are being met and they drive actions taken to improve an organisation’s overall 
security program. They can also identify the risk levels of not implementing certain measures 
and can be used to raise the levels of awareness within the organisation. 
This study focuses more on measuring the third element of risk- vulnerability. Facets of 
vulnerability include the degree of understanding of security issues among computer users. Are 
there any best practices to follow in developing security metrics?  
Below are three security metrics lessons that can be used in developing an effective security 
metrics program in an organisation, as presented by Hayden (2010): 
1. Security Metrics Lesson #1 
Security metrics and consequent risk-management choices will improve as you 
develop your skill to collect, analyse, and understand data regarding security 
operations. 
2. Security Metrics Lesson #2 
Security is a business process that needs to be measured and controlled. 
3. Security Metrics Lesson #3 
Security is the result of human activity. Effective measurement programs make an effort 
to understand people as well as the technology they use. 
Payne (2006) defined steps to develop a process for a security metrics program. These are:  
1. Define the metrics program objectives and goals (provide metrics that communicate 
clearly how user experience with security interaction in end user programs can be 
improved through awareness to ensure that embedded security features are used 
effectively and efficiently for better user and organisational security. The goals are to 
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base the metrics program on improving awareness within our organisation; to 
communicate the metrics effectively to all stake-holders including end users). 
2. Decide on which metrics to generate (identify a specific security process to adopt) such 
as a compliance-based approach where you evaluate whether established standards 
(which need to be identified first) are being followed. If there is no framework in place, 
use a top-down or bottom-up approach to determine which metrics can be desirable to 
use. Start with goals and measurements to generate the metrics). Table 4-3 illustrates the 
top-down approach. 
 
Table 4-3: Top down approach 
1. Define the objectives of the 
security features. 
To increase the policy awareness 
in the organisation. 
Example objective for this study 
2. Identify the progress 
towards each objective. 
Current ratio of policy 
awareness compared to baseline 
2012 survey figure. 
 
3. Determine measurements 
for each metric. 
Number of people trained on 
security policies in the 
organisation. 
 
 
In this case some measurements were already done therefore the bottom-up approach in Table 4-
4 can be adopted: 
Table 4-4: Bottom up approach 
1. Identify measurements that can be collected for this 
process. 
Percentage of people who are not aware of security policies 
in the organisation 
2. Determine metrics that can be generated from the 
measurements.  
Train and improve the number of people aware of security 
policies since the last survey period 
3. Determine the association between derived metrics and 
established objectives of the overall security program. 
To increase security policy awareness among end users 
 
The security industry already uses several commonly recognized metrics today to measure 
aspects of organizational IT security including: 
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1. Risk matrices 
2. Security vulnerability and incident statistics 
3. Annual loss expectancy (ALE) 
4. Return on investment (ROI) 
5. Total cost of ownership (TCO) 
 
These metrics can be limited severely in terms of the value they bring to a security program as 
the measures are usually not well understood, and there is a tendency to measure aspects of 
security that are different from what their users believe they are measuring, regardless of being 
widely accepted.  
“The importance of quality data, the focus on security as a business process, and a greater respect 
for the role of people and social interactions in the security process are all important elements of 
a successful security metrics program” (Hayden, 2010). 
Several metrics have been identified to measure the usability of products or user interfaces. 
These focus on the hedonics and the pragmatics of the products. A vital aspect to encourage 
product use is to educate the user with regard to the existence and the benefits of using it and, as 
such, there is a missing element.  
4.9 SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed InfoSec focusing mainly on usability, Usable Security (USec), 
organisational security culture, security usage and end user program security features. These 
areas define the study premise. Information security was defined and focus was placed on 
embedded features in programs whose primary function is not security. This set the context for 
user interaction with these features as they primarily use the program for other purposes that are 
not security specific. The main objective is to be able to evaluate the UX of interacting with end 
user program security features. The basis of this objective is the assumption that security features 
are user-centred; therefore, their design conforms to usability guidelines. To validate this 
assumption, usability evaluations will be carried out on selected end user programs. Of the 
presented three usability evaluation methods (usability testing, usability inquiry and usability 
inspection), questionnaires from the UI methods, as well as heuristic evaluations and cognitive 
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walkthroughs, will be used in Chapter 5 to carry out the usability tests. Usability frameworks, 
models and attributes were discussed and applied to the study parameters. The ISO9241-210 
framework was applied to the study through literature review and a modified context-specific 
version is presented in Figure 3-5. Security usage in general was studied and general trends were 
noted; user behaviour is identified as a major concern. As the study focuses on the user 
perspective, literature on organisational security culture and a business model for information 
security was analysed. Worth noting was that awareness, knowledge, skills, values and basic 
assumptions play a crucial role in whether the user will or will not use embedded features. 
Navarro (2007) also states that “with the right training, employees can become an organization's 
strongest security asset". Awareness metrics design processes that are applicable to the study 
were also presented and metrics to measure awareness levels of case subjects were noted. The 
next chapter presents the data collection in a case study setup. 
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CHAPTER 5: DATA COLLECTION AND FINDINGS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Based on observations by the researcher, as well as the results of the pilot study discussed in 
Chapter 1, the formal data collection process was informed. The empirical user study was 
conducted in a typical ICT enabled environment. This chapter presents the case study of an 
academic institution that uses information technology to support its processes. The case study 
addresses Research Question 1 and the objective is to come up with factors influencing UX.  The 
question addressed by the study is: 
 
 
 
The chapter will follow the outline presented in the chapter map. 
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What are the factors affecting UX with embedded security features in end user 
programs? 
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5.2 DATA COLLECTION PLANNING 
Literature on HCI and InfoSec was presented in Chapters3 and 4 respectively. Based on the 
literature review, a theoretical framework was developed and is used to direct the study. To 
understand components of the framework in detail, it became imperative to conduct a case study 
of the phenomena. The purpose of the case study was to evaluate the importance of the 
theoretical framework components identified in literature studies by surveying end users in an 
organisation who use programs and their embedded security features to accomplish their daily 
tasks. A single case empirical study was conducted in a site where employees of the case 
organisation are identified as the end users and therefore termed participants.  
5.2.1 Overview of the case study 
The Polytechnic of Namibia is an academic institution in Namibia located in the nation’s capital 
city, Windhoek. Namibia is one of the developing countries in Southern Africa which has 
become a hub of technology as it houses a landing point for the WACS. This brought about 
increased Internet connectivity, coupled with government efforts to ensure that everyone is 
computer literate. This presents a security challenge to InfoSec. The nation is still in the infancy 
of developing a computer emergency readiness team (CERT); hence, it is an interesting case to 
study. The institution has a student enrolment of 13400 per annum and employs 670 full-time 
staff. Of the 670; 350 are academic staff members and the rest are support staff.  Each staff 
member has a desktop computer (PC) and/or laptop allocated to him/her upon employment. The 
student laboratories and library are equipped with PCs, which are used for practical sessions, as 
well as for information searches on the Internet and on e-library resources. Each PC has a 
Windows or Ubuntu operating system installed for daily business activities. Laboratories mainly 
use Windows, although in some departments Centos, Ubuntu, or MAC OS are used. Typical 
application software includes Microsoft Office, Internet browsers, integrated tertiary system 
(ITS), document readers (Acrobat), anti-virus software (Kaspersky lab), and email clients 
(mainly Thunderbird). 
5.2.2 Sampling 
Purposeful heterogeneous sampling was employed for selecting the case site as it allows for an 
in-depth study of one case to gain rich insights into the phenomenon (Saunders et al., 2009). The 
site has the typical elements in an IT driven organisation such as people, processes and 
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technology.  The elements are dynamically connected by culture, human factors, governance, 
enablers, support, etc. The case is one of many similar cases worldwide; its study will provide a 
baseline for studying similar cases. 
The participants in this research comprised lecturers, administrators and other professionals who 
make up the University community. The population was selected to show the diversity of users, 
who use similar programs for similar purposes to achieve different objectives from different 
backgrounds and professions. The participants were conveniently selected for the pilot study to 
give the views of both technical support and typical users, for the main study, respondents were 
self-selecting.  For heuristic evaluation peers and experts in the fields of study were purposefully 
selected to ensure that their evaluation is based on skills and knowledge of the domains. This 
will give credibility to the recommendations. 
5.3 DESIGNING THE DATA COLLECTION 
This section presents the process followed in designing the data collection. 
5.3.1 Research instruments used 
Semi-structured interviews, policy document reviews and a self-administered online survey were 
used to conduct the case study research. 
5.3.2 Designing of the instruments 
5.3.2.1 Semi-structured interviews 
Two sets of questions were compiled to guide the research.  The questions were formulated to 
gain a richer understanding of phenomena to be studied and to ascertain if there is indeed a 
problem. The target participants were five technical (group 1) and five non-technical (group 2) 
employees. Questions were open-ended, so as to allow respondents to provide insight into the 
situation.  
5.3.2.2 Survey questionnaire 
An online survey questionnaire was designed to collect data, based on the findings of the pilot 
study and it is found in Appendix A1. The questionnaire was used to address end user issues in 
Information Security focusing on end user application programs. The aim was to establish 
security problems resulting from inadequate support for end users in using security features 
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embedded in the application programs they use daily. Data was collected about security 
awareness, experience with security interaction, usage and problems associated with the use or 
lack of application security. The raw data is confidential and was used to assess the extent of a 
need to improve the end user’s interaction with security features on their computers. To 
determine the appropriate questions, the Research Question 1 of the study was broken into 
sections reflecting the main pillars of the theoretical framework. Standard end user information 
security questionnaires, such as the one by University of Wisconsin (2008), were adapted for 
use. The questions were mainly open-ended to allow for rich qualitative data to be gathered. 
Respondents were encouraged to think and to express themselves freely. Closed questions were 
also included to enable quick answers and to increase the number of responses as the tool was 
long. They also allowed for quick reflection on the state of affairs. Where closed questions were 
employed in most cases other responses were included to allow for capturing responses that may 
have been missed by the list provided. To improve the responses, rated ranked (e.g. Likert scale), 
matrix and multiple selection questions were also used. Three- and five-point Likert scales were 
used to capture attitudes, frequency and technology usage.  
The online survey is quick and inexpensive to administer. It also saves time in analysis as the 
data can be analysed electronically using statistical tools. A survey was conducted in order to 
understand how the community handles security issues related to electronic information.  To get 
an overall understanding of information security problems resulting from inadequate end user 
support, questions focused on ensuring that information was gathered about end users’ 
knowledge (awareness) of the security threats they are exposed to when they connect to 
networks, as well as security solutions; awareness of computer security policies in the 
organisation; experiences with security interaction; security technology/solutions usage among 
the community members; the programs used for primary tasks at work/ job; knowledge of 
security features embedded in application programs and operating systems; and behaviour 
towards security alerts. 
The information was gathered to give a holistic picture of the issues impacting on user 
experiences with security. 
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5.4 PREPARATION FOR THE DATA COLLECTION 
From the pilot studies it was evident that end users and technical staff members had different 
views regarding security challenges in the organisation. It was necessary to ensure that the 
participants in the research reflected both parties. The first step towards objective data collection 
was to identify the participants for the pretesting and validation of the survey, followed by the 
identification of participants to participate in the survey. Once the participants were identified, 
then a pilot (exploratory) study was conducted to explore and establish the security awareness, 
behaviour, experience and attitudes towards EUP security features in the case site, using each 
data gathering method so that problematic areas could be uncovered and corrected.The pre-
testparticipats did not participate in the main survey as they had already responded and their 
responses were used to improve the tool for the main study. 
5.4.1 Permission to carry out research 
A letter seeking permission from the Bureau of Computer Services (BCS) was written to the 
network and security manager of the case site. Upon receipt of the signed approval (see 
Appendix A2), a cover letter was designed for the survey explaining the purpose of the study, as 
well as establishing rules for confidentiality and ethical conduct. The cover letter is provided in 
Appendix A3. A pilot study was then conducted to establish the existence of the problem through 
semi-structured interviews, and policy document reviews; and the survey tool was pretested. 
5.4.2 Pilot studies: Data collection method 1: semi-structured interviews 
As presented in Section 1.2.2, semi-structured interviews (see Appendix A4) were carried out 
with five technical (group 1) and five non-technical (group 2) employees to understand the 
attitude of the population representatives towards security features and the support given or 
received. Two sets of six questions were presented to the two groups. The findings reflected are 
presented in Section 1.2.2. After the pilot study, a policy document review was carried out, 
which is presented in the next section. 
5.4.3 Data collection method 2: Policy document reviews 
Organisational policy documents available on the staff intranet were reviewed and compared to 
the templates from SANs. The policies conform to the standard templates. The analysis of 
documentation at the case site revealed a list of policies for implementation. The following 
policies exist at the case site: 
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1. Acceptable ICT use describes the acceptable use of ICT equipment in the institution to 
guarantee that the organization is safe from “risks including virus attacks, compromise of 
network systems and services, disclosure of confidential information and legal issues”, 
which is meant for all ICT users in the organization. It is meant to spell out acceptable 
use of ICT resources (Polytechnic of Namibia, 2008). 
2. Password Policy, defining practice for constructing and safeguarding strong passwords, 
and the frequency of change. 
3. Remote access, for all employees accessing the institution’s network off-campus with 
either a company-owned or personal computer, laptop, workstation or mobile device for 
work-related activities. 
4. Virtual Private Network (VPN) which prescribes how to use Remote Access through 
IPsec or L2TP VPN connections to the organization’s corporate network. 
5. Wireless communication that prohibits connecting to the organization’s networks through 
unsafe mobile communication devices and specifies that access can only be approved by 
the ICT department. 
Having established the existence of standard policy documents it became necessary to 
understand why an organisation having the right infrastructure, human resources and policies to 
drive their process is challenged with security issues. An imperial study was carried out, which 
process is described in Section 5.4. Before conducting the actual study the survey tool was 
pretested and validated. 
5.4.4 Survey validation 
The questionnaire was sent to professionals for validation. It was checked for achieving the 
objective of the data collection, convergence, language and its appropriateness as a tool. A 
survey question's validity is established by how well it measures the phenomenon on which it is 
intended to gather data. Validity can either be convergent or divergent; it can be measured 
through comparing answers to questions measuring the same aspect (convergent), or by 
comparing the answer to the same participant's response to an exact opposite question. 
Convergence was tested on the objective and question relatedness. Feedback was used to refine 
the tool. The feedback included the following: 
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1. “As a general comment, the fact you are carrying out a pilot study must have a single, 
clean statement to which all the questions relevantly apply. I am struggling a bit to find it, 
as well as to relate some questions to the overall picture; perhaps they are treated further 
in the questionnaire (I did not go too far beyond the first page).” This was addressed in 
the introduction. 
2. I just took a tour through your questionnaire: 
1. “You certainly will need to put in ranges for age and department requests. 
Psychologically you get a truer answer if the respondent can "hide" behind a 
range than when s/he is put on the spot to reveal an exact number.” This was 
addressed on employment period; however, the age was additional information. 
Hence, the strata were not important even in the analysis of findings. It was 
captured to understand how the individual responded. In case of departments, it 
was difficult to do so as there were many departments in a faculty and 
respondents generally use preference to identify their departments; hence, they 
were at liberty to state their department. Then classification would be done 
relative to institutional groupings. 
2. “Wherever you have "Other", it would be a great idea to actually capture the 
detail. You get a wealth of surprising information with this option.” This was 
rectified by providing space to add specifics.  
3. “I notice you had a request that has an option for "ALL THE ABOVE". I believe 
it would be good if all the other boxes are either unchecked automatically, or 
checked automatically to confirm this selection.  Otherwise your analysis might 
throw out some interesting errors at analysis.” This was rectified. 
4. Where the respondent has responded "NO", do not insist on getting their "YES" 
version in a follow-up question. You will need to examine the question links. 
Hide/unhide of options is a good idea in this case, just as you would on a paper-
based questionnaire (e.g. if answer is "NO" proceed to Question n, or skip 
Question n). 
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5.4.5 Data collection method 3: Survey pre-test  
Pretesting helps to determine the strengths and weaknesses of the survey with regard to wording, 
order and question format. Pretesting also determines if the questionnaire is understandable 
(participating) and the relevance of the choice of analysis (undeclared). 
Once the validation feedback was incorporated, the survey tool was pre-tested with seven users. 
A cover letter explaining the purpose of the study and the survey link were distributed via email. 
The recipients of the pre-test email comprised one professor in Human Computer Interaction, 
two Doctors in Communication, and four lecturers in the school of Information Technology (IT). 
The choice of the participants was to ensure that field-specific content is validated, and that the 
flow and language issues are also exposed. Using the responses gathered the tool was fine-tuned 
and deployed to all population members (670) using a broadcast email to distribute the link. The 
pre-test helped to pick up any typos, and highlighted ambiguity in the wording of the questions. 
5.5 DATA COLLECTION 
5.5.1 Data collection plan 
The focus of the study was established by forming questions about the problem to be 
investigated and determining a purpose for the study. The problem to be studied addressed 
Research Question one. Seven main questions were developed and each was further broken 
down to collect as much information to understand the phenomena in context. A questionnaire 
was developed using E Surveys Pro. The study objectives and cover letter were publicised to all 
staff members in the institution through a broadcast email together with a link to the online 
survey. Data was collected only from those who willingly chose to respond, over a period of 21 
days. The survey tool was open for 21 days during which 58 annonymous participants described 
in table 5-2 completed the survey.  
5.5.2 Data collected 
Semi-structured interviews collected end users’ and technical support opinions about information 
security in the organisation. Thetechnical voice brings out how the technology experts view the 
problem at hand and their proposed solutions, on the other hand the typical user will explain why 
they behave in the manner they do. Understanding the user presents an opportunity to understand 
how intervention can be designed and implemented in the case site. On the other hand, policy 
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document reviews collected information about the policies in existence and their compliance to 
international standards. 
5.5.2.1 Demographics 
The participants entered their age, gender, department and their employment period in the 
organisation.  The gender distribution is shown in Table 5-1. 
Table 5-1: Participants’ representation by gender 
Gender Total 
Female 25 
Male 33 
Total Respondents 58 
 
Table 5-2 shows the department affiliation of participants to the departments constituting an 
academic institution.  
Table 5-2: Respondents’ affiliation 
Department Participants (n=58) 
School of Information Technology 18 
School Of Business Management  8 
School of Communication, Media & Legal Studies 2 
School of Engineering 2 
School of Natural Resources 3 
School of Health and Applied Sciences 1 
Computer Services 2 
Centre of Open and Long life Learning 4 
Centre of Teaching and Learning 1 
Centre of Entrepreneurial Development 1 
Registrar 1 
Library 1 
Auxiliary Services 1 
Payroll, Finance and Accounting 3 
Human Resources 2 
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Namibian German Logistics 1 
Campus Security 1 
58 responses were collected from personnel in the departments shown in Table 5-2. The 
affiliation speaks to the computer user expertise.  
The employment period in the organisation speaks to the culture; the longer you stay the more 
you conform to the norms and practices in your environment. Table 5-3 is a summary of 
respondents’ tenure. 
Table 5-3: Participants’ employment period in the case site 
Employment period Total respondents 
0- 6 Months 4 
6-12 Months 3 
1 Year + 6 
2 Years + 10 
3 Years + 11 
4 Years + 3 
5 Years + 21 
 
The results are based on inductive analysis of security threats and solution awareness; user 
behaviour while interacting with security features; their attitudes and feelings towards security; 
and security policies in place. The interpretations are supported with extracts of actual responses. 
Critical literature review has established that Information security problems are largely due to 
users’ behaviour towards security features and perceptions of program security. To evaluate UX, 
a hierarchical approach was employed as presented by Colabro (2012). It presents three stages as 
follows: 
The first stage is general knowledge that is used to provide a basic sense of end user program 
security usage. It gives an overview of whether end users are aware of security threats and 
solutions at their disposal. Tools for this include usage analysis and in this study a survey was 
used to gather the information. Next, data was collected on user behaviour. 
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Stage two is understanding user behaviour, which is used to determine what users are doing and 
where a problem exists (are they using security features or not?). This can be used to establish 
why users are not using security features. The tool used for this is a case study where an online 
survey (using E Surveys Pro) was deployed to a population of 670 end users and the sample 
respondents (53) were analysed for patterns.  Once the behaviour is known, the next step is to 
measure UX associated with the features. 
Stage three is influencing the users by determining if a security feature is compelling through 
measuring the emotion associated with the feature. The researcher used a survey to find out how 
the users think and feel about embedded security features in the programs they use.  This is 
followed by recommended mechanisms to ensure positive experiences for users while using the 
security features.Table 5-4 is a summary of the findings of a survey conducted in line with stages 
one and two. 
Table 5-4: Summary of survey findings 
Survey question Findings Survey 
Section 
Your knowledge of the 
security threats you are 
exposed to when you 
connect to the network. 
Users not aware of the security threat associated with disclosure of 
passwords 
Participants are aware of their email program handling spam 
Participants are generally aware of security threats they are exposed to.  
Shows that the participants are aware of whether they were 
compromised or not, yet the prior question indicates low awareness. 
This is contradictory- likely that they do not know what they are saying 
92% Of participants did not receive any computer security training 
8.8 
 
8.1 
2.1 
2.2 
 
 
4.1 
Your awareness of computer 
security policies in the 
organisation. 
At most 29% of the participants know of the password policy followed 
by internet with 23%, then general computer usage with 21% and 
wireless has 13%. Ironically, every staff member has a computer for 
their work; all academic staff also have a laptop which connects both to 
the wired and wireless networks in the organisation. 
Participants are not aware of the existence of the policies; hence, the 
policy application is not exercised. 45% got the awareness from BCS, 
but it was by signing the document not reading through and 
understanding it. 
Users do not adhere to institutional policies on general computer usage. 
All problems must be reported to BCS; however 41% of the participants 
depend on friends and the internet. 
4.2-3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8.6 
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Survey question Findings Survey 
Section 
Your experiences with 
security interaction. 
 Majority of participants acknowledge having received security alerts 
A large number of users feel that the notifications are disruptive, 
irritating and annoying -63%, while only  30% feel  positively about it 
They appreciate system feedback with regard to their actions 
 Participants are generally negative about acting on displayed security 
alerts/ notification (58%). 
Despite their appreciation of the feedback, they still have negative 
feelings towards the display of notifications which require their action. 
Participants are usually busy with core duties, they feel they are either 
not responsible for security; or it’s their computer therefore must be 
responsible, or they are obliged to act and yet others feel they should 
protect their information. 
Participants regard alerts as being informative, warning, reminders or 
notifications 
 
6.1 
6.3 
 
 
6.4 
6.5 
 
 
 
6.6 
 
 
 
3.5 
Security technology/ 
solutions usage among the 
community members. 
Participants display a great deal of knowledge about password usage 
and handling. 
Participants are aware of the need for different passwords for accessing 
different resources. 
Participants know that passwords should not be written down 
 Only a few of the participants share passwords with their colleagues. 
7.1-4 & 5.2 
 
7.1 
 
7.2 & 7.3 
7.4 
The programs you are using 
for primary tasks at work/ 
job. 
The popularity of programs among participants is best with email client 
at 100%; next are web browser at 92%; then  word processors (86%); 
next is ITS at 68%; followed by spreadsheets and presentation software 
both at  62%. The document readers are at 50%; the rest are seldom 
used. 
The computer is mainly used as a tool for communication, then 
research, internet browsing, teaching, internet banking, and 
administration. 
A diversity of email clients are in use, contrary to expectations. 
 Social networking programs are used, especially  Facebook, followed 
the professional network LinkedIn 
5.1 
 
 
 
 
9.8 
 
 
8.5 
5.4;3.13 &3.14 
Your knowledge of security 
features embedded in your 
Application Programs and 
Operating System. 
46% of respondents configured program security options 
68% of participants are aware of the existence of spam filters in their 
email programs  
Very few participants are aware of encryption mechanisms for emails 
(e.g. digital signature, certificates same status) 
5.2 
8.1 
 
8.4 
How you behave towards 
security alerts. 
Majority of participants make informed decisions. They actually read 
through before making a choice; however, 18% ignore or just click to 
6.2 
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Survey question Findings Survey 
Section 
get rid of the message.Password controlled access is better secured; 
however, they are prone to social engineering as they (40%) trust 
anyone who claims to be technical support with their login credentials.  
Participants are cautious about email attachments although they trust 
emails from unknown sources. 
When confronted with a computer problem, end users trust the insecure 
Internet (29%) for help, and 12.5 trust their colleagues for a solution. 
This exposes them to internal threats as well as to hackers. 
Users generally do not update their programs as often as required with 
27% only doing it often; 53% when prompted by the software or 
technician; and 18.5% sometimes or never update. 
7.7% of the participants disable security programs from running on their 
PC; however, the majority let them run. 
The majority of respondents do not disable alerts from running (83%) 
The respondents who disable alerts do so because they feel negatively 
about it. Even among those who say it is their responsibility, there are 
still others who disable the alerts as shown in the error handling cross 
tab. 
Many end users allow add-on to run from the Internet, coupled with the 
fact that most of them have administrative rights on their machines. This 
poses a great security risk. 
Mixed feelings among respondents; however, most will move away 
from the site and do nothing about it. A few would contact the 
webmaster. The patterns show that they are aware of restrictions to visit 
certain sites. If genuine, they act on it. 
The majority of respondents feel it is appropriate for organisations to 
block some sites 
86% of respondents can install programs on their machines. 
Many of the respondents download and install software from the 
Internet and do not use secure connections [cross tab] 
 
8.8 
 
 
8.2 & 8.3 
 
8.6 
 
 
3.1 
 
 
3.3 
 
3.4 
3.5 
 
 
 
3.6 
 
 
3.7 
 
 
 
3.8 
 
3.9 
3.10 &11 
The findings have established that many factors, such as lack of knowledge, awareness, 
prioritizing their work targets and misconceptions regarding security threats affect end user 
experience with security. This, in turn, influences how they do/ not secure their information. The 
next section will focus on knowledge of security threat; question 1 of the survey. 
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5.5.2.2 Knowledge of security threats 
The users are generally aware of the information security threats that they are exposed to. The 
survey showed awareness as high as 94% for hacking and as low as 30% for social engineering, 
as depicted in Figure 5-1. 
 
Figure 5-1: End user awareness of security threats 
End users have heard about security threats; however, 13% of the respondents knew that they 
had been hacked; 24% were not sure and the remaining 63% knew they had not been hacked. It 
is quite likely that they do not understand how hacking is carried out; hence, they cannot detect 
it.  Of the 92% who are aware of what spam is, 64% know that they have been victims of spam 
and explain how it happened to them. In most cases it was through unknown email, one 
responded testifies that “I received some unsolicited and unwanted mails into my inbox. Viruses 
affected my computers and these mainly came from the students’ memory sticks I opened on my 
computers and attachments on certain documents that were sent to me by people I do not know.” 
The second part of the response speaks to how computers are usually infected due to downloads 
of infected or malicious files, and sharing of usb devices. The same trend is observed for all the 
other threats, as shown in Table 5-5. 
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Table 5-5: UX with security threats 
Have you ever been a victim 
of: Yes % Yes No % No 
Do not 
know 
% Do not 
know 
Total 
responses 
Hacking 7 14 32 63 12 24 51 
Phishing 10 19 30 58 12 23 52 
Spam 32 64 13 26 5 10 50 
Spyware 16 35 21 46 9 20 46 
Virus  43 83 6 12 3 6 52 
Worm 24 48 15 30 11 22 50 
Social Engineering 3 6 17 36 27 57 47 
 
Further enquiry showed that 68% of the users are aware of their email programs handling spam. 
With this level of awareness, it is tempting to assume that they know how to handle their emails 
well; however. 44% would open emails from unfamiliar sources and 29% open all attachments 
they receive. When confronted with a problem, 40% will disclose their passwords to the 
“support” personnel. This support can be offered telephonically or using remote desktop 
managers. They do not have a perception of the implications of disclosing their passwords. This 
indicates that there is no user training on information security, as confirmed by 92% of the 
participants shown in Figure 5-2. 
 
Figure 5-2: Security training 
5.5.2.3 Security Policy awareness 
The findings show that, at most, 29% of the participants know of the policies that exist in the 
organisation. 29% know about the password policy, followed by Internet at 23%, general 
computer usage at 21% and wireless hat13%. Ironically, every staff member has a computer for 
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their work, all academic staff members also have a laptop that connects both to the wired and 
wireless networks in the organisation. Of those who know about policies, 45% learnt about them 
from the right office and the rest from a colleague or friend.There is a need for the organisation 
to train up users on policies, the organisation has no awreness programs in place. This shows that 
users are not aware of the existence and proper usage of the policies; hence, the application of 
policies within the organisation is not there. The findings reflect that there is no adherence to the 
policies, as shown by the behaviour when confronted with a computer-related problem. The 
official way is to seek help from the Computer Services, yet Figure 5-3 shows that about 42% 
seek it from the most untrusted sources of information such as the Internet, friend or colleague. 
 
Figure 5-3: Source of help 
5.5.2.4 User experience with security interaction 
The end users acknowledge receiving security alerts and appreciate receiving system feedback. 
They feel it is “informative” and serves “To inform me when a program needs to be updated or if 
a virus has been detected”. However, they have negative feelings (63%) for notifications, 
especially when required to act on them (58%). When asked “Updates prompt you with a 
notification to install every 3 hours if the expiry date is more than 24 hours away, and hourly if 
within 24 hours. How do you feel about this?” most of the responses were “irritated”, “annoyed”, 
“this is too often” and time consuming among others.  For instance one responded to question 3 
said it should be the technician’s responsibility: “I have lots of work to consider thinking about 
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security”; and yet another said “there is a department respossible for that”. Among those who are 
irritated their response is “Because most the time it happens while I am very busy and it seems 
like it stops me from working effectively.” or “Because you are busy with some task and then 
you need to stop everything to adress the message.”. Figure 5-4 shows some of the feelings they 
experience with the interactions, such as disruptive, irritated and annoyed. The majority have 
negative feelings; however, 41% feel it is their responsibility as reflected in their responses: “I 
am responsible for the computer and the information thereon so I need to take the messages 
seriously”. 
 
Figure 5-4: Feelings towards acting on security messages 
5.5.2.5 Security technology/Solution Usage 
Table 5-6 shows the frequency of using different types of security technology. Anti-viruses and 
passwords are the most used protection mechanism with a presence of 71%, followed by 
firewalls. Updates are only implemented by 33% and this means the systems are left vulnerable 
to current and new attacks targeting known vulnerabilities. The most shocking realisation is the 
fact that end users do not back up their information, with only 22% doing it.   
 
 
 
Irritated
Annoyed
Frustrated
Indifferent
My work is disturbed
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Table 5-6: Frequency of using security technology 
  %Not at all %Rarely % Sometimes % Often %Always 
Antivirus 2 0 11 15 72 
Firewall 11 8 11 21 49 
Antimalware 47 13 11 9 19 
IDS 53 15 15 8 9 
Passwords 6 0 6 17 72 
Patches 47 13 13 8 19 
Updates 9 13 17 26 34 
Backup 9 9 32 26 23 
Encryption 45 23 13 11 8 
 
5.5.2.6 Frequently used programs 
These are the application programs used to perform daily tasks by end users on their computers. 
Table 5-7 is a presentation of programs used in the case site. 
Table 5-7: Program usage 
 Program % Always % Sometimes % Not at all 
Word processor 86 10 4 
Spreadsheets 62 36 2 
Presentation 62 36 2 
Graphics 20 56 24 
Project management 4 30 66 
Document readers 50 28 22 
Database management 18 42 40 
Email 100 0 0 
Web browsers 92 6 2 
ITS 68 30 2 
Other 26 52 22 
 
In his study, it was established  that the most popular programs are email clients at 100%, web 
browsers at 92%, word processors at 86%, ITS at 68%, followed by spreadsheets and 
presentation software, both at 62%, document readers are at 50%, and the rest are seldom used, 
as shown in Table 5-7.  
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These findings reflect on the Furnell et al. (2005) findings where they identified the same 
programs as popular. SANS (2009), SANS (2011) and (TippingPoint, 2009) have also rated the 
popularity and security exploitation of application programs, they found MS Word and Adobe 
among   the popularly exploited (due to late or no patching) and most popular end user programs.  
Table 5-8 shows that the computer is mainly used as a tool for communication (emails, chats and 
instant messging), then for research, internet browsing, teaching, internet banking, and 
administration, in that order. 
Table 5-8: Uses of the computer 
 
% Always % Sometime % Not At All 
Communication 87 13 0 
Research 85 15 0 
Teaching 57 38 4 
Administration 51 47 2 
Internet Browsing 83 17 0 
Internet banking 53 30 17 
Downloads 40 34 26 
Music, Skype, Games 17 51 32 
Other 17 47 36 
 
A diversity of email clients are in use, contrary to expectations. The case under study uses 
CommuniGate pro (Pronto webmail) for business; however, Figure 5-5 shows many others 
including Windows Live mail. 9% of users selected others and specified Pronto; therefore, there 
are 17 respondents using CommuniGate = 35%. 65% do not know that they use Pronto on a daily 
basis. 
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Figure 5-5: Email clients 
Social networking programs, especially Facebook (74%), followed by the professional network 
LinkedIn (65%), are popular among the respondents. They share a wide range of information 
with their contacts including photos, as well as personal and professional information. One 
respondend shares: “Usually information about workshops and conferences (professional) and 
family events (social).” What are the risks associated with this behaviour? 
5.5.2.7 Embedded security feature knowledge 
Only 46% of respondents have configured security options in their programs. The idea of 
encrypting information sent out via emails is unknown with only 4% using the feature. 
Embedded security is not being used as often as necessary. This presents an easy target for 
cybercriminals. 
5.5.2.8 Behaviour towards security interactions 
Behaviour is affected by organisational culture, as highlighted in Chapter 4. To understand the 
user behaviour in depth, the organisational basic assumptions, values and beliefs plus artefacts 
on information security need to be understood.  User behaviour is influenced by many factors 
such as lack of knowledge, prioritizing their work targets and misconceptions regarding security 
threats (Herzog & Shahmehri, 2007). The survey has confirmed the same facts. A majority make 
informed decisions; they actually read through before making a choice; however, 18% ignore or 
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just click in order to get rid of the message.  When it comes to passwords, they seem to be more 
careful although they are susceptible to social engineering attacks. They easily trust (40%) 
anyone who seems to be offering claims to be technical support with their login credentials. They 
are cautious about email attachments although they trust emails from unknown sources. 
When confronted with a computer problem end users trust the insecure Internet (29%) for help, 
and 12.5% trust their colleagues for a solution. This exposes them to internal threats, as well as 
to hackers. End users generally do not update their programs as often as required with 27% doing 
it often; 53% when prompted by the software or technician; 18.5% sometimes or never. In a 
quest to address this, end users were joined to a domain and some software updates have been 
automated from a central server.  The effectiveness; however, depends on the user logging onto 
the domain instead of onto their local PC. 
7.7% disable security programs from running on their PC; 17% disable alerts; however, the 
majority let them run. Those who disable alerts do so because they feel negative about them. 
They feel irritated, annoyed, frustrated, and indifferent. Their work is being disrupted or it is the 
technician’s responsibility to deal with the alerts; however, even those who claim it is their 
responsibility to look after their security, are users who disable the alerts. This is contradicting 
their feelings- there is no alignment of behaviour to feelings, even among those who say it is 
their responsibility. There are still others who disable the alerts as shown in Table 5-9, a crosstab 
of two tables. 
Table 5-9: Feelings about notifications and alerts handling 
  Feelings about notifications 
    Irritated Annoyed Frustrated Indifferent 
Work is 
disturbed 
My 
responsibility 
Technician's 
responsibility 
Alert 
Disabling 
Yes 8 8 8 8 25 17 25 
No 7 9 5 9 19 47 4 
 
There are mixed feelings about web sensing, when a message is displayed notifying them that the 
page they are trying to access has been blocked by the organisation. Most will navigate away 
from the site and do nothing about it. According to one responded, they “move away from the 
site and navigate to a site that is similar and is not blocked”. A few would contact the web 
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master, i.e. “If it is content that is work related then I'll contact the Systems Administrators to 
unblock it”. The patterns show that they are aware of restrictions to visit certain sites; if genuine, 
they act on it. However, the majority feels it is appropriate for organisations to block some sites. 
Of concern also is the fact that many end users allow add-ons to run on their computers from the 
internet, coupled with the fact that most of them have administrative rights (86%) on their 
machines. This poses a great security risk. Viruses and other malicious software can be executed 
remotely on their machines. They download and install software from the internet and do not use 
secure connections. 60% trust browser auto completion, which may lead to a hacker’s site 
without their knowing it. Based on this, there is a need to address the education aspect which 
targets basic assumptions in order to influence cognitive behaviour. The findings reflect that the 
end users belong to mode 1 and 2 of the information security behaviour modes framework by 
Alfawaz, Nelson, & Mohannak, (2010). As indicated by Schein (2004) a longitudinal in-depth 
study will reveal unconscious assumptions that shape Polytechnic of Namibia’s culture. The 
information gathered from the survey is not sufficient to help understand what drives user 
behaviour. 
5.5.3 Summary of findings  
The findings have established that many factors, such as lack of knowledge, lack of awareness, 
prioritizing their work and misconceptions regarding security threats affect the end user’s 
experience with security. Poor security-related decisions and behaviour with an overall negative 
experience with InfoSec are common, as programs are left vulnerable to exploitation by cyber 
criminals.  As an intervention user training on computer security and security policies in place 
are recommended. 
Improving information security means enhancing user attitudes towards security features in the 
programs they use for their work. To improve user experience with security the users must be 
aware of security threats, solutions/features; they must know the benefits of using the features 
and must interact with the security features.  
Literature on the problem domain established that user attributes such as awareness (of security 
issues, solutions and policies), attitude/perception; and EUPSF usability are among the key 
factors affecting UX with security feature interactions. It can be noted that awareness of security 
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issues, solutions and policies forms the basis of end user feelings while interacting with 
technology (EUPSF). The feelings shape attitude and perceptions which, in turn, influence user 
experience with end user program security features. User experience influences and is influenced 
by technology usability and organisational culture, both of which determine user behaviour. Poor 
usability results in negative feelings and user experience. This means that the user will not use 
the technology (behave negatively) and therefore, there is no information security. On the other 
hand, positive feelings and user experiences result in technology usage (positive behaviour) and 
ultimately, in information security. Organisational culture is not depicted in the theoretical 
framework as it is outside the scope of the study; it is a field of its own and will need a thesis of 
its own. The theoretical framework in Figure 5-6 is a product of consolidating the outcomes of 
literature studies presented in Chapters 3 and 4 and the findings from the case studies conducted. 
It covers the human factors, user experience, usable security, user behaviour and information 
security knowledge domains. 
 
Figure 5-6: Theoretical framework 
As the aim of the study was to determine the factors influencing UX with embedded security 
features, the following are the key factors were identified: 
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1. Awareness of security threats, solutions, policies 
2. Feelings invoked by interaction 
3. Usability of the security feature 
4. End user’s attitudes and perceptions of the security task 
5. Prior user experience 
6. User behaviour with security features 
7. Organisational security culture 
End users will be able to interact with embedded features only if they feel good about them (the 
security will be usable). In the light of all these factors, it is recommend that users be educated 
on security threats, solutions, policies and secure behaviour as a way of influencing future 
experience and organisational security culture.  
The next section will present a security awareness approach. 
5.5.4 Security awareness approach 
As established by the survey results, there is no awareness program in the case site. Following 
the awareness model by Spitzner (2012), the focus is first placed on compliance, which focuses 
on the implementation of standards, promoting user awareness and change through an awareness 
program tailored for the organizational needs; on long-term sustainment, which addresses how to 
improve the organizational posture continually through unceasing improvement; and on metrics, 
which measure the effectiveness of the awareness program.  Security metric development 
guidelines were already presented in Section 4.8.2 and were used to guide the security awareness 
approach that consists of two primary stages. 
Stage 1: Compliance with standards 
Based on the information gathered on end users’ knowledge of the security threats; awareness of 
security policies in the organization; security technology solution awareness and usage; and 
behaviour towards security interaction, it is evident that the organisation complies with ISO 
security standards on security management (ISO 27000 series). Good and relevant policies are in 
place and are implemented from the administrative side.  
Stage 2: Promoting awareness and change 
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To promote awareness and change, there is a need for a motivation or baseline to be established. 
It should not be based on what everyone else is doing. Since the survey has shown that 
knowledge of security threats and solutions, security policy awareness, security technology 
usage and negative user perceptions and behaviour with regard to security, there is a need to 
develop a reference metric for the organisation to evaluate the security awareness baseline. 
Based on the results presented in the previous section, metrics were developed using the Goal-
Question method presented in Section 4.8.2. For instance, the metric is user behaviour. The 
question asked is: how do you behave when confronted with a security dialogue? The goal is to 
measure user behaviour with security dialogue boxes.  
There are seven steps involved in developing a security metrics program, as presented in Section 
4.8.2. In this research the focus is on the first three presented, namely: 
1. Define the metrics program objectives and goals. 
2. The objective is to identify metrics that evidently lead to improving user interaction with 
security features. 
3. The goals are to have a metrics program founded on improving awareness in the studied 
organization; the metrics should be communicated effectively to all stakeholders (end 
users and technical staff). Decide on metrics to be produced. A bottom-up approach was 
adopted from Payne (2006) and is shown in Table 5-10.  
Table 5-10: Bottom-up approach employed for analysis of results 
Bottom-Up Approach 
Identify measurements that can be collected for this 
process. 
The percentage of users unaware of security policies in the organization; 
security threats and solutions; the ratio of users who behave securely. 
Define metrics that can be generated from the 
measurements. 
The number of users aware of security policies; threats and solutions from 
the last dated survey, as well as system and antivirus logs; the number of 
end users who behave securely and the number of successful security 
breaches logged by the security monitoring software. 
Determine the association between resulting 
metrics and established objectives of the overall 
security program. 
The metrics should inform the development of an awareness program that 
can increase the security policy, as well as threat and solution awareness 
among end users. 
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5.5.4.1 Findings on knowledge of policies 
The policies are well articulated; however, the effect of their implementation on user experience 
is unknown. Users barely know the security policies; hence, they do not use them as expected, as 
shown in the findings. Table 5-11 shows responses to the question: “To what extent do you know 
these policies? (1 is not at all and 5 is very well)” 
Table 5-11: Knowledge of policies 
 1 2 3 4 5 Response Total 
Password 11 2 11 12 15 51 
Wireless 14 9 14 7 7 51 
General computer usage 13 4 14 9 11 51 
Internet 14 4 9 12 12 51 
  
Extent 5 is the minimum risk ranked at one (1) and Extent 1 shows a major risk ranked at five 
(5). Generally the policy knowledge risk is moderate (3.04) because the participants identify with 
average to low knowledge on policies in the organization. Interviewed practical computer 
lecturers and IT laboratory technicians indicated that students are not assigned enough memory 
on campus servers and end user PCs to store their data and information. Their computer user 
accounts are mandatory. Typically mandatory user profiles delete user information/data on log 
off. This scenario encourages the use of removable devices among students as they share and 
save materials with peers or lecturers. From the survey results, 81% of the respondents use USB 
sticks to exchange information. Network sharing, Google docs and Drop Box are not common. 
From a security point of view, emails and memory sticks are good paths for spreading viruses. 
As witnessed in the computer laboratories, malicious code is the major breach and extends to the 
staff intranet. Malicious code mainly comprises virus infections with an 85% occurrence; the 
remaining 15% are Trojan horses, as captured in anti-virus logs. 
Using risk factor assignment to questions on security policies awareness, Table 5-12 presents the 
calculated awareness risk values for different policies in the organization. 
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Table 5-12: Calculated risk rating for security policy awareness 
Policy  Average risk value Awareness risk value Risk rating 
Password 171/51= 3.35 50 Elevated  
Wireless 137/51=2.69 40 Elevated  
General computer usage 154/51=3.02 45 Elevated  
Internet 157/51= 3.08 46 Elevated  
Overall  3.04 45 Elevated  
 
5.5.4.2 Security Policy Awareness 
The organisation has policy awareness ranging between 13% and 29% for the surveyed policies. 
Figure 5-7 shows how those knowledgeable about policies learnt about them. Interestingly, 
among those who responded some were not aware of the policies, yet they responded positively. 
  
Figure 5-7: Where users learn about security policies 
 Evidently, there is a need for user education with regard to organisational policy awareness, to 
ensure that those who know about their existence obtain the knowledge from the right sources. 
Consequently, there is no policy compliance as witnessed by user behaviour when confronted 
with computer issues. The policy compliant way to respond is to seek assistance from the IT 
support department; yet approximately 42% source assistance from less secure sources, including 
Internet, friends or colleagues, as shown in Figure 5-3. The general computer usage policy 
stipulates that all sensitive information must be encrypted; however, only 15% of the respondents 
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make use of the technology. User behaviour with regard to policies presents a major risk to the 
organisation’s security.  
5.5.4.3 Security metrics vs awareness 
Based on the findings, there is a need to develop and implement a security awareness program in 
the case site. Currently, the organization is at level 1 of the security awareness roadmap as 
described by SANS (2012). The security awareness roadmap has different levels with the first 
level stated as non-existent, followed by compliance- focused. The third level speaks to 
promoting awareness and change that, in turn, leads to long-term sustainment, which is evaluated 
by metrics at the final level 5. Figure 5-8 is the security awareness roadmap. 
 
Figure 5-8: Security awareness roadmap adopted from SANS (2012) 
The stages of implementing a security awareness program involve establishing a baseline, acting 
and then evaluating the impact. Based on the findings, specific security awareness metrics for 
establishing the baseline are proposed (see Table 5-13).  
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Table 5-13 Security awareness metrics 
Metric What is measured? How it is measured Details 
Awareness survey Number of users who: know 
about security policies; use 
policies; violate policies; 
know about security threats, 
breaches and solutions 
Survey 
Tracking user behaviour 
related to access policies 
To what extent do users know/ 
understand or use security tools, 
features or policies? 
User behaviour Number of users who behave 
negatively with regard to 
security 
Survey What is the current status at the 
case site? 
Computer infections How many computers are 
infected? 
Antivirus logs Are the infection behaviours 
related? 
 
For one to be able to design effective security awareness there is a need to carry out an 
awareness survey to establish a baseline. The baseline will serve as a reference or comparison 
point for measuring the impact of awareness campaigns. It is important to know what computer 
users already know. The findings reflect the absence of user training. This is a direct measure of 
metric 1. 
The second metric from Table 5-13 is user behaviour, which should align to policy and best 
practices. The number of users behaving negatively can inform an organization of the need to 
draw up a security awareness plan. It is important to have an understanding of what users do with 
the ICT resources. Thirdly, there is a need to know the computer attacks that affect the users, 
their frequency and how these impact on information and technology usage. Analysis of antivirus 
and system logs can reflect on the most prevalent infections, the sources, when they occurred and 
the number of devices affected. The source of infection and the propagation mechanisms of 
breaches can inform what needs to be changed in terms of behaviour and know-how. 
5.6 CASE STUDY VALIDATION  
As already said in Section 2.4.7, the quality of a case study can be demonstrated. There can also 
be a demonstration of the validity, and reliability of the process. Four tests for case study quality 
were applied, as shown in Table 5-14. 
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Table 5-14: Case study validity based on Yin, (2009) 
Test Case study tactic Phase when tactic was applied 
Construct validity 1. Framework components- literature review, semi- 
structured interviews and surveys were used as 
sources of evidence 
2. Awareness metrics- literature survey, survey, 
document (anti-virus logs, policy documents) review  
3. Heuristic evaluation - literature review, program 
documentation, survey, security task analysis were 
used as sources of evidence 
Data collection 
 
 
 
Data collection 
 
 
 
Data collection 
Internal validity Pattern matching/ coding 
Explanation building 
Address rival explanations (contradictions in the data) 
Use logic models 
 
Through literature review, where 
applicable, or document review.  
For metric calculation 
External validity Theory (the organisation is a representative case- single 
case selected. The embedded cases are programs typically 
common in the single-case contexts) 
The six steps of conducting a case study 
were followed; hence, this was 
addressed in the process.  
Reliability  Used the six-step case study protocol to conduct the 
study. 
Data collection can be repeated using the 
same tools and process. However, results 
vary as they are influenced by human 
and contextual factors, as well as by 
technological evolution. 
 
5.7 SUMMARY  
This chapter presented the case study that was conducted. The pilot case study explored the 
extent of the UX problem, and the main case study validated the extent of the problem and the 
components of the theoretical framework. The pilot and empirical studies have highlighted 
problems that face end users while using computers to process, store and transmit personal or 
organisational information. It was established that end users do not behave as expected and there 
is a need for action to reduce security risks in the organisation. User education on policies and 
their requirements, as well as security best practices, were some of the issues identified. The end 
user attitudes toward security are not positive. The findings reflect a scenario where there is a 
support mechanism from the organisation. It can be inferred that in scenarios where individuals 
are not supported they experience more negative encounters with security. 
The pilot and empirical studies have addressed stage 1 and 2 of Colabro’s (2012) three ways of 
influencing UX.  Based on the findings it became necessary to address stage 3. Stage 3 involves 
influencing the users by determining if a security feature is compelling, through measuring the 
emotion associated with the feature. Firstly, the proposed awareness metrics are used to evaluate 
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security status and to establish a baseline. Three metrics were identified: user awareness survey, 
user behaviour and computer infection levels. Secondly, USec and UX heuristics should be 
identified and exposed to peers and experts to perform cognitive walkthroughs and to evaluate 
each heuristic against a checklist of items. The HE is meant to give a general perspective of the 
usability and UX of features in selected applications, as well as to validate the UX criteria for 
usable security features.  After this, mechanisms are recommended to ensure positive 
experiences for users while using the security features. The mechanisms will ensure that end user 
experience factors identified in this study are addressed. This, is turn, will ensure that end users 
interact correctly while having a positive experience with embbeded security features. 
The findings reflect negative user experience (measured by usability, emotions and attitudes), 
moderate EUP usability and a need to train end users on security features. These are in line with 
the theoretical framework; hence, they can inform the developments of a framework in Chapter 
6. 
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CHAPTER 6: FRAMEWORK DESIGN 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter presented the empirical research that was conducted and its outcomes. This 
chapter sets out the process that was used to develop the framework following the outline in the 
chapter map.  Section 6.2 describes the different types of frameworks and motivates for the 
specific framework type that is presented in this chapter.  Section 6.3 presents the framework 
methodological design process. The subsequent sections describe and follow the design process 
outlined in Section 6.3.  Therefore Section 6.3.1 presents stage 1 of design science research 
namely the problem identification. Section 6.3.3.1 discusses construct identification and 
validation in 6.3.3.2. Section 6.3.3.3 discusses the relationships among the components identified 
in the previous sections and proposes the EUPSFUX conceptual framework in Section 6.3.3.4. 
Section 6.3.4 presents the actual framework in action. The framework is then evaluated in 
Section 6.3.5. Finally, the summary is presented in Section 6.4.  
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6.2 FRAMEWORKS 
Frameworks can provide the structure upon which the systems can be built. Generally, 
frameworks are operational in nature and provide structure: a detailed description of how to 
implement, create or manage a programme or process. They are characteristically principles-
based and open to continuous improvement. As a result, frameworks usually rely on subsidiary 
standards to ‘make it happen’, and they are further complemented by implementation guides and 
other detailed documents (von Roessing, 2010).  
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6.2.1 Types of frameworks and definitions 
Several types of frameworks exist and, besides the conceptual type, two others are common, 
namely: practical and theoretical frameworks (Eisenhart, 1991). A theoretical or conceptual 
framework is a set of views on how certain concepts or phenomena are linked and why it is so 
(Sekaran & Bougie, 2009). Table 6-1 summarises the different types of framework identified. 
Table 6-1: Summary of framework types 
Type  Description  
Practical A practical framework is determined by accumulated knowledge of practitioners and administrators, the 
results of preceding research and perspectives from a public view (Eisenhart, 1991; Lester, 2005).  
Theoretical  Represents one’s beliefs on how certain variables or concepts are related in a model and explanations of 
the phenomena (Sekaran & Bougie, 2009). 
Conceptual  “explains, either graphically or in narrative form, the main things to be studied—the key factors, 
concepts, or variables—and the presumed relationships among them” (Miles and Huberman 1994; p. 18) 
Others Structural, visual and social frameworks.  
 
According to Tomhave (2005), “A framework is a fundamental construct that defines 
assumptions, concepts, values, and practices, and that includes guidance for implementing 
itself”.  A conceptual framework is a reusable construct that implements a generic solution to a 
generalized problem (Lethbridge and Laganiere, 2005). It is a set of views on how certain 
concepts or phenomena are linked and why it is so (Sekaran & Bougie, 2009).  Borgatti (1999) 
defines it as a collection of interrelated concepts, like a theory but not necessarily as well 
worked-out. These definitions were important in this thesis as they provided the platform to 
come up with the proposed EUPSFUX framework. The following coined definition will be 
adopted for the EUPSFUX framework: A conceptual framework is a reusable construct that 
defines assumptions, concepts, values, and practices for implementing a generic solution 
about a phenomenon, including guidance for implementing and evaluating itself (Borgatti, 
1999; Lethbridge & Laganiere, 2005; Tomhave, 2005; Sekaran & Bougie, 2009).  
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Using the definition, the researcher was able to identify the major components of the framework 
and the key stakeholders to be involved in the framework design. Stakeholders are important in 
focusing our evaluation as they will be evaluated in the case of end users or will use the 
framework to evaluate UX (in the case of IT, UX and IS practitioners). As established in Section 
1.1, security is about the human factor; hence, the realistic collection of realities about product 
use is rarely possible without end users, especially when it comes to interactive products (Pentti 
Routio, 2007). Figure 6-1 shows the composition of a framework.  
 
Figure 6-1: Composition of a framework 
A conceptual framework can explain concepts and suggest relationships among concepts in a 
study; make a context available for interpreting research findings; explain observations through 
mathematics, models or statistics (Miles & Huberman 1994).  
Coming up with a conceptual framework involves defining the concepts and developing a 
conceptual model of your theory explaining the connections among the variables (Sekaran & 
Bougie, 2009). A concept is made up of a number of components and is defined by them 
(Jabareen, 2009). According to Miles and Huberman (1994), a conceptual framework describes, 
explicitly or in a story, the core aspects to be studied, the “key factors, concepts, or variables—
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and the presumed relationships among them” (p. 18).  It offers an interpretive approach to shared 
truth (Jabareen, 2009). Table 6-2 presents the different components of conceptual frameworks, 
descriptions and the literature source. 
Table 6-2: Component descriptions 
Component Description Source(s) 
Variables/ concepts/ 
key factors 
Theoretical/ abstract or empirical/descriptive 
Elements of participating variable 
Sekaran & Bougie,2009 ; Tomhave, 2005; 
Lethbridge & Laganiere, 2005; Miles and 
Huberman.1994  
Relationships  Conceptual model describing relationships and 
direction of the relationships 
Sekaran & Bougie ,2009 ; Tomhave, 2005; 
Lethbridge & Laganiere, 2005; Miles and 
Huberman ,1994  
Explanation of 
relationships/ 
Processes 
Explanation of why these relationships exist. 
A schematic diagram of the theoretical framework  
Sekaran & Bougie ,2009; Lethbridge & 
Laganiere, 2005 
Guidance Specific guidance for using and implementing the 
framework 
Tomhave, 2005; Lethbridge & Laganiere, 
2005 
 
The next sections will discuss types, purpose, presentation and limitations of conceptual 
frameworks.  
6.2.2 Types of conceptual frameworks 
Types of conceptual frameworks include working hypotheses; descriptive categories; practical 
ideal types; models of operations research, and formal hypotheses (Oates, 2006; Shields & 
Rangarajan, 2013). According to Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 18 and 54), they can be: 
rudimentary or elaborate; theory driven or commonsensical; descriptive or causal. They can be 
represented as a model (schematic (boxes and arrows) or mathematical/ statistical (with letters, 
numbers and mathematical symbols)). A conceptual paradigm is a preliminary design before 
validation (empirical investigation) (Nalzaro, 2012; Paditar, 2014). According to Vaughan 
(2008), they can be process frameworks showing how actions move from start to end, usually 
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used to address the ‘how?’ question; or they can be content frameworks where clear variables are 
identified and linked by relationships, to answer the ‘why?’ question. 
As this research aims to develop a descriptive conceptual framework, the components (concepts) 
will be identified; relations will be modelled and the outcome will be tested for evaluating the 
UX of EUPSF successfully. The concepts, in this case, are the topics that address user experience 
with security features interactions. These are UX, USec and user awareness. Section 6.2.2 
presents the purpose of conceptual frameworks. 
6.2.3 Purpose of conceptual frameworks 
According to Nalzaro (2012) and Paditar (2014), the purpose of conceptual frameworks is to: 
1. Clarify concepts and propose relationships among concepts in a study 
2. Provide a context for interpreting study findings 
3. Explain observations 
 
According to Vaughan, (2008), they offer investigators: 
1. The capacity to move past accounts of ‘what’ to justifications of ‘why’ and ‘how’. 
2. A way of defining a reference point that influences the definition and interpretation of the 
data that is gathered from the research question. 
3. A clarifying tool for choosing suitable research questions and associated data collection 
methods. 
4. A locus point/structure for the review of the literature, methodology and results. 
5. The delineation of the research. 
 
In this research the conceptual framework will serve as a tool for clarifying concepts, and their 
relationships, and will provide a context for interpreting research findings. Next, conceptual 
framework presentation strategies are discussed. 
6.2.4 Presentation of conceptual frameworks 
Conceptual frameworks can be presented using: flow charts; tree diagrams; shape-based 
diagrams – triangles, concentric circles, overlapping circles; mind maps or soft systems 
(Vaughan, 2008).  In this research the choice is to use shape-based diagrams.  
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6.2.5 Limitations of conceptual frameworks 
The framework is prejudiced by the know-how and understanding of the researcher – initial bias. 
After developing the theoretical framework, it guides the investigator’s thoughts and may 
influence choices regarding what to consider and what to disregard – on-going bias. This can be 
addressed through iteration of evaluation and development.  
6.2.6 Conclusion 
For the purpose of this study, a descriptive conceptual framework is deemed appropriate. The 
following section will present the descriptive conceptual framework (EUPSFUX) 
methodological design process. 
6.3 EUPSFUX METHODOLOGICAL DESIGN PROCESS  
Based on the different methodologies presented in Chapter 2, as well as on the literature review 
in Chapters 3 and 4, an application of the  framework development  process is presented in this 
section. The composition of end user experience measurement framework has four critical 
components (Ireland, 2014).  These components guarantee that UX metrics measure key factors 
of end users’ product experience influencing secure UX. The components are: end users’ needs 
understanding; knowledge of what is key to end users; identifying metrics to measure success for 
your environment (organisation and product) around the contextual themes; and end user success 
metrics identification for the themes (Ireland, 2014).  
The success of the research depends on having a full appreciation of end users and their 
interaction with security features. User studies were used to gather information that can help in 
understanding the users in context. Factors affecting end users were established and compared to 
literature. The proposed theoretical framework was thus validated by the findings. To evaluate 
end user program features UX,   information security and end user programs’  evaluation 
methods will be used jointly to reflect the intertwinning of the two fields. EUPSFs interact with 
end users; hence, their design follows user-centred program and security design principles in 
information systems.  This is worth considering in coming up with the framework. Figure 6-2 
shows how the phases of the design science research and problem based research were combined 
to come up with the framework design methodological approach. Stages involved at every point 
are depicted in the diagram, based on several literature sources and will be explained in detail 
when the phase is addressed.  
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Figure 6-2: EUPSFUX methodological design process 
The next section will present the application of the process phase by phase. 
6.3.1 Phase 1- Identify problem and motivate  
This section focuses on the area highlighted in Figure 6-3. As explained in Chapter 2, design 
science research methodology Phase 1, in line with problem based research cycle, stages 1 and 2, 
was used to define the problem that will be addressed by the framework. The question that 
motivated the framework development, as presented in Section 1.4 is - “How can UX 
evaluation criteria and metrics necessary for end user program security features be 
constituted into a framework? To answer this question a supporting question was answered 
first: What are the factors influencing user experience with security features? 
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Figure 6-3: Phase 1 of the EUPSFUX methodological process 
Literature reviews were conducted and documented in Chapters 3 and 4. This enabled the 
identification of a broad set of factors which can affect user experience in the studied 
organisation. The identified factors influenced the design of data collection tools for user studies 
and the analysis of the collected data presented in Chapter 5, as they formed the theoretical 
framework underpinning the study. The factors identified are: user awareness of security 
threats and solution; policy awareness and implementation; feelings invoked by 
interaction, prior user experience, end user’s attitudes and perceptions of the security task; 
security technology usage; as well as  user behaviour with security features, and technology 
acceptance. They led to the definition of the problem. The findings reflected the extent of the 
problem and motivated the need for an artefact.  
User awareness was identified as the basis to addressing the problem, as it forms the core of how 
the end users perceive and respond to interaction with security features. In order to address the 
lack of awareness problem it is necessary for the case site to design an awareness program. 
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However, before an intervention can be done, a well-defined criterion for evaluating the 
awareness levels was necessary. 
Upon identifying the significance of user awareness, it then became necessary to identify metrics 
that can evaluate adequately the user awareness levels in context. A bottom-up approach was 
used and the resultant metrics are: an awareness survey, user behaviour and computer infections. 
To delineate the research and align it to the study objectives, focus was placed on awareness 
surveys as they influence behaviour and, consequently, the number of computer infections 
witnessed. IT Technical staff administered the awareness survey to end users. The purpose of the 
awareness survey was to collect data on the factors influencing user experience of end user 
interaction with end user program security features. 
In the context of the study, stakeholders were critical as they are the people who influence the 
security culture of any organisation.  In this study, the identified major stakeholders are end 
users, information security experts, IT team (support/administrators/help desk) and UX experts, 
respectively. The relevance of artefact is with respect to stakeholders. Technically, these are the 
experts who plan, design, implement, operate, evaluate and manage the EUPSF. 
However, this is a subset of many users who can be involved including security and UX 
designers, programmers, system and security administrators (Zurko & Simon, 1996). Preliminary 
data was collected by surveying the stakeholders to establish the extent of the problem 
(exploratory study or/and actual study). The collected data was analysed qualitatively by coding 
and pattern matching and analysis. The findings were validated using literature as reference point 
in Chapter 5. The problem identification process is presented in more detail in Chapters 1 and 5, 
where the actual study is described. 
The output of phase 1 is a statement of the problem as indicated in Chapter 1, Section 1.3: 
 
 
6.3.2 Phase 2 - Define objectives of a solution 
The problem sets out the objective and questions of the study in line with stage 2 of the problem 
based research cycle, by Ellis and Levy (2010) and Phase 2 of DSRM process model by Peffers, 
There is a lack of user experience evaluation criteria (metrics) to assess the user 
experience of end user interaction with embedded security features in end user programs. 
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et al. (2008). The EUPSFUX framework will provide an evaluation platform, the evaluation 
criteria and the guidance to implement it and thus to solve the identified problem. The research 
objectives were defined upon identifying the research problem presented in Sections 1.4 and 
2.4.8.  Phase 2 is highlighted in Figure 6-4. 
 
Figure 6-4: Phase 2 of the EUPSFUX methodological approach 
Primary objective: 
This research aims to design a framework that can be used to evaluate the user experiences (UX) 
of interacting with end program security features from a user’s perspective.  
Specific objectives: 
1. To measure the state of UX with end user programs’ embedded security features. 
2. To determine the suitable security criteria/ methods that can be used to evaluate UX of 
end user program security features.  
3. To determine UX metrics/evaluation criteria can be used to determine the UX of end user 
program security features. 
4. To determine the components and requirements of end user programs’ security features’ 
UX and use them to develop the EUPSFUX framework. 
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6.3.3 Phase 3 - Design and development 
The research design was presented in Chapter 2 and can be summarised. The research followed 
an interpretive approach using inductive reasoning and qualitative methods in a case study setup. 
Qualitative data collection instruments employed include questionnaires, structured interviews 
and literature surveys. The questionnaire had open ended questions to collect end users’ 
opinions. 
Literature established the different fields and domains that are vital to the problem under study. 
These are human (end user) factors, user experience, usable security (EUPSF), user behaviour 
and information security. The outcomes of Chapters 3 and 4 were brought together to define the 
theoretical framework presented in Section 5.5.3. To validate the importance of the components 
of the theoretical framework, an empirical study was conducted and presented in Chapter 5. The 
empirical study identified seven factors presented in Section 6.3.1. The identified factors are 
elements of the five domains in the theoretical framework. However, the user behaviour and 
organisational culture will not be addressed. Policies were reviewed for compliance with 
standards and to validate their presence in the organisation as they are vital to influencing human 
behaviour and shaping the security culture of the organisation. However, there was no in-depth 
analysis to evaluate their overall impact on UX as an individual aspect.  The following sections 
will resent the stages of Phase 3 as highlighted in Figure 6-5. 
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Figure 6-5: Phase 3 of the EUPSFUX methodological approach 
6.3.3.1 Phase 3 - Stage 1:  Construct identification 
Stage 1 of the problem based research cycle is the research methodology. This provides a 
roadmap of how the research will be conducted (Ellis & Levy, 2008). The outputs of this phase 
are constructs and associated components for the framework, as shown in Table 6-3.  
The concepts/ constructs in this case are the topics which address user experience with security 
features interactions, as identified in Chapters 3 and 4 and presented in the theoretical framework 
in Section 5.5.3.  The chosen components were based on the analysis of the empirical data, as 
well as on the theoretical framework. As there are many dimensions to UX, for the purpose of 
this research focus will only be on interaction of UX components. These are UX factors, EUPSF 
(the product under study), the USec aspect of information security (InfoSec) and the user 
awareness aspect of the end user characteristics. The framework is composed of components of 
EUPSFUX evaluation, criteria, validation tools, stakeholders and their roles and an 
implementation procedure. Table 6-3 is a listing of identified components in this research study. 
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Table 6-3: Constructs and components 
Construct Components 
End user (human) 
characteristics 
Awareness, knowledge 
Anticipation/ expectation 
Motivation  
Prior experience 
Emotions, attitudes, perception, priorities, 
Goals, behaviour 
EUPSF (Usable 
security) 
SF characteristics (complex, rare, unpredictable, usability) 
EUP characteristics 
InfoSec goals: confidentiality, integrity, availability, privacy, non-repudiation 
UX factors 
(components) 
End user characteristics 
Context (EUP, organization, academic) 
Product (EUPSF ) 
InfoSec/Context Where (work, personal), what (program in use), culture, policies, secure 
information, InfoSec goals 
6.3.3.2 Phase 3 - Stage 2:  Construct validation 
Stage 2 comprises using findings and literature to validate the constructed framework. This 
section describes how each of the constructs was validated during the development of the 
EUPSFUX. 
Construct: End User (EU) characteristics 
As presented in Chapter 2, an end user is the person who uses the program to complete a task and 
can be any one of the stakeholders. The person has attributes such as: motivation, expectations, 
perceptions, priorities, goals, prior knowledge or awareness, prior experience, emotions, attitudes 
and behaviour. These are characteristics of a human user that can be influenced by the 
environment or by the product in use. Figure 6-6 is a pictorial representation of the construct and 
its characteristics. Awareness and user experience feature as the most prominent characteristics 
and, as such, will be addressed by the framework: 
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Figure 6-6: End user characteristics 
Several instruments were used in the research; hence, limitations will be integral to different 
methods contributing to overall limitations. Questionnaires (to gather end user awareness of 
security threats and solutions, security policies and secure behaviour; feelings with interaction as 
well) and heuristic evaluation by stakeholders of end user program security features were 
applied. The questionnaire survey identified awareness and lack of knowledge as critical 
elements of human factors, followed by perceptions and attitudes. Perceptions and attitudes can 
be addressed more as UX factors even though they are human attributes. In this section a 
motivation for why user awareness is important as a component is presented. 
User awareness of security threats scored highly except for social engineering, which was 
known to only 13% of the participants. This was no surprise as there was a 92% indication of the 
absence of user training or awareness campaigns. More interesting was the contradictions in the 
responses; for instance, one claimed to know what hacking is, but when asked whether s/he had 
been a victim or not, the response was “I don’t know”. The statistics of knowledgeable 
participants is 94%, yet 24% don’t know whether they were victims or not of hacking. Similar 
patterns were observed with other threats too. When it comes to awareness of policies in the 
organisation, the most popular policy was known to 29% of the participants. When it comes to 
configuring security, 46% have done so and 54% not; however, when asked about which 
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embedded security features they use in their programs,  contradictorily, 61% use passwords, 20% 
use permissions and 15% use encryption. The question is what the 46% configured, as only 3% 
said they used other embedded security mechanisms.  
The literature review also established the importance of awareness of all the aspects of user 
experience and information security, both at personal and organisational levels, as depicted in the 
theoretical framework. 
The literature survey in Chapter 3 has established that an End User Security Feature is an 
embedded security function in an end user program that achieves InfoSec goals at program level. 
These are also security functionalities embedded within other products (EUP), as shown in 
Figure 6-7.  
 
Figure 6-7: EUPSF relative to InfoSec and EUP 
Factors that affect the user experience with EUPSF interaction include the fact that security 
features (alerts, dialogue boxes) are rarely displayed; they are too complex for end users to 
understand and implement. Sometimes end users are presented with options that do not lead 
them to making the right security choice (Whitten & Tygar, 2005; Herzog & Shahmehri, 2007). 
Furthermore, designers use technical jargon to describe the features (Furnell, 2006). The features 
InfoSec EUP 
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usually present unclear functionality, minimal or no feedback, forcing uninformed decisions 
(owing to lack of knowledge) (Furnell, 2006). 
Interaction involves a product which, in this study, comprises the end user program security 
feature and an end user. To evaluate UX of the interaction successfully, EUPSF characteristics 
have to be evaluated for adhering to UCD and design for UX. Product document and literature 
reviews were used in the research to identify the features as outlined in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. End 
users reviewed EUPSF for usability and UX issues. Questionnaires and peer/expert reviews 
validated EUPSF. UX and USec experts employed heuristic evaluations to assess the features. 
The evaluation criteria were refined, based on the findings, and are presented in Appendix B1 
and B2. 
Chapter 4 focused on defining and characterising User Experience (UX). It exists as a result of 
user interaction with security in context. The context, in this case, comprises the EU 
characteristics, InfoSec goals, EUPSF characteristics, and the program in use which, in this 
study, is Adobe Acrobat Reader or MS Word, and the organisation. The organisation has a 
security culture, which is achieved through several security policies. User experience is at the 
heart of all these elements, as shown in Figure 6-8. 
 
Figure 6-8: UX relative to other constructs 
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Questionnaires were used to survey user experience with their interactions. Experts from InfoSec 
and UX fields conducted heuristic evaluations of EUPSF in MS Word and Adobe Acrobat 
Reader. 
As defined in Chapter 4, Section 4.2, it is a process which includes protecting information 
integrity, confidentiality and availability on end user devices and on networks. Security is not the 
primary responsibility for the users; hence, they do not have the commitment to learn and 
understand it. End users regard security as a bother/abstraction from their primary task as they 
are usually required to respond or interact with a number of dialogue boxes to complete a single 
security task. Figure 6-9 shows factors that affect InfoSec. 
 
Figure 6-9: Factors affecting InfoSec 
Goals speak to the individual as well as to organisational goals. Organisational goals shape the 
security culture in context through security policy documents, technologies and processes, which 
are implemented primarily to achieve confidentiality (C), integrity (I) and availability (A). From 
the user’s perspective the security should be visible, usable, appealing and should satisfy their 
personal goals. 
Earlier on, the research was demarcated not to focus on organisational culture; hence, to evaluate 
UX successfully, the focus will be on USec. User studies (empirical) have shown that end users 
have a negative experience with security interactions. To ascertain the extent of the problem and 
to influence UX, Usable Security heuristics were identified for two case programs and evaluated 
by peer and expert reviewers through cognitive walkthroughs. User studies are another option; 
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however, in the light of the fact that the end users are not trained on security, peer reviews would 
be more informative. Generally, the features are not easy to locate, they are not logically grouped 
and they require a great deal of effort to locate and apply them. 
6.3.3.3 Phase 3 - Stage 3:  Construct relationships  
Component identification was done in phase 2. In this section the relationship between the 
constructs is presented. Figure 6-10 shows relationships for all constructs involved. Direct 
relationships between constructs are also presented in the figures following 
 
Figure 6-10: Construct interrelationships 
Relationship 1 is between end user characteristics and user experience (motivation and interest 
missing). Figure 6-11 shows how EU and UX relate to each other. 
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Figure 6-11: User awareness - UX relationship 
Relationship 2 is between EU and IS. Users are motivated to achieve information security goals 
(confidentiality, integrity and availability); however, this depends on both user and security 
characteristics. The user, first and foremost, needs to have awareness of the existence and the 
need for information security. The users’ experience and perception of security and their 
interaction will result in whether or not their information is secured. Secure interaction/usage of 
EUP will influence further security usage while loss of information may be a deterrent, as the 
user will develop resistance to use security. User characteristics influence the state of 
information security in most cases; the smaller part is attributed to the technology.  The 
relationship is presented in Figure 6-12. 
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Figure 6-12: EU characteristics and IS 
Relationship 3 is between EU and EUPSF. EUPSF has characteristics that influence user 
characteristics, such as behaviour, emotions and perceptions. End user characteristics, in turn, 
determine whether EUPSF are used as they are designed to do, or not. EUPSF are designed to 
achieve the EU’s security goal if, and only if, the EU uses them correctly. 
 
Relationship 4 is between EUPSF and IS. EUPSF are a subsect of IS and fulfil the goals of IS 
within an end user program. Organisational IS goals are achieved through cumulative security 
achievements in all computer system components of which end user programs are the most used 
and most vulnerable. Usage of EUPSF results in IS, a lack of which leads to information loss and 
compromises. 
 
Relationship 5 is between EUPSF and UX. Characteristics of an end user program security 
feature including usability determines the user experience and the experience, in turn, creates an 
impression of the feature. Positive impressions result in positive attitudes towards the interaction 
and better information security.  
 
Relationship 6 is between IS and UX. IS goals and usability determine UX while interacting 
with a program. If the security goals are in line with end user goals the user is motivated to 
achieve them. IS goals are achieved through usable security technologies. The better the 
usability; the better the satisfaction with the usage; hence, the user will remain with a positive 
experience and anticipation to use the technology again.  UX therefore determines user 
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behaviour with IS and the overall IS posture. If the experience is negative, the end user is not 
motivated to use it and the result is compromised (low) information security. Figure 6-13 
summarises the relatedness of IS to UX. 
 
Figure 6-13: InfoSec-UX relationship 
End user awareness (EUA): End users need to be aware of all the other components and their 
characteristics. EUA determines the usability of EUPSF, and determines UX and overall 
InfoSec. 
 
Refined theoretical framework showing the framework components: The modified 
framework is composed only of the four components necessary for the successful evaluation of 
UX end user security features. User characteristics are at the centre influencing UX which, in 
turn, influences EUPSF usability and the overall organisational information security posture. 
The first step towards developing a conceptual framework was to identify the factors that affect 
the security of user experience with EUPSF interaction. The identified components were 
connected as shown in Figure 6-14.  
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Figure 6-14: All components relatedness 
If users are aware of security threats, security technologies and embedded security features, they 
interact with and use security technologies to protect themselves. Knowledge enables end users 
to enjoy securing program information from threats and, therefore, to maintain information 
security. Security awareness is at the core of information security as it determines the feeling 
invoked by interaction with a EUPSF. Feelings determine the attitude towards interaction and; 
hence, influence the user experience. Prior experience shapes user behaviour with security 
features. This, coupled with EUPSF usability determines the overall security posture. Since user 
behaviour is complex and beyond the scope of the study is deliberately excluded from the 
theoretical framework presented in Figure 5-6. 
6.3.3.4 Phase 3 – Stage 4:  Tentative design  
Figure 6-15 is a conceptual design showing the links among the different components of the 
EUPSFUX evaluation framework. The framework can be used by InfoSec experts to evaluate the 
usability of the EUPSF, security awareness and the impact on general InfoSec in an organisation 
and to inform them of suitable interventions. UX experts can use it to evaluate how the actual 
UX compares to the designed UX. This will inform them on how to influence positive 
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experiences in the context: they can propose interventions to InfoSec experts; or the IT technical 
team can use it to determine focus areas for their security awareness programs in the 
organisation. The conceptual design shows how the UX is influenced by context which, in this 
case, is the organisation and their InfoSec policies, the end user characteristics -  including the 
goal in engaging with an EUP  - as well the EUPSF characteristics. 
 
Figure 6-15: Conceptual relationship 
Figure 6-15 shows how the different constructs identified in addressing the research objective are 
linked in designing the EUPSFUX framework.  The evaluation criteria and metrics were derived 
from literature. Each field of study making up the components of the framework has factors that 
influence UX. These factors can be evaluated for their effect and influence. The combination of 
the different criteria formulates the criteria for the designed framework, as shown in Figure 6-16. 
The evaluation criteria resulting from the process depicted in Figure 6-16 will be used to 
evaluate different stages of the framework implementation by both InfoSec and UX practitioners. 
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Figure 6-16: Framework evaluation derivation process 
The output, in this instance, are the UX metrics, IS metrics and heuristics for evaluating the UX 
of the security that are presented in Section 6.7, phase 5 of the DSR process. In Section 6.1, the 
components of a framework were introduced as including components, relationships, evaluation 
criteria and implementation guidelines. The first three components have been presented. The 
next section discusses the implementation guidelines.  
Implementation guidelines inform practitioners on how to apply the framework in a real life 
setup. Figure 6-17 shows the framework implementation guideline that is in five stages. The 
implementation stages are explained in the next section.  
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Figure 6-17: Implementation of the framework 
Implementation stage 1: Identify UX factors in context. This includes three aspect of UX, 
namely: end users (stakeholders), product (EUP and its security features) and the context, which 
is the organisational security culture. These three factors were established in Chapters 3 and 4 
during literature review and were confirmed in user study 1, presented in Chapter 5. 
Implementation stage 2: Establish the UX baseline by evaluating the current UX state in the 
context. Data is collected and analysed against awareness metrics and UX heuristics. The 
baseline serves two purposes: 
 It identifies areas that need to be improved in order to improve UX. 
 It provides a reference point for assessing the effectiveness of the awareness program 
implementation in stage 4. 
Implementation stage 3: Implement (promote UX change). In this stage intervention is 
implemented in the form of an awareness program that focuses on influencing factors. Findings 
from user studies confirm that the major influencing factor is end user awareness of security 
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features, threats, technologies, policies and best practices. Since UX depends on EU 
characteristics, it is vital to address the characteristics with the greatest impact first. 
Implementation stage 4: Evaluating UX after implementing the intervention. 
Implementation stage 5: Maintain and sustain. A strategy for evaluating and influencing UX 
periodically is put in place. This might consider upgrades or version releases. Influencing factors, 
such as security breaches, can be monitored against an acceptable threshold. When it gets above 
low level, this signals the need for intervention. To demonstrate the applicability of the 
implementation guideline, Table 6-4 was designed by populating each stage with possible data. 
6.3.3.5 Phase 3 - Stage 5: Framework consolidation: 
Now that all the components of the framework have been identified, the next stage is putting all 
the pieces together to achieve our objective by answering the question: “How can UX evaluation 
criteria and metrics necessary for end user program security features be constituted into a 
framework?” Figure 6-18 is a composition of all the components, according to the definition of a 
framework presented in Section 6.1. 
 
Figure 6-18: Tentative framework composition for UX experts 
The proposed framework for evaluating the user experience of interacting with end user program 
security features is presented in Figure 6-19. The framework answers the main research question: 
How can a framework be designed to evaluate the user experiences (UX) of interacting with end 
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program security features from a user’s perspective?  Thus, it achieves the main research 
objective.  
 
Figure 6-19: EUPSFUX framework 
The components of user experience are end user program security features (products), end users, 
and the organisational security posture (context). They all contribute to the user experience and 
to the overall security posture of the organisation and have been presented in detail in Section 
6.4. From the research findings the order of importance is EU characteristics especially 
awareness and perception which can bring change in all aspects, this should make up half of the 
composition, technology (EUPSF) characteristics should make up about a third of the 
components as it is driven by humans and influence human factors as well as the context and 
eventually the context shaped by organisational security culture should occupy a fifth. These 
components are evaluated for their characteristics and their effect on user experience through 
user studies, heuristic evaluations and cognitive walk- throughs. Stakeholders (UX/ InfoSec 
experts and IT technical team) firstly use the implementation guidelines to implement the 
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framework; secondly, they design, evaluate and apply UX factors evaluation criteria; thirdly, 
they evaluate, regulate and influence the organisational security posture; lastly, they design, 
choose and implement end user programs. 
6.3.4 Phase 4 - Demonstration 
The application of the framework is demonstrated in the following sub-sections using 
theoretical validation, task scenario analysis and literature. According to Hevner et al., 
(2004), artefacts created in design science research are not often implemented in practice, but 
they describe concepts, practices, practical competences and products innovatively, which 
ensures effective and efficient IS use, design, analysis and implementation.  In the light of this, 
task scenarios will be modelled and evaluated to demonstrate the applicability of the framework. 
This is in line with Peffers’(2008) Phase 4 where simulations, case studies, experiments and 
proof of concept are used to establish the adequacy of the framework in addressing the identified 
problem.  During the development, as well as during the evaluation of the framework, 
stakeholders were purposefully selected to evaluate the different stages. The following sections 
are part of the highlighted phase of the DSRM for the EUSFUX framework in Figure 6-20. 
 
Figure 6-20: Phase 4 of the EUPSFUX methodological approach 
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6.3.4.1 Theoretical demonstration 
Literature was used to ensure the internal validity of the proposed framework by deriving and 
validating the appropriateness of the proposed components. The objective is to demonstrate the 
appropriateness of activities and appropriateness in the UPSFUX framework in evaluating 
successfully the UX of EUPSF interaction as well as its utility. 
6.3.4.2 Task Scenario analysis 
Task scenario analysis aims to address the question: How can the proposed framework be 
evaluated for the successful and adequate evaluation UX of end user program security features? 
This is demonstrated by applying the framework on end user program security features. 
Scenario-based design is a set of related user-centred techniques in which the use of a future 
system is explained elaborately earlier in the development process. Narrative explanations of 
anticipated usage incidents are used variably to direct the development of the system that will 
facilitate use experiences. Scenario-based design is not a formal or task- specific method; rather, 
it is an informal method for visualising future use options (Rosson & Carroll, 2002). The 
scenario details the order of actions and events leading to a result. These actions and events are 
related in a use context that comprises the goals, plans, and reactions of participants (Rosson & 
Carroll, 2002). 
“A scenario is a scene that illustrates some interaction with a proposed system. A scenario is a 
tool used during requirements analysis to describe a specific use of a proposed system. Scenarios 
capture the system, as viewed from the outside, e.g., by a user, using specific examples.” (Arms, 
nd) 
Steps: 
1. Who are the users/ actors? 
2. Goal  
3. Use case (a summary of scenarios for a single task or goal) 
4. Use case scenarios (A scenario is an example of what happens when someone 
interacts with the system.) 
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Scenario 1: InfoSec expert: 
A system administrator at the Polytechnic of Namibia was consulted about the security concerns 
in his organisation. The IT department is well staffed with skilled personnel; they have 
developed up-to-standard policies, which are comparable to those in other similar institutions; 
they have a call centre open from 0700 until 2200. The organisation has invested in state of the 
art current security technology and IT infrastructure; however, computer infections are rife and 
the users do not behave as expected. Table 6-4 is a demonstration of the framework 
implementation guide. 
Table 6-4: Framework implementation demonstration 
Implementation stage Component Attributes  Example 
Identification of EUPSFUX 
factors 
Context 
Organisational 
security  culture 
factor 
Policies  Perform a systems security audit. (Are the relevant 
policies in place? Is the right infrastructure 
properly installed and managed? What are the 
security risks associated with the installed 
technologies? What are the security technologies 
installed? What security processes exist in the 
organisation?) 
Infrastructure  
Information security 
technologies 
Processes  
Product End user programs What programs are installed? Are they up to date 
and licenced? Audit  
Program security What are the risks associated with the installed 
programs? (Document review). What are the 
security features in the programs? (Document 
review and cognitive walkthrough). Program 
design security evaluation against standards. 
Program goal What is the primary goal of the program? 
(Program documentation) 
User Role  What are the skills and competencies of the end 
user? 
 Goal  What is their goal in using technology? (End user 
program) 
Establish EUPSFUX factors 
baseline 
UX factors User studies, UX 
heuristic evaluation 
Are the EUPSF appealing, beautiful, attractive, 
motivating, desirable, exciting or comfortable? 
What are user attitudes towards EUPSF 
interaction? 
What feelings are evoked by user- EUPSF 
interactions? 
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Implementation stage Component Attributes  Example 
User 
characteristics 
User studies What are the goals of users when they interact 
with the program? 
Are they motivated to use the EUPSF?  
Are they aware of the existence of EUPSF? Are 
they aware of the benefits of using them? 
How do they behave with EUPSF? 
EUPSF (Product) User studies, 
usability and 
security heuristic 
evaluation 
Are the EUPSF easy to use, easy to locate, 
understandable, useful, learnable, satisfactory, and 
effective? Do they offer assistance? Are they 
efficient, secure or valuable? 
Promote UX change Develop UX 
change strategy 
Use usable EUP 
Communicate 
policies 
Develop and 
implement 
awareness program 
Influence 
organisation 
InfoSec culture 
Evaluate, choose and implement EUP with usable 
EUPSF 
Promote policy awareness 
Promote security awareness 
Promote a secure organisational culture 
Evaluate EUPSF factors User User study Use baseline criteria to allow for comparisons 
Product EUP review 
Context InfoSec culture 
UX User study 
 
Further points to consider include an understanding of the stakeholders (HR, IT department, 
Users, Management). Establish a baseline- review of the antivirus and system logs; conduct an 
awareness survey; observe or survey or log user behaviour or phishing attacks. Enumerate the 
severity of the problems. 
Scenario 2: IT technical support team 
The scenarios presented can be applicable, with a focus on the implementation of controls and 
usable programs. 
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Scenario 3: UX expert 
Post-use studies were conducted at PoN and the results reflected negative attitudes towards 
security interaction. The users have a negative attitude towards security and they feel disturbed 
and frustrated by the interaction 
6.3.5 Phase 5- Framework evaluation 
This section describes the evaluation and validates the proposed framework for rigour and 
relevance in line with Phase 5 of the EUPSFUX methodological approach highlighted in Figure 
6-21. The artefact evaluation findings can be presented in the form of immediate, intermediate 
and long-term impact, according to (Shrestha, Cater-Steel, & Toleman, 2014). This will be 
achieved by demonstrating quality, transferability, credibility, confirmability, dependability and 
utility. The EUPSFUX framework is assessed using implicit criteria that were explicitly 
presented in Section 2.4.6.1 and in the proposal (output of the awareness of problem phase). 
Table 2-5 presents the criteria and methods applicable to the EUPSFUX evaluation framework. 
 
Figure 6-21: Phase 5 of the EUPSFUX methodological approach 
For this study, relevance was established through completeness, and consistency; and rigour 
will be demonstrated through well-tested processes and methods. Theoretical validation, 
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heuristic evaluation, expert reviews and informed argumentation approaches are used to 
validate and demonstrate the applicability of the framework.  These methods are discussed in the 
following sections. Completeness and utility demonstrate whether the framework meets the 
research goal namely “to identify USec UX metrics applicable to EUPSF”. The evaluation 
process followed the outline in Figure 6-22. 
 
Figure 6-22: Evaluation process 
The findings from the evaluation process are discussed in Chapter 7. 
6.3.6 Phase 6- Communication  
After iteration of design and evaluation, a final product is presented. This will be detailed in 
Chapter 7, which is the finalisation of the framework design process. The communication is 
Phase 6 of the EUPSFUX methodological process highlighted in Figure 6-23. 
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Figure 6-23: Phase 6 of the EUPSFUX methodological process 
6.4 SUMMARY 
 Chapter 6 has described the process used to design the EUPSFUX framework. A discussion of 
the process and applicability for framework development is also included.  The chapter discussed 
in detail the various components of the framework and how they were derived from the related 
disciplines, namely user experience and information security. Construct and construct component 
identification through literature review presented in Chapters 3 and 4 and the UX factors survey 
in Chapter 5 was also presented. The identified framework components EU, UX, EUPSF and IS 
context characteristics, the relationships, evaluation criteria, implementation criteria are 
composed into the EUPSFUX framework, as shown in Section 6.3.5.5.  
The EUPSFUX framework emphasises the following aspects: 
1. Identifying and understanding the factors that affect user experience, the context as well 
as the stakeholders. 
2. Establishing the baseline of UX through surveying the UX factors and evaluating them 
against UX, IS and USec criteria. 
3. Promoting UX change by implementing awareness programs that focus on EUPSF, 
organisational security policies and culture, security best practice and secure behaviour. 
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4. Measuring the impact of the awareness program on user experience by comparing it to 
the established baseline.  
5. Maintaining and sustaining the user experience by monitoring and evaluating the 
awareness program on a regular basis, followed by user experience evaluation. Device 
strategies to continuously improve positive user experiences with program security 
feature interactions.  
The study stakeholders were identified as end user, IT technical team, IS and UX experts. Next, 
the evaluation and validation of the proposed framework will be presented in Chapter 7 and the 
outcomes will further refine the framework. 
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CHAPTER 7: FRAMEWORK FINALISATION 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
In line with Phases 5 and 6 of the framework development process, this chapter presents the 
EUPSFUX framework evaluation, the refined EUPSFUX framework, the EUPSFUX framework 
limitations and finally the chapter summary will be presented following the flow in chapter 
outline. 
 
 
 
7.2 EUPSFUX FRAMEWORK EVALUATION  
Section 7.2.2 discusses validity and objectivity of the framework to establish the quality of 
framework evaluation; Section 7.2.4 discusses the reliability aspect while Section 7.2.4 focuses 
on the relevance and Sections 7.2.5 through 7.2.7 discusses the theoretical validation through 
expert validation.  
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7.2.1 Evaluation tools 
The framework was evaluated by appraising the designed components: security awareness 
metrics; security and UX heuristics for the artefact. The resulting framework itself was evaluated 
using literature and expert reviews; the implementation guide was subjected to use case scenario 
analysis, as demonstrated in Section 6.3.4.2. Table 7-1 is a list of evaluation tools applicable to 
the EUPSFUX framework developed in this study. 
Table 7-1: EUPSFUX framework evaluation tools 
Dimension Method Objective/ Target 
Goal  Informed argumentation, Use case 
scenario analysis, expert reviews 
Efficacy, validity 
Environment   Fit with organisation (relevance) 
Consistency with people  Use case scenario analysis Ease of use 
Consistency with technology None None 
Consistency with organisation Use case scenario analysis Utility  
Structure Informed argumentation Consistency 
Use case scenario analysis Completeness  
Activity Informed argumentation Consistency 
Informed argumentation Completeness (functionality) 
Evolution Use case scenario analysis Learning capability 
 
7.2.2 Quality of the EUPSFUX framework 
Care was taken, throughout the design phase, to ensure that it demonstrates construct validity, 
internal validity, external validity, objectivity and reliability. Construct validity requires the 
researcher to use the correct measures for the concepts being studied. Internal validity 
demonstrates that certain conditions lead to other conditions and requires the use of multiple 
pieces of evidence from multiple sources to uncover convergent lines of inquiry. External 
validity reflects whether or not findings are generalizable beyond the immediate case; the more 
variations in places, people, and procedures that a case study can withstand and still yield the 
same findings; the more there is external validity. Techniques such as cross-case examination 
and within-case examination, along with literature review, help to ensure external validity. 
Objectivity is the degree of independence from researcher bias. Reliability refers to the stability, 
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accuracy, and precision of measurement. The procedures used are well documented and can be 
repeated with the same results over and over again. (Yin, 2009; Dooley, 2002; Oates, 2012). 
7.2.2.1 Validity 
The research paradigm followed in this research is interpretivism; hence, reference is made on 
how much trust can be placed in the research instead of validity. Trustworthiness is the level of 
trust that can be placed in the research based on the use of valid methods and techniques derived 
from literature to measure framework components.  
External Validity/ Transferability is the extent to which the research is generalisable to 
different environments, participants, and time; and it depends on the representativeness of the 
sample studied (Oates, 2012, p. 294). However, environmental aspects such organisational 
culture, and personal dispositions make it impossible to apply the same process in a different 
context. Instead, focus is put on transferability of the findings to other, similar contexts. 
Transferability is demonstrated through documentation of the tools and methods which were 
used in designing and validating the EUPSF.  
Internal/Credibility validity is the degree to which findings are precise, compare to reality and 
measure it correctly; however, in interpretivist research there are several created realities; hence, 
there is no benchmark for testing the results (Oates, 2012, p. 294). Instead, the focus is on 
credibility of the research process. Triangulation of methods (interviews, surveys, peer and 
expert reviews, and heuristic evaluation), strategies (case study, surveys and design and creation) 
and data (literature, interview, survey, heuristic evaluation, peer and expert reviews) are used to 
demonstrate this aspect. The findings reflect the programs have no means of educating the user 
on the existence and use of embedded security functionalies and their benefit.  
7.2.2.2 Objectivity/ Confirmability  
Objectivity cannot be demonstrated in this case because the researcher has personal experiences 
that can influence the interpretation of collected data. Moreover, the researcher is a member of 
the community being studied and interacts with participants often.  As such, focus is placed on 
the demonstrated confirmability of the findings. Given the collected data, summaries and the 
analysis, another researcher can draw the same conclusions. 
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To demonstrate confirmability, the following tools and methods were used: 
1. Clearly outlined methods and processes were used for data collection and analysis 
2. Use of literature to confirm findings 
7.2.3 Reliability/Dependability  
Reliability is usually centred on repeatability of the study; however, when a social problem is 
studied, it is bound to vary at different times as the influencing conditions evolve. As such, data 
collected at different times cannot be similar (Oates, 2012, p. 294; Hevner et al., 2004). 
Moreover, as the researcher’s involvement impacts on the outcome, different researchers will 
produce different results. It is best to demonstrate the dependability instead, as it speaks to the 
research procedure and data recording, which allow an audit to be carried out successfully on the 
research process (Oates, 2012, p. 294).  
To demonstrate dependability, the following tools and methods were used: 
1. The survey was self-administered to eliminate bias. 
2. Research methods and strategies are clearly documented in Chapters 2, 5 and 6. 
7.2.4 Relevance 
Relevance of the EUPSFUX evaluation framework is demonstrated in Section 6.3.4. 
7.2.5 Theoretical validation 
Theoretical validation was conducted using peer and expert (heuristic) reviews, as well as 
informed argumentation (against standards and theories) in a case study setup  
7.2.6 Heuristic evaluations 
EUPSF were validated through task-oriented heuristic evaluations by peers and experts in the 
HCI, InfoSec, USec and UX fields in two different case programs. The heuristic evaluation item 
had checklists of security tasks specific to case programs (Word and PDF reader), which were 
evaluated during execution. Heuristic evaluation is a fast and cheap method used to check 
interface compliance with recognised heuristics (Nielsen , 1995). The process involves eight 
stages: planning, selecting evaluators, selecting the program to evaluate, determining a set of 
heuristics to evaluate, prepare to collect data, developing tasks for evaluators, conducting the 
evaluation and finally, analysing the data. The process followed a multiple case study strategy, as 
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it allows for comparisons and increases the generalisability of findings by enhancing external 
validity. The six steps of case study research were followed in line with the eight heuristic 
evaluation stages. The next sections will present the process followed, step-by-step. 
7.2.6.1 Planning 
Multiple case programs are used to evaluate the USec UX metrics (heuristics) in end user 
programs. The participants, in this case, are mainly practitioners in the domains of study and they 
comprise of peers and experts. According to Danino (2001), planing usually involves one of the 
following three approaches: 
1. Develop a set of tasks and ask evaluators to carry them out. 
2. Provide evaluators with the goals of the system, and allow them to develop their own 
tasks. 
3. Ask evaluators to assess your dialogue elements 
In this study, the first option was employed whereby EUPSF specific tasks were given to the 
peers and experts to evaluate using HE. 
7.2.6.2 Evaluator selection 
According to Patton (1990), intensity sampling is used in heuristic research as it permits the 
researcher to benefit from the rich personal experiences of the participants. This was combined 
with stratified purposeful sampling as representatives were chosen from different fields (InfoSec, 
HCI, UX and USec) pertaining to the study, as well as representative of different stakeholders 
identified for this study. The peers represent IT administrative support, both in the case 
organisation and outside, as well as typical end users in the organisation as they are students at 
PoN. Literature on usability evaluation stipulates that a maximum of four experts is sufficient for 
comparison, while for user studies two end users are acceptable (Nielsen, 1994; 
Usabilityhome.com). Literature has it that 3 to 5 experts can unveil 75% + usability issues, while 
novices will uncover 22 to 29% issues (Nielsen, 1995; Balatbat, 2013). According to Danino 
(2001), if more evaluators are used, then more usability problems will be revealed; however, he 
attests that the cost/benefit ratio decreases at about five evaluators. This research is multi-
disciplinary, so to capture the different disciplines in depth, 16 evaluators were selected. Peers 
163 
are not as experienced in their domains; hence, to some extent they gave end user views. Table 
7-5 is a summary of expert and peer reviewer profiles. 
7.2.6.3 Design – Selecting the program 
The heuristic evaluation tools and associated tasks for the two EUPs were developed using a 
combination of tested heuristic evaluation tools by considering the specific security features and 
tasks for each, as well as findings from user studies. The case program selection is presented 
next. 
Case program selection criteria 
Case programs were selected based on the following criteria: 
1) Program popularity in the case site and globally 
2) Development following user-centred design principles 
3) Integration of security in the design process 
4) UX goals in the design process 
5) Availability of security features in the programs 
6) Prior work on usability and UX evaluation 
Program popularity in the research case study and globally 
A survey conducted showed the most frequently used end user application programs (EUP) in 
the case site and, naturally, these were the choice for the study. The applications matched with 
what other researchers had already identified in other studies (Furnell, 2010; SANS, 2011). The 
most popular end user programs were email clients with  100% uasge rate. The second most 
popular programs in this case were web browsers, as confirmed by  92% usage. This compares 
very well with literature. Web browsers are popular end programs owing to the shift to online 
business, socialising and education in the technology era. According to W3Schools (n.d.), the 
most popular browsers are Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox and Internet Explorer (IE). After 
almost four years on the market, Google Chrome took over from Mozilla Firefox from 2012; 
Mozilla Firefox had been an equal competitor to the old-time leader, Internet Explorer in 2008 
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and since 2009 it had taken a lead over IE. The same web browsers are used in the case 
organisation as confirmed by the survey findings. 
Since users use a diversity of devices with a diversity of platforms to access the web, pdf has 
become the indispensable tools for cross platform compatibility. Adobe Reader has become a 
popular tool for enhancing transferability of electronic documents making it one of the most 
popular programs used today. In most organisations the most popular end user programs include 
Adobe PDF Reader, QuickTime, Adobe Flash and Microsoft Office  (Bhunu, Shava & van 
Greunen, 2013; SANS, 2011; Furnell, et al., 2005). 
Considering the diversity of web browsers on the market and different approaches to security, 
the researchers chose to shelve them for a dedicated comprehensive study. The focus was then 
streamlined to MS Word and Adobe Acrobat Reader, as they satisfied the criteria presented 
earlier. The compliance is demonstrated in Table 7-2. 
Table 7-2: EUP compliance to selection criteria 
Criteria Compliance 
Program popularity in the case site and globally MSWord has a popularity of 86 in the site, globally 92% 
(Furnell et al., 2005; SANS, 2009; SANS, 2011) 
Adobe and MS Word 
Development following user-centred design principles Program documentation of both articulate to this 
Integration of security in the design process Program documentation of both articulate to this 
UX goals in the design process Program documentation of both articulate to this 
Availability of security features in the programs Program documentation of both articulate to this, as well 
as program interfaces, tools and menus. 
Prior work on usability and UX evaluation Furnell, 2005; Furnell, 2006; Furmell, 2010 ; Furnell et 
al., 2005; Schulze & Kromker, 2010; Nielsen, 1994 
 
7.2.6.4 Determining a set of Heuristics to evaluate 
The process followed identifying the security features in selected programs through document 
reviews and cognitive walkthroughs.  In this section, Adobe and MS Word specific features are 
presented. 
User experience in end user programs is incorporated through features. In Office 2013 the 
following features have improved the user experience  (Microsoft, 2013): 
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1. The Trust Center and message bar, trusted locations, trusted publishers, and sticky trust 
decisions 
2. Actionable security prompts 
3. Improvements to the Encrypt with Password feature 
4. Document Inspector 
5. XML file format support 
Through program document reviews for Adobe Reader and Microsoft Office, a number of 
elements were identified for these most commonly used programs in general, and in particular, to 
the case studied. These are presented in Table 7-3 (Microsoft, 2013; Adobe, 2012).  
Table 7-3: Security features in Adobe and MS Office 
Elements  MS Office Adobe 
Protected mode + + 
Tighter integration with built-in, always-on  + 
PDF Whitelist 
Framework 
 + 
Secure product lifecycle  + 
Auto update + + 
Patch management + + 
Active content (active X controls, add-ins, data connections, macros, spreadsheet links) +  
Enhanced security/Turn on or off your security and privacy features  + 
Alerts + + 
Dialogue boxes + + 
Security agents +  
Office assistant +  
Permissions  +  
Document flow protection +  
Cryptographic agility   +  
Office file validation   +  
Expanded file block settings +  
Integrity checking of encrypted files +  
Data Execution Prevention (DEP) support;  +  
Group policy enforcement,  +  
Trusted time-stamping support for digital signatures,  +  
Domain-based  password complexity checking  +  
Enforcement  and encryption +  
File block +  
 
The characteristics presented in Table 3-4 can be used as the criteria to measure how usable a 
security feature in a program is.  
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Heuristics development: The Usable Security and UX Heuristic Evaluation tool design 
In Chapter 1, the research was delineated to focus on USec evaluation based on the 
understanding that end user program security features are designed for usability by following 
UCD principles. To evaluate compliance of security features to usability principles, the heuristic 
evaluation tool was developed following the three-stage heuristic process for specific application 
domains by van Greunen, Yeratziotis, and Pottas (2011). The heuristics were based on 
Yeratziotis, Pottas, and van Greunen’s  (2012)’s usable security heuristics for online health 
social networks; Nielsen’s (1994) heuristic evaluation tool, as well as the computer system 
usability questionnaire and practical heuristics for usability evaluation.  The heuristics are also 
based on usability criteria as applicable to security features identified in Section  3.6 For each 
heuristic, a list of checklist items is provided. Checklist items are criteria for measuring the 
heuristic in question. The tool has as an extent field for each checklist, which can have a value 
between 1 and 5. 1 is very difficult, 2 is difficult, 3 is moderate, 4 is easy, and 5 is very easy. The 
extent can be used to calculate each metric score per EUP and to determine the criticality of 
usability in determining the focus area for intervention. 
The validation tool was designed in MS Word and comprised the purpose, expert profile 
(qualification and specialisation), list of tasks, instructions, heuristics and associated checklist 
items assessment. In total, 16 high level heuristics for security and UX were identified for the 
two programs. 
The heuristic developed and associated checklists are presented in Appendix B1 for Adobe 
Acrobat Reader and in Appendix B2 for MS Word. The purpose of the evaluation is to determine 
the awareness plus usability and UX of the embedded security features in two case end user 
programs (MS Word and Acrobat Adobe Reader). The outcome will inform what the user 
awareness program in the case site should focus on and will inform the metric (heuristic) for UX 
in the case site. However, on a general note, it should inform security and security UX designers 
on how to improve the features for better usability and UX. 
7.2.6.5 Prepare to collect data 
Prior to collecting the data, a cover letter was designed and the heuristic evaluation tool was 
pretested. The next sections will talk to this. 
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Cover email 
A cover email was designed explaining the purpose of the study as well as establishing rules for 
confidentiality and ethical conduct. The cover email was sent to the peers and experts along with 
the two tools. The email is provided in Appendix A3. 
Heuristic pretesting 
The tools were sent to three experts in InfoSec and USec for pretesting. The feedback did not 
come for three months and the tools were deployed in their original format. One of the experts 
later responded and made the comments in Table 7-4. The comments were used to polish the tool 
for future use. 
Table 7-4: Improvements on the HE 
Section  Item Comment  Action 
Demographics  Research area Are you providing a separate 
key for the abbreviations? 
No need as it is designed 
for field experts 
Procedure  Instruction specified seven tasks in 
the Adobe HE tool 
Nine tasks Corrected  
Note Extent scale From using games, etc., 
usually 1 is easy and 5 very 
difficult 
Was based on existing 
psychology evaluation 
criteria as a way of 
ensuring that values are 
not inserted without 
thought, especially with 
the peers. Standard 
heuristic tools apply the 
scales similarly (bad to 
very good, unlikely to 
likely) 
Typos Missing word 1.3 
 
17.12, 18.1 
Insert feature at the end 
Delete the word “the” 
Corrected 
 
Corrected  
 
7.2.6.6 Developing tasks for evaluators 
The tasks were developed through cognitive walkthrough and following the EUP security help 
documentation. Two sets of tasks were developed; one for each program. There were seven (7) 
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tasks for MS Word and nine (9) for Adobe Acrobat Reader. The tasks are incorporated in the 
respective heuristic evaluation tools in Appendix B1 and Appendix B2. 
7.2.6.7 Heuristic evaluation 
Sixteen domain experts and peers were individually presented with a set of security tasks to 
perform in MS Word and Adobe and to comment on overall security and UX of the interaction. 
The expert and peer review aimed at evaluating the relevance of the proposed heuristics. It also 
served the purpose of evaluating how the potential users of the model found the proposed model 
to be useful and applicable to managing user experience. The expert reviews were conducted 
through a heuristic tool, which was emailed to subject domain experts and peers for completion. 
Some of the evaluators chose to evaluate one case program instead of both. The participants 
represented the technical stakeholder, who is usually tasked to design, evaluate and implement 
security in typical organisations, as well as the end user in the case site. Eight experienced 
InfoSec, UX, USec and HCI experts ,who are aware of security challenges in the case and four of 
whom have been associated with the case site for around five years were selected (Shneiderman 
& Plaisant, 2005).Expert reviews were carried out with three doctoral students, four doctors and 
one professor, who are practising in the target fields. Peer reviews were carried out by eight 
system administrators, who are studying towards their honours and Masters qualifications in the 
studied organisation. As was established in the empirical study, PDF viewers and Word 
processors are the most popular software.  As such, the evaluations were conducted on these two 
end user programs.  
The experts and peers completed a list of checklist tasks and indicated their responses, the extent 
to which they believed in their choices and they optionally commented on the checklist items. 
Comments and responses from experts and peers in the fields were used to validate the suitability 
of the heuristics. End users were not used for security feature usability and UX evaluation 
because, during the empirical study it was noted that the users are not trained on security and, as 
such, a user test on usability and UX would present complexities for them. Hence, the collected 
data would reflect the issues as much as would experts. 
The expert reviewers critique program security features to determine conformance with a list of 
usability and UX heuristics by using the program to complete usual security tasks. UX was 
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measured from a usability as well as from an engagement point of view. Evaluation was done 
against USec principles: visibility (findable), ease of use, satisfaction, effectiveness (is the 
document secure? confidentiality, integrity, availability to intended users), motivation, comfort, 
usefulness as well as desirable, understandable, helpful. The overall subjective User Experience 
metrics were also applied: utility, usability, aesthetics, identification, stimulation and value, 
based on Section 4.15. The review aimed at providing feedback that will inform the design of a 
user awareness program in the case site and will inform the design of heuristic/metrics for UX 
with EUPSF in the case site. 
The review process also provided important feedback to the building/ development phases by 
demonstrating the utility of the proposed artefact. Security tasks were performed to evaluate 
security and experience of experts and peers with the interaction. The findings were used to 
validate components of the framework which is being developed. 
In order to deem a heuristic an important element in the intervention (e.g. awareness program), 
the heuristic should score more than 5 (33%) on No on a positive aspect; otherwise a 5 is 
considered on yes, if it is a negative aspect. If a checklist item scores more than 5 on N/A, then it 
should be taken off the list. This decision was reached after considering benchmark scores for 
average scores of a popular questionnaire for measuring the perception of usability -  System 
Usability Scale (SUS), which is 68 (Sauro & Lewis, 2012). According to Sauro and Lewis 
(2012), the average Single Usability Metric (SUM) score is 65%, which is an average of task 
metrics—completion rates, task-times and task-difficulty ratings. 
7.2.6.8 Data analysis 
Data analysis was mainly done through data categorisation using predefined themes. Each 
heuristic is a theme and the data will be analysed under those themes. The first section of the tool 
captured the demographic information of the evaluators. Their profiles as per completed 
demographics are presented in Table 7-5. 
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Table 7-5: Expert and peer reviewer profiles 
Reviewer Qualification Field of expertise Gender Code 
1 Dr Expert IS, Forensics F E1 
2 Student PhD IS Expert IS, USec M E2 
3 Student PhD IS Expert IS F E3 
4 Student PhD UX Expert UX F E4/3 
5 Dr Expert HCI F E5/4 
6 Dr Expert IS F E6/5 
7 Prof Expert IS M E7 
8 Dr Expert UX,HCI, USec M E8/6 
9 Student Honours IS IS + System admin M P1 
10 Student Masters IS IS + System support F P2 
11 Student Honours IS IS + System admin F P3 
12 Student Honours IS IS + System admin M P4 
13 Student Honours IS IS + System admin F P5/6 
14 Student Honours IS IS + System admin F P6/7 
15 Student Honours IS IS + System admin M P6 
16 Student Honours IS IS + System admin F P7/8 
 
E3 and E7 did not participate in the Adobe Acrobat Reader evaluation. P6 did not participate in 
the evaluation of MS Word. The codes of the reviewers will vary according to the application in 
question owing to the selective participation. 
Heuristic evaluation 1 - Adobe: 14 of the 16 participants, comprising four Doctors, two Doctoral 
students, one Masters student and seven system administrators doing Honours in IS, took part in 
evaluating Adobe. Among them two are USEC experts, one is a USEC peer, four are InfoSec 
experts, eight are InfoSec peers, two are UX experts and two are HCI experts. Of these, one is an 
HCI/USec/UX expert and one is an IS/UX expert. 
Heuristic evaluation 2- MS Word: 15 respondents out of the 16 participants. They comprised one 
Professor, four Doctors, three Doctoral students, one Masters Student and six system 
administrators doing Honours in InfoSec. Of these, there are two USEC experts, one USEC peer, 
five InfoSec experts and seven InfoSec peers, two UX experts and two HCI experts. Of these, 
one is an HCI/USec/UX expert and one is an IS/UX expert. 
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The discussion of the findings and their impact is presented in summary. Table 7-6 presents a 
summary of Adobe evaluation. 
Table 7-6: Adobe heuristic evaluation 
Visibility/Findable/locatable/readily displayed; the security feature must be easily found 
 Yes No N/A Total  
Can you easily  locate the security feature 9 5 0 14 
After completing a security action, do you get some form of feedback 10 2 1 14 
Can you disable the security? 10 2 1 14 
Motivating-  the security feature must encourage users to re- use it again in future 
 Yes No N/A  
Are you motivated to use it again? 9 4 0 14 
Will you recommend it to others? 10 4 0 14 
Does it satisfy your perceived goals? 8 5 0 14 
Desirable- the security feature must be pleasant to use, and look at  
 Yes No N/A  
Is the presentation visually appealing? 8 3 2 13 
Is the feature pleasant to use? 7 4 1 13 
Useful- the security features must enable the user to achieve security goals willingly. 
 Yes No N/A  
Helps me to be secure 11 3 0 14 
They protect my work 11 1 2 14 
It does everything I would expect it to do 5 9 0 14 
Learnability/understandable, ease of use - the system should ensure that security actions are easy to learn and 
remember 
 Yes No N/A  
The security features have been grouped into logical zones, and headings have been 
used to distinguish them from other program features 
9 4 1 14 
I learned how to use the security feature easily 10 4 0 14 
The security features are easy to remember 8 6 0 14 
Menus make obvious which security items are selected 7 6 1 14 
The program protects you from making errors 7 6 0 14 
Security-related information is presented in a standardized manner 9 4 0 14 
Aesthetics and Minimalist Design; the system should offer users relevant information relating to their security actions 
 Yes No N/A  
Only the security information essential to decision-making is displayed on the screen 5 5 3 14 
All security icons in a set are visually and conceptually distinct 9 3 2 14 
Security labels are brief, familiar and descriptive? 9 5 0 14 
Exciting/emotion/perception- the program should promote excitement and good perceptions/ emotions 
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 Yes No N/A  
You feel excited about the security features 8 6 0 14 
You perceive them as good 11 3 0 14 
Security tasks evoke positive emotions in you 10 4 0 14 
The security-related error messages are accurate in their descriptions 11 2 0 14 
It was enjoyable to perform security functions 8 5 0 14 
Satisfaction- the system should ensure that users have a good experience when using security and that they are in 
control 
 Yes No N/A  
Security features are easy to work with 8 6 0 14 
You feel disturbed when you perform security tasks 2 11 1 14 
Security-related prompts imply that you are in control 11 2 1 14 
You are satisfied with the security 8 5 0 14 
User Suitability - the system should provide options for users with diverse levels of skill and experience in security 
 Yes No N/A  
Do the security features support both novice and expert users? Are multiple levels of 
security error message details available? 
5 8 0 14 
Can you easily change the level of security detail? 7 7 0 14 
Can you easily change between novice and expert levels? 3 9 2 14 
Can you customize security to meet your individual preferences? 8 6 0 14 
Comfortable to use /User Language -the system should use plain language that users can understand with regard to 
security 
 Yes No N/A  
Are security actions named consistently across all prompts in the program? 8 4 1 13 
Is security information accurate, complete and understandable? 8 5 0 13 
Are security messages stated in clear and simple language, where used? 8 5 0 13 
Is security jargon avoided? 6 6 0 13 
User Assistance/ Help - the system should make security help apparent for users 
 Yes No N/A  
Is there a security help function visible (e.g. a key labelled “Security Help”)? 6 6 2 14 
Is the security information provided relevant? 10 2 2 14 
Can users easily switch between security help and their work? 8 5 1 14 
Do instructions follow the sequence of user security actions? 10 3 0 14 
Does the system provide users with updated security educational opportunities, if they 
desire it? 
3 7 3 14 
Efficiency -  the security feature must complete the user’s goal in a timely and accurate manner 
 Yes No N/A  
Was it easy to enforce security? 5 5 2 14 
It takes long to compete the tasks 5 7 2 14 
Accessible - the security feature must be reachable to accomplish a security objective 
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 Yes No N/A  
Does not present technical or physical barriers 11 2 0 14 
Readily accessible 10 3 0 14 
Effective - the extent to which the security feature fulfils the users’ expectations with ease. 
 Yes No N/A  
Does what it is supposed to do 9 2 1 14 
Fulfils my security needs 8 6 0 14 
Usable - the security features must allow the user to do what they want to do in the way they expect to do it without 
difficulty, hesitancy, or queries 
 Yes No N/A  
Is it convenient to use? 9 5 0 14 
It is simple to use? 8 6 0 14 
Is it doing the expected? 10 3 1 14 
Valuable/ impact of use - the security feature should relate to the user goals in a beneficial way 
 Yes No N/A  
It secures my documents 10 2 1 14 
You are not losing information 8 4 1 14 
Your files are not edited by wrong people 9 1 3 14 
It does not waste my time 11 1 1 14 
It assures you of the file author 8 1 3 14 
Security - the system needs to consider integrity, availability, confidentiality, auditing and non-repudiation 
 Yes No N/A  
The information is only accessible to authorised users 12 0 1 14 
Protected or confidential  - can information be accessed only with valid authentication? 12 0 1 14 
The program encrypts the whole file 11 1 1 14 
You can update or delete document properties’ information 9 3 2 14 
The program notifies you of your access privileges 8 4 1 14 
The program protects all files downloaded 6 2 5 14 
Does the program disable macros? 2 5 6 14 
Are notification messages relating to security displayed to the user before access to the 
system is granted? 
7 3 2 14 
Are the controls for sharing readily available? 6 5 1 14 
Does the program install required software updates automatically and notify you about 
this action? 
7 5 1 14 
Does the program display options to assist in the reporting of security incidents? 5 5 3 14 
Does the program notify you of any vulnerability associated with not applying security? 4 6 3 14 
Does the program notify you about auto-recovery? 5 6 2 14 
Awareness/Expected -  security features must be expected in the programs; users should be aware of their 
existence 
 Yes No N/A  
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Does the system provide awareness and educate you on how to complete tasks? 3 10 1 14 
Do you expect the security features? 9 3 0 14 
Are you aware of the location of the security features in the program? 12 2 0 14 
Are you aware of the limitations of the security? 8 6 0 14 
Are you aware of the effect of applying security? 14 0 0 14 
Are you educated on proper security usage? 10 4 0 14 
 
Heuristic evaluation by both peers and experts established that the security features are: 
Visibility: “some security features not that easy to find” as shown by a 36% No response, among 
those who indicated Yes, some found it difficult to locate the tools.  Not easily locatable:  “I 
accessed them through "Tools'. I would of recommended a security tab on the menu too” and one 
other reviewer commented that it is “very hard to locate looks like with some versions of adobe 
this is possible only at file creation”. Overall, it is visible based on Yes responses. Feedback is 
not always provided but fairly good.  Users can remove the security, “However, in order to 
complete certain tasks I needed to remove the signature that was done in task”, and some found it 
very difficult to do so. 
Motivation: Users are motivated to use some of the features again and to recommend to others, 
though it does not really support perceived goals (36%); 
Desirable: Visual presentation is not so good: “one should have an idea first, it is just displayed 
in the menu structure.” Features are not so pleasant to use (31%). One participant skipped the 
question. 
Useful: It is useful - “it helps me to be secure”; has “better features than Word, but it can still be 
affected by malicious code”, though it does not do everything expected (64%).Respondents feel 
that their work is protected, although some feel their work would be protected if they had 
configured all the security actions; they could not complete some of the tasks: “it offers most 
security features cannot do everything expected of it- it can be removed too easily without 
verification”. “it offers most security features that I would of expected to see but it did not do 
everything I expected during the configuration of these features” 
Learnability/understandable, ease of use: It is generally easy to learn- “it took time to locate 
it”, though some did not find it so easy to learn. They are logically grouped within other program 
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features such as Edit and Tools; there is no Security heading and it is not clear where to find 
them.  Security features are not so easy to remember, to see which features are selected and the 
program does not protect users from making errors. 
Aesthetics and Minimalist Design: It does not conform to minimalism “There is an overflow of 
information in certain screens when configuring a security feature. A lot of information can be 
hidden and displayed when needed by the user”. Design and security labels are not really brief, 
familiar or descriptive.  
Exciting/emotion/perception: Respondents do not feel so excited about the security features 
though they are perceived as good and evoke positive emotions. Features give accurate error 
messages – “most fairly understandable descriptions”. They are not exciting or enjoyable to work 
with- “it was frustrating and time consuming”;  
Satisfaction: Generally, it was satisfying; there is no distinction of expert levels though one can 
customise their security detail. The user language is good, but not comfortable to use; there is 
poor help or assistance; it is efficient to apply security; it is accessible; effective; usable though 
not convenient; valuable, though it might waste time for novices. Generally, it is regarded as 
secure, except for no total encryption; there is no relevant dialogue on security vulnerability 
associated with not performing security actions; and sharing controls are not readily visible; 
there is no awareness on security task completion. Table 7-8 summarises MS Word heuristic 
evaluation. 
User Suitability – The system does not provide options for users with diverse levels of skill and 
experience in security: “they have standard and advanced security options”. “Some good 
descriptions of security features”; however, there is “too much technical oriented terms used to 
describe the security features” and this will challenge novice users, as there is no other option for 
them. Users can change the level of security detail moderately, with difficulty.  
Comfortable to use: Security actions do not appear multiple times; hence, consistency cannot be 
evaluated. Reviewer “only noticed the "Protection" and "Sign & Certify" menus in the "Tools" 
tab. There was no other reference to them in other parts of the program”. Security information is 
not understandable for novices. “Definitely not understandable to users that have no expert 
security knowledge”. Security messages are stated in simple plus technical languages. 
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User Assistance/ Help: There is no Security Help menu or tab; however “online help” is 
accessible and the “search bar in help brings up security features”. Relevant security information 
is provided although it is “Difficult to determine without the required security knowledge”. Users 
can switch moderately between security help and their work. The system does not provide users 
with updated security educational opportunities, if they desire. 
Efficiency: It is not easy to complete security tasks and it takes time to complete the task, for 
both experts and peers. 
Accessible: The security features do not present technical or physical barriers depending on the 
user’s ability; for the reviewers it was highly favourable. They are readily accessible “From the 
perspective of a fully abled user”. 
Effective: the features are rated as doing effectively what they are expected to do and fulfil the 
users’ needs. However, four of the six experts believe it does not fulfil their security needs. 
Usable: Three experts do not agree that the security is convenient to use, even though six of 
eight peers regard it as convenient. This can pose a serious usability problem for end users. It is 
simple to use; however, one expert highlights “non IT users will struggle”. And mostly reviewers 
believe the security is doing what is expected. 
Valuable/impact of use: It secures users’ documents “For features configured successfully”. 
One expert alludes to it as being “too easy to circumvent”. Three experts disagree that they are 
not losing information though “All the information is intact”. From the peer point of view, the 
information is safe. Security features assure users of the file author, although they could not 
locate the information. 
Security: High on access, confidentiality, encryption. The rest of the heuristics fared badly with 
all experts agreeing that downloaded files are not protected by the program. The program does 
not disable macros. This is highly risky, as they can be a vehicle for breaching security. 
Notifications of security are not displayed or applicable, according to five experts. On the 
contrary, peers see the notifications. Sharing controls are not readily available. There is no: 
assistance in reporting incidents, education on the risks of not using the security features and 
notification about auto-recovery. 
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Awareness/ Expected: Faired well even though the program does not provide the education to 
users as shown by 11/14 responses. Neither does it explain the limitations of the features 
explicitly.Generally, the security in Adobe is moderate to good, based on the review. It would 
have been helpful if all reviewers had filled in the extent per checklist item; however, limited 
feedback in that regard is provided, making it extremely difficult or impossible to calculate the 
difficulty levels. However, there are critical areas that need to be focused on to improve the 
usability. Using awareness as a vehicle, experts in the organisation could evaluate what impacts 
the security in line with organisational security values; and could focus on those in the 
intervention program. The completed extents of task usability complexity are reflected in Table 
7-7. They are rated from very difficult (1) to very easy (5) per heuristic checklist item. Column 1 
is the heuristic and the next column is the checklist item for the heustic in question. 
Table 7-7: Summary of extents of usability per item 
  1 very 
difficult 
2 
difficult 
3 moderate 4 easy 5 very easy 
Heuristic Checklist 
item 
Y N N/A Y N Y N  N/A Y N Y N 
2 1. A - - - 1 1 1 - - 1 - 3 - 
2. B - - - - - 2 - - 1 - 1 - 
3. 3 - - 1 - - 2 - - 2 - 1 - 
3 1. 1 - - 1 1 1 1 - - 1 1 - - 
2. 2 - 1 - - - 2 - - 1 1 - - 
3. 3 - - - 1 1 1 1 1 - 1 - - 
4 1.  - - - - - 2 1 - 2 - - - 
2.  - - - - 1 1 1 - 2 - - - 
5 1.  - - - - - 3 - - 1 - - - 
2.  - - - - - 2 - - 2 - - - 
3.  - - - - 1 1 2 - - - - - 
6 1.  - - - - 1 1 - - 1 - 2 - 
2.  - 1 - - - 4 - - 2 - 1 - 
3.  - 1 - - 1 3 - - 2 - 1 - 
4.  - - - - 2 - - - 2 - 1 - 
5.  - 1 - 1 - 2 - - 1 - 1 - 
6.  - - - 2 1 1 - - 1 - 1 - 
7 1.  - 1 - 1 - 1 1 - - - 1 - 
2.  - - - - - 2 - - 2 - 1 1 
3.  - - - - - 2 - - 2 - 1 - 
8 1.  - - - - 1 1 - - 1 1 1 - 
2.  1 - - - - 1 - - 2 - 1 - 
3.  - - - - - 1 1 - 1 - 1 - 
4.  - - - 1 - 3 - - - - 1 - 
5.  - - - - 1 - - - 1 - 1 - 
9 1.  - - - 2 2 - - - 1 - - - 
2.  - - - - - 1 - - - - - - 
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  1 very 
difficult 
2 
difficult 
3 moderate 4 easy 5 very easy 
Heuristic Checklist 
item 
Y N N/A Y N Y N  N/A Y N Y N 
3.  - 1 - 1 - - 1 - 1 - - - 
4.  1 1 - - - - - - 1 1 - - 
10 1.  - 1 - 1 - - 2 - - - 1 - 
2.  - 1 - 1 - 2 1 - 1 - 1 - 
3.  1 1 - - - - 1 - - - 1 - 
4.  - - - - - 1 1 - 1 - 2 - 
11 1.  - - - - 1 1 - - 2 - 1 - 
2.  - 1 - 1 - - 1 - 2 - 1 - 
3.  - 1 - - - 2 1 - 1 1 1 - 
4.  - 1 - - - - 2 - 1 - 1 - 
12 1.  - - - - - 2 - - - 1 - - 
2.  - - - 1 - - - - 3 - - - 
3.  1 - - - - 2 - - 1 - - - 
4.  - - - 1 - - 1 - 2 - - - 
5.  - - - - 1 1 - - - - - - 
13 2.  - - - - 1 1 1 - 1 - - - 
3.  - - - 1 - - 1 - - - - - 
14 1.  - 1 - 3 - - - - 1 - - - 
2.  - - - 1 - 3 - - - - - - 
15 1.  - - - - - 2 1 - 1 - - - 
2.  - 2 - - - - 1 - 1 - - - 
16 1.  - 1 - - - 2 1 - 1 - 1 - 
2.  - 1 - 1 - 1 - - 1 - 2 - 
3.  - - - - 1 1 - - 1 - 2 - 
17 1. 1 - - - - 1 1 - - 1 - - - 
2.  - - - - 1 - - - 1 1 - - 
3.  - - - - 1 - - - 1 - 1 - 
4.  1 - - - - 3 - - 1 - - - 
5.  - 1 - - - 1 - - 1 - - - 
18 1.  - - - 1 - 2 - - 2 - - - 
2.  - - - 1 - 2 - - 2 - - - 
3.  - - - - - 2 - - 1 - - - 
4.  - - - - - 3 - - 1 - - - 
5.  - - - - 1 2 - - 1 - - - 
6.  - - - 1 - 1 - - - - - - 
7.  - - - - 1 - - - - - - - 
8.  - - 1 1 1 1 - - - - 1 - 
9.  - - 1  - 1 1 - - - 1 - 
10.  - - - 1 - - 1 - - 1 - - 
11.  - 1 - - - - 1 1 - - - - 
12.  - 1 - - - - 1 - 1 - - - 
13.  - 1 - 1 - - 1 - - - - - 
19 1.  - 1 - - - 2 2 - - - - - 
2.  - - - - 1  1 - 1 - - - 
3.  - - - 1 - 2 1 - 1 - - - 
4.  - 1 - - - - - - - - 1 - 
5.  - - - - - 1 - - 3 - - - 
6.  - - - - - 1 1 - - - 2 - 
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Microsoft Word 
Table 7-8 is a summary of the heuristic evaluation conducted on MS Word security features. 
Table 7-8: Word heuristic evaluation 
Visibility/Findable/locatable/ readily displayed – the security feature must be easily found 
Checklist Items Yes No  N/A Total Others 
Can you easily locate the security feature? 12 3  15  
After completing a security action, do you get 
some form of feedback? 
12 3  15  
Can you disable the security? 9 4  14 1 not sure 
Motivating-  the security feature must encourage users to re-use it again in future 
Checklist Items Yes No  N/A  Ext    
Are you motivated to use it again? 10 5  15  
Will you recommend it to others? 12 3  15  
Does it satisfy your perceived goals? 11 3 1 15  
Desirable– the security feature must be pleasant to use, and look at 
Checklist Items Yes   No  N/A Ext  
Is the presentation visually appealing? 9 6  15  
Is the feature pleasant to use? 9 5  15 1 Ext 3 
Useful -  the security features must enable the user to achieve security goals willingly. 
Checklist Items Yes No N/A Ext  
Helps me to be secure 12 2 1 15  
They protect my work 14  1 15  
It does everything I would expect it to do. 7 7 1 15  
Learnability/ understandable, ease of use – the system should ensure that security actions are easy to learn and remember 
Checklist Items Yes No N/A  Ext  
The security features have been grouped into 
logical zones, and headings have been used to 
distinguish them from other program features 
13 2  15  
I learned how to use the security features easily 11 4  15  
The security features are easy to remember 12 2 1 15  
Menus make obvious which security items are 
selected 
10 4 1 15  
The program protects you from making errors 5 8 2 15  
Security-related information is presented in a 
standardized manner 
8 5  15 1 I don’t 
know, 1 not 
sure 
Aesthetics and Minimalist Design – the system should offer users relevant information relating to their security actions 
Checklist Items Yes   No    N/A  Ext   
Only the security information essential to 
decision making is displayed on the screen 
10 3  14 1 I don’t 
know 
All security icons in a set are visually and 
conceptually distinct 
8 6  15 1 ext 3 
Security labels are brief, familiar and 
descriptive 
12 3  15  
Exciting/emotion/perception – the program should offer excitement and good perceptions/ emotions 
Checklist Items Yes   No    N/A Ext    
You feel excited about the security features 6 6 3 15  
You perceive them as good 12 2 1 15  
Security tasks evoke positive emotions in you 8 4 2 15  
The security-related error messages are 
accurate in their descriptions 
11 3  15 1 ex 4 
It was enjoyable to perform security functions 9 3 2 15 1 ext3 
Satisfaction – the system should ensure that users have a good experience when using security and that they are in control 
Checklist Items  Yes  No N/A Ext  
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Security features are easy to work with 9 4  15  
You feel disturbed when you perform security 
tasks 
3 12  15  
Security-related prompts imply that you are in 
control 
9 4 1 15  
You are satisfied with the security 11 2  14 1 ext 3 
User Suitability – the system should provide options for users with diverse levels of skill and experience in security 
Checklist Items Yes  No  N/A  Ext   
Do the security features support both novice 
and expert users? Are multiple levels of 
security error message details available? 
7 7 1 15  
Can you easily change the level of security 
detail? 
7 6  15 1 ext 2, 1 ext 
4 
Can you easily change between novice and 
expert levels? 
3 8 3 15 1 ext 2 
Can you customize security to meet your 
individual preferences? 
11 4  15  
Comfortable to use /User Language – the system should use plain language that users can understand with regard to 
security 
Checklist Items Yes No N/A Ext  
Are security actions named consistently across 
all prompts in the program? 
10 5  15  
Is security information accurate, complete and 
understandable? 
10 4 1 15  
Are security messages stated in clear and 
simple language, where used? 
10 5  15  
Is security jargon avoided? 9 5  14  
User Assistance/ Help – the system should make security help apparent for users 
Checklist Items Yes  No N/A Ext  
Is there a security help function visible (e.g. a 
key labelled “Security Help”)? 
4 11  15  
Is the security information provided relevant? 11 2 2 15  
Can users easily switch between security help 
and their work? 
8 4 3 15  
Do instructions follow the sequence of user 
security actions? 
9 5 1 15  
Does the system provide users with updated 
security educational opportunities, if they 
desire it? 
3 9 3 15  
Efficiency  - the security feature must complete the user’s goal in a timely and accurate manner 
Was it easy to enforce security? 9 4  14  
It takes long to compete the tasks 6 7  14  
      
Accessible – the security feature must be reachable to accomplish a security objective 
Checklist Items Yes   No  N/A  Ext  
Does not present technical or physical barriers 12 2  14  
Readily accessible 10 4  14  
Effective - the extent to which the security feature fulfils the users’ expectations with ease. 
Checklist Items Yes   No  N/A  Ext  
Does what it is supposed to do 13 1 1 15  
Fulfils my security needs 11 2 1 15 1 ext 4 
Usable - the security features must allow the user to do what they want to do in the way they expect to do it without 
difficulty, hesitancy, or queries 
Checklist Items Yes   No  N/A  Ext  
Is it convenient to use? 12 3  15  
It is simple to use? 13 2  15  
Is it doing the expected? 13 1 1 15  
Valuable/ impact of use – the security feature should relate to the users’ goals in a beneficial way 
Checklist Items Yes   No  N/A  Ext  
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 It secures my documents 14   14  
You are not losing information 12 1  14 1 I don’t 
know 
Your files are not edited by wrong people 12 1 1 14  
It does not waste my time 8 4 2 14  
Assures you of the file author 7 4  11  
Security – the system needs to consider integrity, availability, confidentiality, auditing and nonrepudiation 
Checklist Items Yes No N/A Ext  
The information is only accessible to 
authorized users 
12 1 1 14  
Protected or confidential information can be 
accessed only with valid authentication 
13  2 15  
The program encrypts the whole file 9 5 1 15  
You can update or delete document properties 
information 
13 1 1 15  
The program notifies you of your access 
privileges 
11 2 2 15  
The program protects all files downloaded 7 5 2 15 1 I don’t 
know 
Does the program disable macros? 5 7 3 15  
Are notification messages relating to security 
displayed to the user before access to the 
system is granted? 
10 2 2 15 1 ext 3 
Are the controls for sharing readily available? 9 5 1 15  
Does the program install required software 
updates automatically and notify you about this 
action? 
6 6 2 15  
Does the program display options to assist in 
the reporting of security incidents? 
6 8 1 15  
Does the program notify you of any 
vulnerability associated with not applying 
security? 
4 11  15  
Does the program notify you about auto 
recovery? 
8 6  14  
Awareness/Expected security features must be expected: the programs, users should be aware of their existence 
Does the system provide awareness and 
educate you on how to complete tasks? 
3 11 1 15  
Do you expect the security features? 12   14 2 question not 
clear 
Are you aware of the location of the security 
features in the program? 
13 2  15  
Are you aware of the limitations of the 
security? 
8 7  15  
Are you aware of the effect of applying 
security? 
15   15  
Are you educated on proper security usage? 11 4  15  
 
The heuristic evaluations reflect the following: 
Visibility: Security feature are easy to locate, although “some features were easier to locate than 
others (E4)”; and (E6) agrees. “Restricting editing not possible on my Mac because I am the only 
user on it (E5)”. ‘Some of them like password protect (E3)” are not easy to locate; it is “not too 
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clear where one can find the security features (E8)”. Feedback is available after completing 
tasks, but “feedback is difficult to understand though (E8)’. Security can be disabled; however, 
“I did not receive or at least did not notice any feedback when disabling the security” and “Not 
all security features could be disable password (E8)”, One expert found the question confusing. 
As such, clarity needs to be added to the tool for future evaluations. “Not sure what this question 
means? Disable security on the document or disable security features in the application? (E5).”  
Motivation: It is partial, as some who said “yes’ went on to qualify, i.e. “some of the security 
features”, “I will probably just use the password feature to control access to the document. Other 
features are just too difficult to apply correctly (E8)”. The security features can be recommended 
to others as they achieve perceived goals, but “for user who don’t understand digital certificates. 
The encryption feature is not recommendable (E3)”. 
Desirable: Visual presentation is not so good “visual appearance is lacking. The use of images 
could contribute more to understanding the purpose of a security feature (E8)” Features are 
moderately pleasant to use. 
Useful: Useful, although E1 cites that it is “easily broken” and, according to E8,“I was only 
confident that I did the password protection correctly. All other tasks completed I am not 
confident that they were configured correctly”. The features protect the user’s work. “I feel that 
if I had configured all the security actions correctly that my work would be protected. But the 
knowledge time and effort needed to configure all those features correctly is overwhelming” 
(E8). However, the security does not do everything expected of it. 
Learnability/understandable, ease of use: They are logically grouped within other program 
features, such as Edit and Tools; there is no security heading and it is not clear where to find 
them. “Not at all logical to me where some features are located (E3)”.  The program does not 
protect users from making errors. “When creating the password I was not able to view the 
characters that I was typing in. I could have easily made a mistake. Furthermore it did not give 
me automatic feedback as to whether I had a strong or weak password (E4)”.  
Aesthetics and Minimalist Design: The security features do, to a greater extent, conform to 
minimalist design. 
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Exciting/emotion/perception: “Useful but not exciting” E1 summarises the responses; “I do 
perceive them as good if I knew how to configure them” (E8).  “I did feel positive emotions 
when I configured the password protection just as I felt negative emotions when I could not 
configure the other features correctly”, as summarised by (E8). Emotions are not always positive, 
as “Not always I was unaware of how to set the read only feature on and therefore found it 
frustrating. I eventually had to watch a help video which was time consuming. Negative 
emotions were experienced here” (E4). Other users experience the same challenges. Error 
messages are accurate in their descriptions, but “Difficult to understand”. “Overall yes”; the 
tasks invoke positive feelings. 
Satisfaction: Generally satisfying; they are easy to work with; important to reviewers; they do 
not feel disturbed; security prompts do not always imply that the user is in control, “The prompts 
provided in some cases do not imply that I am in control (e.g. I cannot return and edit the details 
of a digital certificate before I actually add the digital certificate to the document” (E8).  
User Suitability: The system does not provide options for users with diverse levels of skill and 
experience in security.  All experts, but one, agree that security features do not support both 
novice and expert users and feel that there are no multiple levels of error message detail 
available. E6 chose Not Applicable, which infers that the functionality is not available and this is 
confirmed by a walkthrough of the features. On the contrary, all peers believe it is supported.  To 
ensure that users use the features, their skills need to be upgraded to acceptable levels, as there is 
“only one level available” E5. 
Comfortable to use: Comfortable, although a lot of technical jargon is used; end users (novices) 
may not understand it. 
User Assistance/ Help: No; however, the EUP help function incorporates security help 
functionality, as indicated by E5: “Help search bar brings relevant functions”. Relevant security 
information is provided. The system does not provide users with updated security educational 
opportunities, if they desire. 
Efficiency: It is easy to enforce the security, for all experts who answered; however three rated 
usability at 3. E1 says yes, E4 “overall yes” - this implies inherent difficulty. E3 rated it as very 
easy. On the peer side, more than half (4) did not find it easy. Considering that peers are closer to 
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end users, and even experts raised concerns, the feature is not so easy to use. It creates a barrier 
for the user. 
Accessible: The security features do not present technical or physical barriers. Readily accessible 
as 10/14 respondents indicated Yes. 
Effective: the features are rated as doing effectively what they are expected to do and fulfilling 
the user’s need.  
Usable: They are very usable for peers; fourof the seven experts share the same view. 
Valuable/impact of use: It secures users’ documents. Security assures users of the file author. 
“You have the ability to restrict access to certain people in a domain, assuming it is configured 
correctly” (E8). “It does require a lot of time to learn to configure” (E8), “Only if you know how 
to use the feature then you don’t waste time” (E3), although it is “Difficult to figure out which 
feature to use. Not all features are in the same menu” (E7). Security is valuable; therefore is not 
considered to waste time; however,it requires a lot of time to learn, to figure out which feature to 
use as features are not in the same menu and users need to know where to find them.  There is a 
need for EUA. 
Security: High on access and confidentiality. “Not evident if the entire document is encrypted” 
(E8). Some believe yes; some no. The feature Help does not specify the extent of the application 
of the security; security is placed on keeping the password. Interestingly enough, end users are 
encouraged to keep a list of passwords and corresponding document names. Question: Are the 
documents secured or it is just an extra task to perform that results in a breach of security best 
practices? Controls and notifications are good. The rest of the heuristics fared badly. All experts 
agree that downloaded files are not protected by the program. Sharing controls are not readily 
available. There is no: assistance in reporting incidents; education on the risks of not using the 
security features; and notification about auto-recovery. Auto recovery - Most experts said No 
(5/8), 1/8 said yes, but “You need to be aware of this feature”: only two agree; however, all but 
one peer agree that the program notifies. 
Awareness/ Expected: All experts agree that there is no security feature awareness or education 
offered by MS Word. The security features are expected in the program; however, two experts 
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found it difficult to understand the expectation of the question. For future use, the question needs 
to be clarified, i.e. Do you expect the security features in the program? Awareness of the feature 
location is excellent, although twoexpert said it is “not all easy to locate” (Expert 6) and “Not 
easy to locate though” (E8). All reviewers are aware of the implications of applying the security, 
although five experts out of eight are not aware of the security limitations. The participants are 
trained from other sources; not the EUP. There is a need to educate users on the features in 
programs implemented in the organisation. The software does not educate or assist users on 
security usage (E8). 
Generally, the security in MS Word is usable based on the review; however, there are areas of 
concern that need organisational experts to address in order for user experience of these features 
to be positive. In a similar study, a major obstacle for end users to the use of EUPSF was found 
to be their usability (Furnell, 2005).The importance of empowering end users to protect 
themselves was highlighted, and usability problems were identified in terms of finding, 
understanding, and ultimately using the security features, using Microsoft Word as an example 
(Furnell, 2005). It would have been helpful if all reviewers had filled in the extent per checklist 
item; however, limited feedback in that regard is provided making it extremely difficult or 
impossible to calculate the difficulty levels. 
7.2.6.9 Reporting - Result interpretation 
The usability of security features in MS Word and Adobe Reader are moderate to good, although 
the user experience is on the low side. The features achieve their goals, although they place a 
burden on the user. For instance, the features are not so easy to locate, i.e. “are not easy to locate; 
it is “not too clear where one can find the security features (E8)”; “Signature can be digital 
signature or a signature image. Had to google digital signature in the latest Word for Mac version 
as I used it before on different Word version- discovered it is not provided for (E5)”. This puts a 
burden on the reviewers, as they need to go out of their way to find them. In some cases the user 
has to go on the Internet to get the help they needed to complete the security task. This gives 
negative emotions about the feature and can deter the usage of it. For example, E4 said: “Not 
always I was unaware of how to set the read only feature on and therefore found it frustrating. I 
eventually had to watch a help video which was time consuming. Negative emotions were 
experienced here” answering to the checklist item “Security tasks evoke positive emotions in 
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you”. The result confirms that, contrary to the assumption, security features are not so usable and 
result in negative user experience, even for security interested and experienced expert users. UX 
was measured by usability, emotions and attitudes associated with task execution. Based on these 
findings, awareness and training on security features is vital to improving security and user 
experience of interaction with EUPSF. The cross comparison of MS Word vs Adobe heuristics 
on a checklist basis is presented in Appendix B3. 
7.2.7 Expert review:  Tentative framework evaluation  
Experts from the InfoSec, IS and HCI fields were identified and approached to evaluate the 
framework development process. 
Informed argumentation demonstrates whether the framework development process conforms to 
existing standard methods or not (Oates, 2012).  The framework development process followed a 
tested and proven method for information systems, behavioural and artefact development, design 
science research. Literature sources were augmented to justify the stages of the process. 
The expert validation was undertaken through document review by field experts. A detailed 
outline of the framework development process, the framework components, plus their validation 
and the resultant framework, were sent to five experts in total. The experts are from the fields of 
HCI (1), InfoSec (3) and IS (1). Four of the experts returned written comments, and they were all 
involved in a discussion. The HCI expert was engaged via Skype to explain his concerns and to 
give clarification on some of the written feedback as he is based in South Africa. Three local 
experts (two InfoSec and one IS) were engaged in a group discussion also, where the researcher 
presented the process and they commented. The comments were audio-recorded and noted on 
paper. The fifth InfoSec expert is from the USA, but was on contact during the write-up and thus 
was also verbally engaged on their feedback.   
The experts critiqued the development process on consistency to the design science research 
method, which was followed and the feedback was used to refine the process. The comments 
were made on a section basis; this made it easier to address them. The process was also validated 
against four other framework development processes. All of this was done to demonstrate the 
rigour of the development method. 
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7.3 REFINED EUPSFUX FRAMEWORK 
The framework underwent reviews by five experts in the fields relevant to the framework.  Table 
7-9 provides an overview of the expert demographics. 
Table 7-9: Expert demographics 
Reviewer Qualification Field of expertise Gender Code 
1 Dr Expert Information Systems M ER1 
2 Student PhD InfoSec Expert  InfoSec, USec M ER2 
3 Student PhD InfoSec Expert InfoSec F ER3 
4 Dr Expert HCI F ER4 
5 Dr Expert IS, Forensics F ER5 
 
Based on the evaluation and validation processes, Table 7-10 presents the identified areas of 
improvement by experts. Experts ER1 and ER2 gave comments that influenced the change in the 
framework while the rest commented on alignment and terminology used, e.g. the use of the 
word evaluation vs. assessment. 
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Table 7-10: Framework development process evaluation 
Evaluation criteria Expert Proposed improvement Improvement made 
Utility ER1 Who are the target users of the framework?  
• Why will they use the framework?  
• How will they use the framework?  
• What will they achieve from using the 
framework? 
Stakeholders clearly defined. 
Roles of stakeholders 
explained. 
Demonstrated through a use 
case scenario. 
Demonstrated through a use 
case scenario. 
 
Utility and validity   ER2 Key aspects that come into play here include: your 
methodology, your target community, the literature 
section and the findings. 
The phases are applied to the 
development process and the 
stakeholders are defined. 
Completeness ER1 ER1 How do evaluation, derivation and implementation 
guidelines of the framework link? 
Components are related 
clearly in the framework. 
Is this an implementation guideline helping the 
practitioner on how to use the framework?  
Explicitly explained in the 
framework description 
Completeness  ER2 I would think there are data and findings which 
could have helped in coming up with this 
framework. 
Refer to those mentioned sections. 
Reference has been made to 
supporting data. 
Ease of use  ER1 The framework is a bit dense and difficult to 
follow. I suggest putting in the abstract 
components; then unpack them in the description of 
the framework 
The framework was refined 
to be lighter and clearer as in 
Figure 7-1. 
General ER5 
 
 
ER1 
 
Formatting of the diagram to align the components. 
Colours and text should blend well. 
 
Validity ER1 Refer to theoretical framework and relate to 
empirical study 
Addressed in the design 
process. 
  Clarify the evaluations in the framework. How does 
the first one relate to the second one? Too early to 
evaluate change the wording, i.e. assess 
Changed in the framework 
and explained. 
 
189 
Based on the critical reviews of the experts, the feedback was incorporated to finalise a refined 
framework.  Figure 7-1 represents the refined framework. 
 
Figure 7-1: Refined framework 
The original framework, Figure 6-19, is suitable as a demonstration of the applicability of the 
implementation guidelines as it positions all components relative to one another with typical 
data. The framework demonstrates that EU characteristics/ factors are the centrepiece of the UX 
evaluation and influencing in EUP and can influence the security posture of the organisation at 
large. Identified metrics speak mainly to the EU characteristics especially awareness. The 
EUPSF as a technology supports the EU to have positive experiences while using ICTs for their 
work using EUP.  
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Organisational security culture drives and influences EU interaction with EUPSF hence UX can 
be contextual, this is to a large exnt depended on the human aspect as they are responsible for 
designing policies and selecting the right EUP for employees. 
7.4 FRAMEWORK LIMITATIONS 
The areas of user behaviour and organisational culture were not addressed because of the scope 
of the study. Heuristic studies were conducted by peers and experts. It would have been 
interesting to compare the findings with user studies on the same scope. The framework was not 
implemented and evaluated in real use. The study was conducted in one site; a cross site 
evaluation would have improved the generalisability of the framework. The heuristic list is very 
long and that deterred most of the consulted experts from completing the evaluation. 
7.5 SUMMARY 
This chapter presented the tools, processes and a guideline developed in the research and 
positions them as contributions to the body of knowledge and industry practice. The quality of 
the  framework was demonstrated by demonstrating: transferability through documentation of 
the tools and methods which were used in designing and validating the EUPSF; credibility by 
using data and method triangulation; confirmability though the use of clearly outlined methods 
and processes for data collection and analysis as wel as use of literature to confirm findings.  The 
reliability of the study was demonstrated through bias elimination in the administration (self) of 
the survey as well clear documentation of research methods and strategies.  
EUPSF were validated through task-oriented heuristic evaluations by peers and experts in the 
HCI, InfoSec, USec and UX fields in two different case programs using a multiple case study 
strategy in line with the eight heuristic evaluation stages. The heuristic evaluation eight stages 
are: planning, selecting evaluators, selecting the program to evaluate, determining a set of 
heuristics to evaluate, prepare to collect data, developing tasks for evaluators, conducting the 
evaluation and finally, analysing the data.  
Using the comments of the experts on the framework development process presented in Table 7 
10 on the tentative framework and its development process, a refined framework was designed 
and is presented in Section 7.3, Figure 7.1. 
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CHAPTER 8: OVERALL RESEARCH CONCLUSION 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapters discussed the problem, methodologies, literature studies, as well as the 
empirical study, the framework design and evaluation. The research problem was identified as 
the lack of user experience evaluation criteria (metrics) to assess the user’s experience of 
interacting with embedded security features in end user application programs. A framework for 
evaluating UX of security features in EUPs, which integrates organisational InfoSec culture, end 
user characteristics and EUP security features into a UX metric, was developed. The proposed 
framework is in line with the main goal of this research work. It is envisaged that the developed 
security UX framework will make available a platform for testing and ensuring that application 
security does not only provide security to information, but also a secure and positive experience. 
This will encourage users to make informed use voluntarily of embedded security features in 
their programs and will, in turn, improve personal and organisational information security. In so 
doing, the framework will address the following gaps which were identified from the literature 
review: 
1. Lack of tools to evaluate UX with application security features 
2. Lack of metrics to measure awareness levels of case subjects. 
The study adds to the literature in the area of UX evaluation and measurement, in general, and 
specific to end user program security. The research contributes to the theoretical body of 
knowledge within the information security and user experiences’ sub-domain of human 
Computer Interaction on securing end user program security features. It also creates a platform 
for further academic research on human factors of information security and user behaviour. This 
chapter presents the researcher’s view of the whole thesis, following the outline. 
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Reflection, lessons learnt, research limitations, future directions and concluding remarks are 
presented in the following sections. First, the next section presents an overview of the research 
contributions. 
 8.2 RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS  
From the research it was established that there are no tools and mechanisms to evaluate UX 
experience with EUPSF; hence, the need exists to develop a framework to address the gap. This 
thesis contributes to the body of knowledge of InfoSec and UX elements of HCI on how user 
behaviour can be influenced for positive UX with InfoSec. This study has identified factors that 
affect UX with end user program security features. Secondly, metrics which can be used to 
evaluate user awareness of security features and UX with interaction with security features 
embedded in end user programs were identified and developed. Thirdly, the framework presents 
the components and the relationships that exist between the components themselves and their 
impact on UX of interacting with embedded end user security features. During the process of 
answering the research questions guiding this study, the following can be noted: 
From the literature review and case site document analysis, the following shortcomings were 
identified: 
C
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1. The lack of a security awareness program at the case site.  Thus as a result there is a need 
for the creation of security awareness programs to be implemented with the view of 
communicating with institutional policies and best practices. 
2. The lack of specific metrics for establishing baseline security awareness among end 
users. 
3. The lack of an integrated view of security and user experience components. 
In response to the shortcomings, answers to the research questions and the case study, the 
following contributions to the body of knowledge can be recorded: 
1. A theoretical framework showing the components of the research topic and their 
relationships (Section 5.5.3, Section 6.3.3.3). 
2. The identification of security and UX issues affecting end users with application 
programs (Section 5.5.2). 
3. Metrics for establishing baseline security awareness among end users (Section 5.5.4). 
4. A model showing the relationships between the InfoSec and UX aspects and user 
behaviour. This also provided a new approach to addressing environmental aspects on 
security behaviour (Section 5.5.3). 
5. Metrics for evaluating UX of interacting with application programs using a heuristic 
evaluation (Section 7.2.6).  
6. An incremental framework development process for developing and evaluation of the 
EUPSFUX framework (Section 6.3).  
7. A framework (EUPSFUX) for evaluating the UX of interacting with embedded security 
features in end user application programs (Section 6.3.5.5). 
8. Framework implementation guidelines to guide the implementers at insitutional level 
(Section 6.3.3.4). 
9. A theoretical framework showing the components of the research topic and their 
relationships, an output of the literature review. 
10. The identification of security and UX issues affecting end users with application 
programs, as published in Paper 1. Answered Research Question 1 using literature 
reviews and empirical studies (Appendix C1). 
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11. Metrics proposed for establishing baseline security awareness among end users, as 
published in Paper 2 and Cambridge book, Chapter 10. This was in part answering 
Question 2, on identifying the UX metrics for EUPSF (Appendix C2 & 3). 
12. A need was identified for security awareness programs to be implemented in an academic 
institution aimed at communicating policies and best practices. 
13. The research adds to the literature in the area of UX evaluation and measurement, in 
general, and specific to end user program security features. 
14. A platform was created for further academic research on human factors of information 
security in end user programs. 
Specific novel contributions to the body of knowledge are discussed in the following sections. 
8.2.1 Contribution 1: Framework design process 
A framework design process guided the research process as it informed every stage of the 
framework development and related it to the research methodology applied to the case study. 
The process was based on a review of design science frameworks applicable to information 
systems. 
Benefits 
It allows for the framework to be validated for rigour as it can be evaluated for the reliability of 
the method applied in developing the EUPSFUX framework. 
8.2.2 Contribution 2: Framework implementation guideline 
The process allows for stakeholders (practitioners) to apply the framework in context and to 
collect actual measures of UX at any given time. 
Benefits 
The process can be followed systematically and is based on theoretical foundations as the design 
was informed by literature reviews. 
8.2.3 Contribution 3: EUPSFUX framework 
The framework is based on the three critical components that should be present in every business 
model for information security (BMIS) and user experience. The components are: people 
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(referred to as stakeholders in this study and end users in UX), technology (product in UX which, 
in this study, is the security feature in a EUP (in particular MS Word and Adobe acrobat 
Reader)) and organisation strategy (context in UX which, in this case. is the organisational 
InfoSec culture). The framework focuses on the human factors as a dynamic interconnector 
between people and technology. UX occurs as a result of human and technology factors and is 
dependent on human factors and technology factors in context. The technology is end user 
security features in the context of MS Word or Adobe Acrobat Reader as used at PoN. The 
people aspect defines program end users, InfoSec experts, UX experts and IT technical experts 
(team). The critical components allow for information security and UX to be evaluated at three 
levels, namely: people, technology and context. Level 1 is identifying EUPSFUX factors through 
user studies, context analysis and focusing on particular products. At level 1, the experts are 
evaluating the critical components. Level 2 entails establishing a baseline of the identified factors 
by evaluating InfoSec, EU, UX and EUPSF factors, using user studies, heuristic evaluation and 
security awareness baseline metrics. This is also done by the experts. Level 3 is influencing UX 
change; this is done by developing an intervention that is context sensitive as it is influenced by 
factors identified in the environment of application. In this instance, there was no user awareness 
program in place; hence, that is recommended as the first strategy for influencing positive and 
secure UX. Depending on the posture of the context and culture, a change management programs 
might be necessary to influence user behaviour. The rest entails re-evaluating and maintaining or 
influencing the UX for better organisational security. 
Benefits 
The framework allows for user experience of end user interactions with end user program 
security features to be evaluated in a context-sensitive manner. 
8.2.4 Contribution 4: Framework evaluation toolset 
Measures EUPSF usability, security and UX done using heuristic evaluation security awareness 
metrics. The next two sections present the tools in detail. 
8.2.5 Heuristic evaluation 
End User Program (EUP) USec, UX and security heuristics with associated checklist items, were 
developed and applied to MS Word and Adobe Acrobat Reader. The heuristic evaluation is 
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specific to end user program; however, can be varied on a task-specific basis to match the 
inherent security functionality and features in the program under review. The heuristics are used 
as criteria to identify security, usability and user experience violations during interaction with an 
EUP.  It allows for InfoSec, IT team and UX experts in organisations to identify areas of 
concern; to train end users on best practice and to achieve organisational security and positive 
user experience. 
Benefit  
Informed intervention to improve end user interactions with EUPSF, user perceptions and 
attitudes towards security features, positive user experiences and behaviour, and an overall 
secure organisation can be achieved. 
8.2.6 Awareness metrics 
Measures for evaluating security awareness levels in context were generated.  Awareness survey, 
user behaviour and computer infections were identified as awareness metrics. 
Benefit  
They allow for practitioners (UX, IT team and InfoSec experts) to establish the UX and security 
posture of the organisation before taking any action. 
8.3 REFLECTION 
This section presents a reflection on the relationship of the expected product of the research 
process, the research problem and the contributions made. The research paradigm, DSR has 
reflection as the third cognitive process that is carried out before concluding the research 
(Vaishnavi & Kuechler, 2004). Three types of reflection will be presented, namely: scientific, 
methodological and substantive 
8.3.1 Methodological reflection 
Focus is placed on the appropriateness of the applied research methods, paradigms and 
processes. The problem-based research cycle, as well as design science research, was chosen for 
the study. The problem-based research was used to identify the problem, set the research 
objectives and identify the research methodology. Problem identification fits with stage 1 of 
DSRM; and the determination of research objectives and question fits with stage 2 of DSRM. 
Stage 3 of DSRM speaks to design and development of a solution; however, there is a need for a 
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clear methodology to be defined which, when followed, can lead to the artefact development, as 
such problem-based research in a case study setup was used to complement DSRM in this aspect. 
After determining the methodology, problem-based research was silent on how one can go about 
solving the problem and this is where DSRM comes in with a detailed approach to solving the 
problem, through the design of the architecture and functionality; then the creation and 
development of the artefact. Once the artefact has been developed, it is then evaluated in stage 4 
of DSRM. There is a moment of reflection on the output, which feeds back to development as a 
way of improving the output. The final stage is the communication of the framework though 
scholarly platforms and to various audiences. 
DSRM was also found appropriate to the problem setup. A business problem was identified and 
DSR is the right tool to develop and implement a solution to address the problem. The problem 
was phenomenological hence an artefact was the solution, making DSR the correct choice for a 
paradigm with a case study strategy. 
8.3.2 Scientific reflection 
Technological advancements have revolutionised all businesses to be technology-driven. In so 
doing, end users of technology have been faced with the challenge of having to make decisions 
which they traditionally regarded as specific to IT practitioners. Among them are security-related 
decisions which are mostly perceived by end users to be complex. Each program used to 
accomplish work related tasks has its own set of security features which differ from the next 
program. As is the nature of technology-centric organisation, the end user has to complete 
several tasks related to their duties using different end user programs. For instance, one uses a 
document creator to create a memo, and to ensure its integrity one signs it and shares it 
electronically using an email client program in PDF format. In this simple case, the end user has 
interacted with three different programs with different security interactions. User studies have 
shown that the user remains with a negative experience and usually chooses the easier way of 
responding to security interactions, which results in security breaches. 
Literature has shown that there are no mechanisms in place to measure the user experience of 
these interactions; hence, there is a need to come up with metrics and methods to address this. 
The thesis contributes a framework which can be applied to evaluate, influence and maintain 
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acceptable user experience levels. The framework is positioned to contribute to InfoSec, HCI and 
EUP design. 
8.3.3 Substantive reflection 
The study focused on two broad fields namely InfoSec and UX which are both complex and 
wide. The scope of the study covers Computer Science, Cognitive Psychology, UX and Industry 
Design. The nature of the fields ensured a broad understanding of human factors affecting end 
user interaction with security features. This enabled the identification of UX evaluation criteria 
suitable for InfoSec in particular focusing on EUPSF in MS Word and Adobe. The 
understanding of the HCI, InfoSec and USec enabled the development of the EUPSFUX 
evaluation framework. 
8.4 LESSONS LEARNT 
Self-realisation was the greatest gift I took out of this research journey. As a technical person 
technology has always been my focus and I believed that if a product is designed with a user goal 
in mind, then it is automatically usable and the end user accepts and enjoys it. During my 
journey new realities were presented that altered my personal views of end users. A new passion 
was awakened and I cannot believe how I ever missed my passion for the user perspective of 
technology. I developed a deeper understanding of human behaviour, experience and motivation 
when they interact with technology. 
Rich knowledge and appreciation of my fields of study were gained, together with an 
interdisciplinary appreciation for research. Research passion, skills and abilities were 
tremendously developed. I learnt to value that the role of the end user is the success of 
technology implementation and in shaping the organisational security culture. 
At the beginning, the aim was to evaluate secure user experience, but as the research problem 
unfolded it became apparent that there were other aspects of UX that I needed to understand first. 
Secure UX is not just a matter of marrying information security and user experience fields, but it 
is a process of understanding the fields holistically and being able to apply the understanding to 
arising situations. Human factors are very complex and dynamic. These present a challenge in 
evaluating user experience. In addition, security presents itself to end users in a variety of forms, 
increasing the complexity of the study. 
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As a step towards this grand dream, a way of evaluating UX of end user interaction with EUPSF 
has to be developed. This can later be tailored to evaluate the security of user experience. A new 
challenge presented itself in the form of end user awareness (EUA). EUA assumed a central 
position in all efforts to understand security and interaction. As such, it had to be attended to. 
EUA anchors InfoSec, UB and UX alike, so how then can the security posture, user behaviour 
and user experience be evaluated without first evaluating the product awareness levels in 
context?  Moreover, UX is an intersection of end user and product (technology) characteristics in 
a specific context. 
A new passion was birthed: EUA of information security factors. This led to the development of 
EUA metrics using goal-question, bottom-up methods. To understand the security of UX, UB, 
HCI, security objectives and characteristics, as well as the human nature in organisational setup, 
have to be investigated fully. 
8.5 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
The research was conducted in only one academic institution; hence, there was no comparison of 
the outcome and the impact of the organisational culture. The organisational culture was not 
studied in depth to enable conclusions to be drawn about what drives the human interactions. The 
study; however, managed to gain a glimpse of the tip of the iceberg of what the people do. 
The framework was not empirically validated in the case site to evaluate the actual applicability, 
as it requires a long period of time, which was beyond the scope of a PhD study. The nature of 
the research was an intersection of many fields and, as such, it was difficult to find experts with 
tri-expertise in the fields of InfoSec, UX and HCI. Only one such expert was available. It would 
have been more interesting to compare the evaluation from multiple sources with similar 
expertise. 
The strength of the framework is that it was developed from a user perspective of end users in a 
typical case. However, the weakness is that it does not address user behaviour and organisational 
security culture, as they are beyond the scope of this study. 
8.6 FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
In future, the framework will be tested in different setups and the domain of the research 
participants will be broadened to allow for generalisability of the framework. An in-depth culture 
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study of the case site will be carried out in the quest to understand their underpinning 
assumptions, which influence both individual and organisation values and behaviour. Finally, 
further research in secure UX as a research focus will be pursued. Also important is the study of 
the user behaviour domain of HCI and its influence on organisational information security 
culture. 
8.7 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The main objective of the research work was to develop a framework that would evaluate UX of 
end user program security features. To achieve this goal, three sub-objectives were formulated 
and were achieved through several researches aimed at addressing the corresponding research 
questions as presented in Chapter 1, Section 4. Table 8-1 presents the research questions and 
answers.  
Table 8-1: Research question, answers and evidence 
Research question Answer Evidence  
What are the components of a 
framework to evaluate UX of end user 
program security features? 
Components and requirements 
of end user program security 
features’ UX were determined 
and used to develop the 
EUPSFUX framework. The 
identified components are: 
factors affecting UX (users 
(people), technology and 
organisation strategy); UX 
evaluation criteria; 
implementation guidelines; UX 
intervention and stakeholders. 
Framework, implementation 
guidelines and evaluation metrics 
 
What are the factors affecting UX 
with embedded security features in 
end user programs? 
Identified factors:  
 Security feature 
awareness 
 Policy awareness and 
implementation 
 Organisational culture 
 Feelings evoked by 
Theoretical framework, Figure 5-6  
Components of EUPSFUX 
framework 
Paper 1: Factors affecting user 
experience with security features 
Paper 2: Metrics for security 
201 
Research question Answer Evidence  
interaction 
 Usability of the 
security feature 
 End user’s attitudes 
and perceptions of the 
security task 
 Prior user experience 
 User behaviour with 
security features 
awareness 
What are the suitable usable security 
criteria/ methods that can be used to 
evaluate UX of end user program 
security features? 
To determine the best USec 
evaluation methods for 
evaluating UX of application 
security features. Develop 
heuristic evaluation and 
associated checklists. the 
identified 17 criteria are: 
Awareness/expected; 
Motivating; Comfortable; 
Useful; Desirable; Accessible; 
Visible / readily displayed/ 
findable; Valuable/ impact of 
use; Usable; Supported; 
Understandable/complexity/ 
learnable; Long term 
experience/ memorability;  
Security/ safety; Efficient; 
Effective; Satisfaction; 
Exciting/perception/ emotion 
Heuristic evaluation, framework 
evaluation criteria 
Which UX metrics/ evaluation criteria 
can be used to determine the UX of 
end user program security features? 
To determine UX criteria that 
can be adopted for end user 
programs security features UX 
(EUPSFUX). 
 
Heuristic evaluation, framework 
evaluation criteria 
UX metrics for UX in application 
program security 
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The research work mainly followed an interpretivist philosophy employing inductive and design 
science approaches complemented with case study strategies. Data collection and gathering 
followed the qualitative method using semi- structured interviews, surveys and heuristic 
evaluations as instruments. 
Findings from the studies were published in peer reviewed conferences and journals in 
Information Security and Human Computer Interaction. The research papers are partially 
presented in Chapter 5, where the actual studies are described and the full papers are part of the 
appendices and are presented in Appendix C1, Appendix C2 and Appendix C3. 
A discussion of the framework development process is presented in Chapter 6 and 7 where the 
framework is developed and evaluated. 
The framework brings together the factors that affect users with information security in 
application programs; metrics for measuring user awareness of security features; user 
experiences of interaction with security features and their behaviour towards the features within 
an academic institution.   
Making security awareness programs available which focus on awareness, then knowledge and 
skills, among the staff members of an academic institution would enhance positive security 
behaviours in the organisation. Consequently, as they interact with students they will impart the 
information regarding security positive behaviours to them and this will result in overall secure 
user experiences for all involved. The revised theoretical framework in Figure 6-14 shows how 
the different elements of HCI influence InfoSec and UX in the study context. 
Awareness is the basis of feelings while interacting with technology. The feelings shape the 
attitudes and perceptions which, in turn, influence user experience with the technology in use. 
Negative feelings mean that the user will resist using the technology and consequently, there will 
be no security. On the other hand, positive feelings mean that the users have a good perception of 
the technology, and a positive experience while interacting. As a result, they behave in a secure 
manner; hence, they secure their information. 
The proposed framework could easily be used by the case site and other similar setups. 
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APPENDIX A1: ONLINE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE  
End User Information Security Survey     
 
   
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
   1. Introduction      
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
  
This questionnaire will be used to address end user issues in Information security focusing on end user 
application programs. The aim is conduct a pilot study to establish security problems resulting from 
inadequate support for end users in using security features embedded in application programs they use 
daily. We will collect data about security awareness, experience with security interaction, usage and 
problems associated with the use or lack of Application security. The results will be confidential and 
will only be used to assess the extent of a need to improve the end user’s interaction with security 
features on their computers. 
  In the first section you will be asked about your general information.  
  
  
   
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
1. Which school/Department are you in? *  
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
2. What is your gender? *  
Female 
Male 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
3. How long have you been in the Organisation? *  
0- 6 
Months 
6-12 
Months 
1 
Year + 
2 
Years + 
3 
Years + 
4 
Years + 
5 
Years + 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
4. What is your age? 
*  
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
   2. User Information Security Awareness      
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  In this section you will answer general question about security threats and intervention strategies.     
   
  
 
 
  
1.  
       Have you ever heard of the following? (tick all that apply) : 
*  
Hacking Phishing 
Spam 
Spyware 
Virus 
Worm 
Social 
Engineering 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
2. Have you ever been a victim of: 
  Yes No Don't Know 
Hacking    
Phishing    
Spam    
Spyware    
Virus    
Worm    
Social Engineering    
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
3. If any of the answers to 2 is yes, please explain how it happened? *  
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
4.  
       What are possible sources of information threats? (Tick all the appropriate choices) 
*  
Internet 
USB 
sticks/ flash 
Opening 
attachments 
Opening 
email from CDs/DVDs 
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and external 
drives 
strangers 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
5. How frequent do you use the following security technologies? *  
  Not at all Rarely Sometimes Often Always 
Antivirus      
Firewall      
Antimalware      
Intrusion 
Detection 
System 
     
Passwords      
Patches      
Updates      
Backup      
Encryption      
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
6.  
        Do you have any of the above security systems installed on your machine?  
*  
 Yes 
 No 
 Don't Know 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
   3. User Behaviour/ Interaction with the programs      
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
  You will respond to questions on your interaction with the application programs as you work.    
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1. How often do you update your Programs? *  
Not at all 
Sometimes 
When 
prompted 
Often Always 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
2. How do you update? 
*  
Manually 
Automatically 
Not at all 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
3. Do you disable antivirus software/ personal firewalls running on your PC? *  
Yes 
No 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
4. Do you disable alerts from displaying? *  
Yes 
No 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
5. What do you think is the reason for programs to display alerts to you? 
*  
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
6. Do you allow your browser to install add-ons such as Java script, Flash, Active X on your 
computer? *  
Yes No 
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
7. While you are browsing the internet you get a Websense message telling you that 
the site you are trying to visit is blocked by your organisation. What action do you take? 
 
*  
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8. Do you think it is appropriate for an Organisation to block sites for end users? *  
Yes 
No 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
9. Are you able to install programs on your computer? *  
Yes 
No 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
10. Do you download and install free software of choice from the internet? *  
Yes 
No 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
11. When you connect to the Internet do you always use secure connection? 
*  
Yes 
No 
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
12. Do you share files with colleagues or students? *  
Yes 
No 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
13. Which of the following do you use to share your files? (tick all the applicable) *  
Memory 
Stick 
Network 
Common 
Server 
Email 
Dropbox GoogleDocs 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
14. Are you part of any of the following social or professional networks? 
*  
  Yes No 
LinkedIn   
Facebook   
Twitter   
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15. What Information do you share with your professional and social networks? 
*  
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
   4. Security and security policy awareness      
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
  
In this section you will be asked question about your security and security policy awareness. A security 
policy is a set of goals and rules for an organisation's computer systems usage that ensures security of 
organisational information and computer assets.  
 
  
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
   
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
1. Do you receive training on computer security from the technical department? *  
Yes 
No 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
2. Are you aware of any computer security policies in the Organisation? *  
Yes 
No 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
3.  
        To what extent do you know these policies? ( 1 is not at all and 5 is very well) 
*  
  1 2 3 4 5 
Password      
Wireless      
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General 
Computer 
usage 
     
Internet      
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
5. Do you know and follow the requirements of the policies? *  
Yes 
No 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
   5. Application Program Usage      
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
  This section will ask you about the application programs you are using on your computer.    
  
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
1. To what extent do you use the following programs? 
*  
  Always Sometimes Not at all 
Word Processors    
Spreadsheets    
Presentation    
Graphics    
Project Management    
Document Readers    
Database 
Management    
Email    
Web Browsers    
ITS    
Other    
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2. Have you ever configured your program security options? *  
Yes 
No 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
3.  
        Which one of the following security features in your programs have you used to protect 
your information?    
*  
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
   6. User Experience with Program security features.      
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
  
In this section you will be asked about your experience with program security features and how you feel 
about the interaction.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
1. Have you ever received program notifications warning you to protect your 
information? 
*  
Yes 
No 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
2. How do you respond to program notifications? 
*  
Ignore 
Read through and 
make a choice 
Click anything to get 
rid of the message 
 
/ 
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3. Updates prompt you with a notification to install every 3 hours if the expiry date is 
more than 24 hours away, and hourly if within 24 hours. How do you feel about this? *  
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
4. When you agree to update you get three progress statuses, preparing to download, 
downloading and installing. Is this helpful? *  
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Not sure Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
5.  
        How do you feel when security messages are displayed and require your action? (please 
tick all the applicable) 
*  
Irritated Annoyed Frustrated Indifferent 
My 
work is 
disturbed 
It is my 
responsibility 
It is the 
technician’s 
responsibility 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
6. Why do you get the feeling you mentioned in the previous question? *  
 
 
 
  
 
   
 
  
 
  
 
   7. Password Usage and Management      
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
  In this section you will be asked about your password usage and management.    
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1. Do you use different passwords for loging to different application programs and 
websites? *  
 Yes 
 No 
 Sometimes (elaborate) 
       
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
2. Do you write them down?  
Yes 
No 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
3. If yes do you protect the password file?  *  
 Not Applicable 
 No 
 Yes 
 How do you protect it 
       
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
4. Do you share passwords with colleagues? *  
Yes 
No 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
5. Do you use the remember password option? *  
Yes 
No 
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   8. Email usage and computer support      
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
  You will be asked about the Email programs you use and support you get while using the computer.    
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
1. Does your email filter spam? (put them in junk/ bulk email folder) *  
Yes 
No 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
2. Do you open emails from unfamiliar names? 
*  
Yes 
No 
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
3. Do you open all attachments? *  
Yes 
No 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
4. Do you encrypt your emails before sending them out? 
*  
Yes 
No 
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
5. Which email client do you use? 
*  
 Communigate 
 MS Outlook 
 Outlook Express 
 Thunderbird 
 Yahoo mail 
 Gmail 
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 Hotmail 
 Other (Please Specify) 
       
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
6.  
       If your program misbehaves where do you get help from? 
*  
Internet Friend Colleague 
BCS 
technician 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
7.  
        If the technician is helping you, do they:  (please tick all the applicable) 
*  
 Come to your office 
 Use the phone 
 Control your computer from their office? 
 All the above 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
8. While trying to resolve the problem, if you are asked for your password do you give 
it? *  
Yes 
No 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
   9. Computer Knowledge and Acceptace      
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
  This section deals with your computer knowledge and technology acceptance.    
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1. Do you like using computers for work? 
*  
Yes 
No 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
2. Are you comfortable with computer technologies? 
*  
Yes 
No 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
3. How do you feel about the technician taking control of your computer from their 
office? 
*  
very 
comfortable Comfortable 
Neutral Unease 
Very 
unease 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
4. Do you think you are the only one with access to your information on work 
computers? 
*  
Yes No 
Maybe 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
5. Can technicians be trusted? 
*  
Yes No 
Maybe 
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6. Do you appreciate a new version when it is released? 
*  
Yes 
No 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
7. To what extent do you trust your web browser to auto-complele the URL (Internet 
address) for you? 
*  
 Always 
 Often 
 Sometimes 
 Rarely 
 Not at all 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
8. To what extent do you use your computer for the following: 
*  
  Always Sometimes Not at all 
Communication    
Research    
Teaching    
Administration    
Internet browsing    
Internet banking    
Downloading notes, 
games, programs, 
movies and music 
   
playing games, music, 
Skype    
Other    
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APPENDIX A2: PERMISSION TO CONDUCT STUDY
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APPENDIX A3: COVER LETTER 
Polytechnic of Namibia 
Private Bag 13388, Windhoek 
13 Storch Street, 
Windhoek  West 
Date, 
Dear colleague, 
Objective: To carry out a pilot study survey to assess the computer security status at P.o.N. 
A lecturer (busy with her Doctorate studies) in the Computer Systems and Networks Department 
in collaboration with the Bureau of Computer Services (BCS) is studying Computer information 
security culture in the organisation, focusing on ways to improve your experience with 
Application program Security. 
In order to understand how the Polytechnic of Namibia community handles security issues 
related your computer information and to reduce the risk of losing it, we are busy with a pilot 
study.  The survey will gather information about: 
1. Your knowledge of security threats you are exposed to when you connect to the network. 
2. Your awareness of computer security policies in the organisation. 
3. Your experiences with security interaction. 
4. Security technology/ solutions usage among the community members. 
5. The programs you are using for primary tasks at work/ job. 
6. Your knowledge of security features embedded in your Application Programs and 
Operating System. 
7. How you behave towards security alerts. 
Please answer the questions as honestly as possible; the information gathered from this will be 
used to improve the information security in our organisation. It is not intended to assess your 
computer knowledge.  The results of this survey will be used to enhance your information 
security by considering your experience with application programs. Please feel free to include 
any information you think will be of help to us. The results will be confidential. Your input will 
241 
be greatly appreciated as it will influence how we address your concerns. Your usual cooperation 
is highly appreciated. 
Thank you for your cooperation. 
Yours sincerely 
Fungai Bhunu Shava 
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APPENDIX A4: SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS  
Structured interviews 
End user 
1. To what extent do you feel that the security alerts/ dialogues displayed to you are: 
a. Annoying  
b. Time wasting 
c. Too long 
d. Vague 
e. Helpful   
2. Do you like interacting with them? 
3. Of the programs you use, which one displays its security dialogues in a favourable way? 
4. How does the above mentioned program present the dialogues? 
5. How do you think it can be improved? 
6. Do you get the relevant technical support from the BCS? 
 
IT/Technical staff 
1. To what extent do you think the user is responsible for security problems usually 
experienced in the network? (viruses, social engineering, hacking…) 
Always, sometimes, never. 
2. Why is this a problem? 
3. In your own opinion, how can it be fixed? 
4. Do you think users at poly are not behaving responsibly? 
5. What policies are directly related to the users? 
6. Do organisational policies allow users to be in control of their own security? (can they 
update software? Can they install plugins?) 
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APPENDIX A5: SURVEY RESULTS SUMMARY  
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APPENDIX A6: SURVEY RAW DATA  
FreeFormResponseOneLineSingleChoic HorizontalSingleChoiceHorizontalFreeFormResponseOneLineMultipleChoiceHorizontal MatrixSingleChoice FreeFormResponseOneLineMultipleChoiceHorizontal MatrixSingleChoice SingleChoiceVerticalSingleChoiceHorizontalSingleChoiceHorizontalSingleChoiceHorizontalSingleChoiceHorizontalFreeFormResponseOneLineSingleChoic HorizontalFr eFormResponseOneLineSingleChoic HorizontalSingleChoiceHorizontalSingleChoiceHorizontalSingleChoiceHorizontalSingleChoiceHorizontalMultipleChoiceHorizontal MatrixMultipleChoice FreeFormResponseOneLineSingleChoic HorizontalSingleChoiceHorizontalMatrixSingleChoice SingleChoiceHorizontalSingleChoiceHorizontalMatrixSingleChoice SingleChoiceHorizontalMultipleChoiceVertical SingleChoiceHorizontalSingleChoiceHorizontalFreeFormResponseOneLineSingleChoic HorizontalMultipleChoiceHorizontal FreeFormResponseOneLineSingleChoic VerticalSingleChoiceHorizontalSingleChoiceVerticalSingleChoiceHorizontalSingleChoiceHorizontalSingleChoiceHorizontalSingleChoiceHorizontalSingleChoiceHorizontalSingleChoiceHorizontalMultipleChoiceVertical SingleChoiceHorizontalMultipleChoiceVertical SingleChoiceHorizontalSingleChoiceHorizontalSingleChoiceHorizontalSingleChoiceHorizontalSingleChoiceHorizontalSingleChoiceHorizontalSingleChoiceHorizontalSingleChoiceVerticalMatrixSingleChoice
RespondentIDS artDate EndDate IPAddress EmailAddressFirstNameLastName CustomDataWhich What is How long What is &nbsp;& Have you If any of &nbsp;& How &nbsp;& How How do Do you Do you What do Do you While Do you Are you Do you When Do you Which of Are you What Do you Are you &nbsp;& &nbsp;& Do you To what Have you &nbsp;& Have you How do Updates When &nbsp; Why do Do you Do you If yes do Do you Do you Does Do you Do you Do you Which &nbsp;& &nbsp; While Do you Are you How do Do you Can Do you To what To what 
Response Response Response Response Hacking Phishing Spam Spyware Virus Worm Social EngineeringHack Phishing Spam Spyware Virus Worm Social EngineeringR sponse Internet USB sticks/ flash and external drivesOpening attachmentsOpening email from strangersCDs/DVDs Antiviru Firewall AntimalwareIntrusion Detection SystemPassw rdsPa ches Updates Backup EncryptionResponse Response Response Response Response Response Response Response Response Response Response Response Response Memory StickNetwork Common ServerEmail Dropbox GoogleDocsLinkedIn - YesLinkedIn - NoFacebook - YesFacebook - NoTwitter - YesTwitter - NoResponse Response Response Password Wireless General Computer usageIntern t Response Response Word ProcessorsSpreadsheetsPresentationGraphics Project ManagementDocu  ReadersDat base ManagementEmail Web BrowsersITS Other Response PasswordsPermissionsEncryptionOther (Please Specify)Open-Ended ResponseResponse Response Response Response Irritated Annoyed FrustratedIndifferentMy work is disturbedIt  my responsibilityIt is the technicianâ€™s responsibilityResponse Response Open-Ended ResponseResponse Response Open-Ended ResponseResponse Response Response Response Response Response CommunigateMS OutlookOutlook ExpressThunderbirdYahoo mailGmail Hotmail Other (Please Specify)Open-Ended ResponseResponse Come to your officeUse the phoneControl your computer from their office?All the aboveR sponse Response Response Response Response Response Response Response CommunicationResearch Teaching AdministrationInternet browsingInter et bankingDownloading notes, games, programs, movies and musicplaying games, music, SkypeOth r
8014845 ######## ######## 41.182.35.113jslay@polytechnic.edu.naJill Slay IT 1 1 59 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 Drive by download of virus; just picked up spyware1 2 3 4 5 5 5 5 3 5 5 5 5 5 1 5 2 2 2 it has found a security threat2 stop browsing 1 1 1 2 1 1 4 1 1 very little - only with friends1 1 4 4 4 4 2 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 4 disable printing 1 2 bit too often 4 6 am an IT Sec professional1 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 4 8 Windows live mail 1 2 2 1 1 5 2 1 1 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
8043519 ######## ######## 196.44.131.220 Economics 2 2 37 1 2 3 4 5 6 2 1 1 1 1 3 3 -spyware automatically downloaded to my computer while browsing the internet. Computer affected by viruses while surfing the internet (that time I had no antivirus programme); I receive quite a lot of unsolicited emails / spam through my private email, an1 2 3 4 4 1 1 1 5 1 4 3 4 1 3 2 2 2 They warn you about possible attacks to your computer; they warn you about possible viruses or unsafe websites2 Fru trat d when I am try ng to research on something. Usually I would access the website on my personal computer and get what I want1 1 1 1 1 1 4 6 2 2 2 n/a 2 2 4 2 4 5 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 1 3 1 1 1 2 1 1 3 4 automatic deletion of web history1 2 Thats too often and can be disruptive.(I set my antivirus programme to update daily during a period when I am not very busy)5 5 6 I w uld rather be secure than have my computer compromised with the possibility of losing data or important information1 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 4 5 6 3 1 2 1 1 4 2 2 2 5 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 2
8046525 ######## ######## 41.182.33.255 Engineering 1 5 30 1 3 4 5 6 2 2 1 1 1 1 3 Dont know 1 2 5 4 2 2 5 2 3 3 2 1 3 2 2 1 Reminder 2 Get annoyed 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 3 4 1 1 depends 2 2 4 2 1 1 4 2 1 1 1 2 3 3 3 1 1 2 3 1 1 2 1 2 annoyed 3 1 dont know 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 6 1 1 2 1 1 4 2 3 1 3 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 2
8046535 ######## ######## 196.44.131.220 School of Information Technology2 7 28 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 3 2 1 1 1 1 2 used a flash disk with malicious content1 2 3 4 5 5 5 3 2 5 2 2 2 2 1 4 1 2 2 to inform you about the security state of your computer1 mov  awa from the site and navigate to a site that is similar and is not blocked2 1 1 2 1 1 2 3 4 2 1 1 career related information2 1 3 3 3 3 2 1 1 1 1 2 3 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 2 it is good as it reminds you constantly4 6 I am responsible for the computer and the information thereon so I need to take the messages seriously1 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 4 1 2 1 1 1 5 2 2 1 3 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
8046707 ######## ######## 41.182.33.255 School of Engineering1 3 33 1 2 3 4 5 6 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 I have not answered yes to any in question 21 2 3 4 5 4 4 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 3 2 2 2 To give warning of threatening dangers like viruses or to give notice for updates1 If it's a website to assist me with my work I contact IT support to unblock it1 1 2 2 1 1 4 2 2 2 I have not joined any of those social networks, there is no time for those.2 2 1 1 1 1 4 2 1 1 1 2 3 2 3 1 2 2 3 2 4 Not any 1 2 I have never received such notifications3 6 Because security is the responsibility of every user not just for IT support1 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 8 Pronto 4 1 2 1 1 1 5 2 2 1 4 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 3 3
8046723 ######## - 196.44.131.220 School of Information Technology1 5 28
8046892 ######## ######## 41.182.19.115 School of IT 2 7 37 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 1 1 Phishing is most common threat that from time penetrate the Polytechnic netowrk such as receiving an e-mail with the PON domain claiming it is from a system administrator. The other problem I experienced is caused by inefficient enforced antivirus "Kaspersky" that sometime fail to update hence worms and virus attacked my PC.1 2 3 4 5 5 3 2 1 5 3 3 5 1 1 2 1 2 2 To provi e useful nformati n pertaining to the program, though so etime it can b irritating2 I leave the part cular site1 1 2 1 1 3 4 1 1 2 professional credentials2 1 3 3 5 3 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 3 1 1 2 2 2 Very disruptive 3 6 Because I always want to ensure a safe working environment on my PC1 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 8 Pronto 4 1 3 2 1 1 5 3 3 2 3 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
8047154 ######## ######## 41.182.33.255 Software Engineering1 7 38 1 2 3 4 5 6 2 2 1 1 1 1 3 My computer was infected with viruses that slowed down my machine.1 2 3 5 5 3 3 5 3 3 3 2 1 2 1 2 2 To inform me when a program needs to be updated or if a virus has been detected1 I cl se the page 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 1 1 Very limited information on my professional networks, a little more on social network2 1 4 3 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 Irritated 4 4 If it is a security message, i would want to know what is happening1 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 6 4 1 1 1 1 5 2 2 1 3 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 2
8047375 ######## - 41.182.12.126 BCS 2 7 33 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 3 1 1 1 1 1 3 Phishing: fake yahoo mail front-end in atempt to gather my user name and password, spam,spyware, virus,worms: through downloads, usb sticks and internet browsing1 2 3 4 5 5 5 3 5 5 5 3 2 1 3 2 2 2 Programs display alerts for several reseans, some of which my be upgrade alret etc.1 If it is a legitimate site I contact the system administrators to unblock the site1 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 4 1 1 2 general stuff 2 1 5 5 5 5 2 1
8047516 ######## - 196.12.10.227 IT 2 7 41 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 i was hacked 4 5 5 5 4 5 4 5 5 4 3 5 3 2 2 errors 2 reload 1 1 1 1 2 5 2 2 2 nada
8047800 ######## ######## 196.44.131.220 SIT, Business Computing1 4 27 1 2 3 4 5 6 3 3 1 1 1 1 2 dfaeregfvgghbg 1 2 5 5 2 1 5 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 i donk know 1 none 2 2 2 1 1 1 4 1 1 1 ordinary status updates n personal details2 2 1 1 1 1 4 2 1 1 1 3 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 irritated 4 7 fhdxfxhfh 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 6 3 1 1 1 1 4 2 3 1 3 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1
8048468 ######## ######## 196.12.10.5 Bureau of Computer Services2 7 33 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 Virusses and worm infections mostly by assisting staff with cleaning their Memory Sticks. Spam is out of the users control. a Server might get hacked which contains your e-mail address for example Facebook which giving spammers the ability to flood your inbox. We've outsourced our spam services which I must say is working perfectly.1 2 3 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 1 5 2 2 2 Alerts are being displayed for the users own protection. Examples a e outdated anti-virus databases, security patches etc.1 If it is c ntent that is work rela ed then I'll contact the System  Administr tors to unblock it.1 1 1 2 2 1 3 4 2 2 2 Don't have time for social sites2 1 5 5 5 5 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 3 1 2 Protected or looked after.4 6 a Security message is there for your own protection. I would like to be in charge of what's happening on my pc at all times.2 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 4 6 1 4 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 3 2
8048571 ######## - 41.182.28.131 CED 2 1 n/a
8048597 ######## ######## 41.182.19.115 Dean, School of Humanities1 7 54 1 2 3 5 2 3 1 3 1 3 3 My computer crashed a couple of years ago. i had somebody come from BCS to set up my computer again.1 2 3 4 5 4 1 1 4 1 3 4 1 1 3 3 2 2 To warn you of impending disaster2 I just try nother site.1 1 1 1 1 1 4 1 1 2 Actually  I share very little information.2 1 5 4 4 4 1 1 1 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 Resentful 2 1 2 3 5 It should be controlled centrally1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 4 4 1 2 1 1 4 2 3 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 3 3 3 3
8048601 ######## - 196.44.131.220 Business Computing2 3 32 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 Unsolicited mail came into  my mail box, my antivirus reported strange viruses1 2 4 5 5 4 2 5 4 5 4 2 1 4 2 2 1 to remind me 1 leave the site 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 4 2 1 2 Course mataterial, photos2 1 4 4 5 5 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 great 4 6 have to protect my pc1 2 1 2 2
8048611 ######## ######## 41.182.28.131 Centre for Open & Lifelong Learning1 6 42 1 2 3 4 5 6 3 2 2 2 2 2 3 Did not experience any1 2 3 4 5 5 1 1 5 1 3 5 1 1 3 2 2 2 To warn you about security threats1 Nothing I clo e the programme1 1 1 1 2 1 4 2 2 2 None 2 1 4 2 3 4 2 1 1 1 1 2 3 2 2 1 1 1 3 2 1 2 2 Sometimes irritated3 5 You are sometimes busy with something urgent when these messages come up1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 4 2 1 1 1 3 2 3 1 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
8048621 ######## ######## 41.182.33.255 Office of the Registrar2 3 24 1 3 5 6 3 3 2 3 1 2 2 A device which had a virus on was entered into my laptop and things started to appear weird and after all I was informed that it ws a virus.1 2 3 4 5 2 1 1 3 1 4 2 1 1 3 2 2 2 So that you can update the software as it becomes outdated.2 No acti n, since there might be a reason why the institution has blocked the side.1 2 1 1 1 1 4 1 2 2 Information which suites the time of the conversation.2 1 1 1 1 1 4 2 1 1 2 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 2 It just irretates me 4 1 Because most the time it happens while I am very busy and it seems like it stops me from working effectively.1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 5 6 8 Pronto 4 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 3 2 3 3
8048631 ######## ######## 41.182.19.115 Agric 2 1 confidencial 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 maybe people hacked into my email address and started sending stupid mails to my friends1 2 3 4 5 5 3 2 5 1 5 5 3 1 5 2 2 2 I am not sure 2 do not open the websense1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 Professional stuff 2 2 5 4 5 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 Its great and helpful5 6 BECAUSE AT THE END I AM THE ONE RESPONSIBLE2 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 5 6 4 1 2 1 1 5 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 3 2
8048643 ######## ######## 41.182.33.255 Economics and Finance2 6 42 1 2 3 4 5 6 2 2 1 2 1 2 3 I received some unsolicited and unwanted mails into my inbox. Viruses affected my computers and these mainly came from the students memory sticks I opened on my computers and attachments on certain documents that were  sent to me by people I do not know.2 3 4 5 2 1 1 5 1 5 3 1 1 3 2 2 2 To warn me of new developments and impendi g da ger1 Nothing 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 4 1 News, Greetings, jokes etc1 1 2 3 3 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 I have no qualms about it if it is once a week5 6 I am the one owning and using the computer. So anything that concerns the welfare of my computer is my responsibility.2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 6 4 1 2 3 4 2 1 1 3 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1
8048657 ######## ######## 196.44.131.220 Library 2 4 36 1 2 3 4 5 6 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 - 1 2 3 3 1 1 5 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 to remind me 2 forget about it 1 2 2 1 1 4 1 1 1 best practice 2 2 5 1 1 1 4 2 3 3 1 3 3 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 very bad 3 1 2 3 4 5 7 I don't get that feeling2 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 4 6 4 1 1 1 1 4 2 3 2 3 1 1 2 2 1 3 1 3 3
8048778 ######## ######## 196.44.131.220 School of Business Management1 7 50 + 1 2 3 5 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 Received warnings from different providers1 2 3 4 5 5 5 1 5 1 3 3 1 1 2 1 2 2 Warning and information2 Check with Web master1 1 2 1 1 3 4 1 1 2 Additional competencies and research topics and information2 2 4 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 3 3 1 1 1 3 2 1 2 2 Time consuming 4 6 Because I am a responsible user1 1 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 5 6 7 4 1 2 3 4 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 3 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
8048814 ######## ######## 196.44.131.220 School of IT - Software Engineering Department2 7 33 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 n/a 1 2 3 4 3 1 1 1 3 1 2 2 1 1 3 1 2 1 To make me aware of attacks coming my way1 Yes. I dont go further onto it1 1 2 2 1 1 2 3 4 5 2 1 2 Friendship 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 3 Its good 3 7 I have lots of work to consider thinking about security2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 4 6 4 1 1 1 1 5 3 3 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2
8049032 ######## ######## 197.243.184.106 SIT 2 4 52 1 2 3 4 5 6 2 2 1 1 1 2 3 internet downloads1 2 3 4 5 5 5 1 1 5 5 5 4 5 1 3 2 2 2 Indication of tampering or possible security infringements2 move on 1 1 1 2 1 1 4 1 1 2 Minimal. 2 2 1 1 1 1 4 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 3 2 2 stupid 4 6 It needs to be checked otherwise my information could be at stake1 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 6 1 1 2 1 1 5 2 3 1 5 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 3 2
8049069 ######## ######## 196.44.131.220 COLL 2 5 45 Yrs 1 2 3 5 6 7 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Not applicable 1 2 3 4 5 5 5 1 3 5 1 4 4 2 1 3 2 2 2 It serves as a warning2 Close the webpage1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 More on education2 1 4 4 4 4 3 1 1 2 2 2 3 2 3 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 Annoys 4 5 You will need to drop what you were doing and attend to this.1 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 3 7 3 2 3 2 1 1 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 3 3 3 2
8049164 ######## ######## 41.182.33.255 School of Economics and Finance1 7 40 2 3 4 5 2 1 2 2 1 3 3 A virus appeared on my  computer which was detected on campus and causes my computer performance and changing the normal appearance of folders1 2 3 4 3 1 1 1 5 1 1 1 2 1 1 3 2 1 Could be virus hidding behind alerts2 Avoid g those websites1 1 2 1 1 4 1 personal information2 2 3 2 3 3 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 I don't feel safe to do so. I don't take prompt serious on my PC unless the BCS inform me about it1 7 As they are the expertise when you come to technical matters of PCs1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 6 4 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 3 1 2 2 1 2 2 3 3 3
8049243 ######## ######## 41.182.18.233 School of IT/ Basic Computer Studies2 5 32 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 2 3 1 3 1 1 2 I receive a lot of spam in my mailbox, probably from other sites I visited. Viruses and worms have I got before on my computer - I guess from memory sticks etc1 2 5 5 2 3 5 3 3 5 3 1 3 2 2 2 updating on what's happening1 Disable the feature to allow it run1 1 1 1 1 3 4 5 1 1 1 about my profession and social comments2 1 5 5 4 4 2 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 1 2 It''s too much 4 4 Its cool, its part of a security feature3 Similar or some but not all of them2 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 3 5 6 3 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 3 2 2 2
8049301 ######## ######## 196.44.131.220 Auxiliary services 2 7 44 2 2 1 3 1 1 3 1 rumours or hearsay.1 4 1 3 1 5 1 1 1 3 1 1 5 2 1 2 to be updated daily2 informing the expert1 2 1 2 2 1 4 5 6 2 1 2 chating 1 2 5 5 5 5 1 1 2 2 2 3 2 2 3 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 once u are aware u can not wait until expiry period.5 5 6 i feel my work is challenging3 its, and email programs1 4 by filling or using code2 1 1 2 1 2 1 4 5 6 7 8 pronto 4 1 1 1 1 5 2 2 1 3 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3
8049439 ######## ######## 41.182.87.188 Health and Applied Siences1 4 28 1 3 4 5 6 1 2 1 3 1 3 3 my email acounts was hacked and the person was sending emails to all my contacts, spam is every day thng especilay with hotmail and yahoo email accounts, hv enot experiance it wilth the poly email though.1 2 3 4 5 2 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 2 2 2 1 it indicates that thers a securuty threat to the PC1 I try to add adds on if the page can allow me, but with little success1 1 1 1 2 1 4 1 1 2 mostly up date on personal information [facebook] and CV  for linkedin2 1 1 1 1 1 4 2 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 its time consuming and distracting5 5 becouse some  ti e the massage will pop up when I am busy and do not have time to attend to the poping up msg.1 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 4 5 6 7 4 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 3 2 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
8049609 ######## ######## 41.182.80.175 Information Technology2 5 26 1 2 3 4 5 6 2 2 1 1 1 1 3 Downloading infected and or fake files.1 2 3 4 5 5 2 2 5 4 4 4 3 1 4 1 2 2 To make me aware of what is going on, with the computer.1 Try an alternative ebsite.1 1 1 2 1 1 2 3 4 5 1 1 1 Mostly photos. 2 1 5 5 5 5 2 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 3 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 3 1 2 It can become quite annoying when I am busy but they are helpful.3 6 Because it is in my best interest.1 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 4 5 6 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 3 3 1 5 1 1 3 2 1 1 1 1 2
8050275 ######## ######## 41.182.18.233 Land Management 2 5 52 1 2 3 4 5 6 2 2 1 2 1 1 3 Does not know really!1 3 4 4 1 1 1 4 1 2 2 1 1 3 2 2 2 When an application usage period about to expire1 Nothing 2 2 1 1 1 2 4 1 Basic information about self2 2 1 1 1 1 4 2 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 This is useless and unhelpful as it is destructive3 5 Becuase I am really disturbed1 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 5 6 1 1 2 3 4 1 1 1 3 2 3 2 3 1 2 2 3 1 2 3 3 3
8050487 ######## ######## 41.182.18.233 Payroll 1 4 36 5 3 3 2 2 1 3 3 The computer crushed1 2 4 5 5 1 1 5 1 5 1 1 1 3 1 2 2 To warn you of any virus or updates2 Ye , I leave he page.1 1 2 2 1 4 2 2 2 Work Related 2 1 5 2 5 4 2 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 3 2 1 2 2 Software are freqently updated , so im okay with that5 6 I get to learn new things everytime1 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 4 4 1 2 1 1 3 2 2 1 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
8051143 ######## ######## 196.44.131.220 SHAS, EHS 2 2 36 yrs 1 2 3 4 5 3 2 1 1 1 1 3 Cant open many of the social websites (spyware),  so many virus computer failures.1 2 4 3 4 3 4 5 4 5 4 3 1 3 2 2 2 for protection purposes1 nothing 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 6 1 1 2 work related 2 2 3 2 3 3 3 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 follow instructions3 2 I feel it is not part of my job decription1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 4 6 4 1 2 1 1 3 3 3 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 3 3
8052735 ######## ######## 41.182.65.159 Centre for Open and Lifelong Learning1 7 38 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 2 2 1 1 1 2 My computer has been infected by viruses/worms while surfing the Internet and downloading software/music. I usually get emails which try to get my personal information but I never divulge them.1 2 3 4 5 5 5 5 5 1 5 5 1 1 4 1 2 2 To make you aware of any intrusion or possible sources of infection2 I close the ite 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 1 1 1 General information, no personal information2 1 4 4 4 4 2 1 1 2 2 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 I think it is important to take note of such notifications4 6 I am responsible for the safety of the information on my computer1 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 6 8 Pronto 4 1 2 1 1 1 3 2 3 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
8052923 ######## ######## 41.182.18.233 Centre for Teaching and Learning2 7 49 1 2 3 4 5 6 2 2 2 2 1 2 3 My anti-virus program detected the virus and then removed it.1 2 3 4 5 4 1 1 5 1 4 3 1 1 3 1 2 2 To alert me about updates and/or security threats.2 I try other websites that are not blocked.2 1 1 1 1 1 2 4 1 1 2 Usually information about workshops and conferences(professional) and family events(social).2 1 1 1 1 1 4 2 1 2 2 2 3 2 3 1 1 2 3 2 1 1 2 It's fine with me. 4 4 Because I think it's how it is supposed to work.2 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 3 1 2 2 1 1 4 2 3 1 3 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
8053183 ######## ######## 196.44.131.220 Finance and Accounting2 4 33 1 2 3 4 5 6 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 There was attempts, via email, but I deleted the emails before any damage could be done.1 2 3 4 5 5 5 5 5 2 5 3 2 1 3 1 2 2 To assist you when there is a risk to you2 Fi stly I try not t  access dodgy sites, however if there is such a message I terminate the connection1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 Limited information2 1 3 2 3 3 3 1 1 1 2 2 3 1 3 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 I do not like it, but it is for the best..3 1 5 6 Because you are busy with some task and then you need to stop everything to adress the message.1 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 4 1 2 2 1 1 5 2 3 1 4 2 1 2 1 1 1 3 2 2
8053329 ######## ######## 41.182.65.159 Human Resources 1 4 29 1 2 3 4 5 6 3 1 1 3 1 1 3 Through email by providing bank details for example and virus infection on computer and laptop.1 3 5 5 1 1 4 1 4 4 1 1 4 2 2 2 To remind me of epiry dates or to update program.2 I stop opening it. 1 2 2 1 1 1 4 1 1 2 My post and field area, interests1 1 4 2 3 3 2 1 3 1 2 3 3 3 3 1 2 1 3 2 1 2 1 2 It is at times annoying4 6 It is being responsible to follow policies to be secured and protected.2 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 4 4 4 1 1 1 3 2 3 1 5 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
8053434 ######## ######## 41.182.87.188 SIT 1 5 33 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 N\a 1 2 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 5 2 2 2 to give me information2 ignore and look for something else1 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 4 1 1 2 Bithdays, and other2 1 5 5 5 5 2 1 1 1 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 3 1 2 Do it and move on 5 5 6 sometimes i need to restart my machine1 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 5 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 2
8054822 ######## ######## 196.44.131.220 COLL 1 7 43 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 2 2 1 3 1 1 1 I don't know....! 1 2 3 4 5 5 4 4 3 5 3 5 5 3 1 3 1 2 2 to remind you to take action and thus to keep your computer protected1 If it is ecessary I email the web aster to allow me access1 1 1 1 1 1 2 4 6 2 1 2 only the very basic2 2 1 1 1 1 4 2 1 2 2 2 3 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 3 1 2 It is very annoying. Longer times between notification would be better4 6 Because it protects my work first and thus is my responsibility3 for better protec ion2 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 2 1 1 2 2 3 1 2 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 2 2
8054901 ######## ######## 196.44.131.220 LIBRARY 1 7 54 1 2 3 4 5 2 2 1 2 1 3 3 Received through email1 2 3 4 5 5 1 1 4 1 4 4 2 1 3 1 2 2 As a warning of am impending threat1 I leave the site 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 2 2 2 Professional information2 1 3 3 4 4 2 1 1 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 It is a sensible option4 6 If I don't follow the advice in the message I suffer the consequences1 1 4 Don't writ  th  full password down just a few letters to jog my memory2 2 1 2 1 2 5 6 8 Pronto 4 1 2 1 1 1 5 2 3 1 3 2 1 1 2 1 2 3 3 2
8055653 ######## - 196.44.131.220 Business Computing1 6 28 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 2 2 1 1 1 3 spam emails come in to notify me that i have won a lottery1 2 3 4 5 5 5 4 4 5 2 4 3 3 1
8056062 ######## ######## 196.44.131.220 Namibian German Centre for Logistics2 5 31 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 Hacking, scripts were uploaded to the centre website, that manage to divert index pages, Spam emails are experienced often when registering to certain websites, Virus and worm attacks came from using USB's without scanning them first1 2 5 5 1 1 5 5 5 4 4 1 5 2 2 1 Remind you of pending issues1 Close it and never go to that site again1 1 1 2 1 1 2 4 5 1 1 1 Basic profile info, qualifications, experience2 1 3 3 4 5 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 I am fine about it 4 2 3 4 5 6 sometimes you are busy with computer intensive work, and then an update or scan requires some RAM, it slows down the system1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 4 6 8 Pronto 1 1 2 3 2 1 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
8056205 ######## - 41.182.65.159 Shool of IT 1 3 26 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 3 1 1 1 1 3 Computer Virus transfered from a memomry stick to my computer and computer became very very slow1 2 3 4 5 5 4 3 2 5 3 4 3 2 1 2 1 2 1 Not sure, depends from program to program1 None 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 3 4 5 1 1 1 Personal and Educational information2 2 3 3 3 3 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 2
8060288 ######## - 196.44.131.220 Security 2 7 34
8061636 ######## ######## 46.30.226.16 IT 2 2 35 1 2 3 3 n/a 2 3 4 4 3 3 5 4 4 4 1 4 2 2 2 warning 1 close it 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 4 1 2 1 professional 2 1 5 3 2 4 4 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 3 1 1 1 2 2 a nuisance 5 4 6 at update stage 1 2 4 don't write it down2 2 1 2 2 2 2 5 6 7 1 1 2 4 2 1 1 3 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 2
8065063 ######## - 41.182.44.51 MATHS AND STATISTICS1 4 40 1 2 3 5 6 1 3 1 1 1 OPENED ONE MAIL AND IMMEDIATELY IT FORWARDED MAIL TO ALL ON MY CONTACT LIST1 2 3 4 5 3 1 1 4 1 4 2 1 1 3 2 2 2 VIRUS INFECTIONS?1 I DONT PROCEED 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 4 1 1 2 SOCIAL ISSUES 2 2 3 3 3 4 3 1 1 1 1 2 3 3 3 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 ITS OK 4 6 IM THE USER OF THE COMPUTER1 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 5 8 PRONTO 4 1 1
8070141 ######## ######## 41.182.44.51 legal department 1 7 35 1 3 5 6 1 dont really know but was told there was a virus1 2 3 4 5 1 1 1 5 1 1 5 1 1 1 3 1 2 dont know 1 yes 2 1 1 2 2 4 1 none 2 2 5 3 3 5 2 1 1 2 1 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 demanding 3 3 interferes with my work1 2 4 no 2 2 1 2 2 2 4 4 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 2 4 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
8071999 ######## ######## 196.44.131.220 Land Management 2 7 35 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 x 2 5 5 5 1 5 5 5 4 1 1 3 1 1 2 marketing 1 try another one 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 3 4 1 1 x 2 2 1 1 1 1 4 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 3 x 4 2 x 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 5 1 2 1 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
8072606 ######## ######## 41.182.7.27 Economics and Finance2 5 46 1 2 3 2 2 2 no 1 2 3 4 4 4 4 4 5 2 2 3 5 1 3 2 2 2 Setting a warning 2 I do not continue. Normally there will be no access allowed1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 Professional  info and social life2 2 5 5 5 5 4 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 3 1 1 A nuisance 3 6 Protection of my computer2 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 5 4 1 2 1 1 3 3 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 2
8074652 ######## ######## 87.57.31.190 SIT/SE 1 7 44 1 2 3 4 5 6 2 2 1 2 1 1 3 Virus, worms through memory sticks transfered1 2 3 4 4 4 1 1 5 1 2 3 2 1 3 2 2 2 to alert me 2 I close it 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 2 my name 2 1 3 3 3 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 3 1 1 1 1 2 1 3 2 2 thats fine 4 6 because ido 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 4 3 1 2 2 1 5 2 2 2 4 1 1 2 2 1 3 3 2 3
8081202 ######## ######## 41.182.2.189 SIT Computer Systems and Networks2 1 56 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 Spam: I've no idea. I just changed my mail address and that was the end of the story. I was once confronted with the stoned virus. It was on a floppy disk that was sent to me by a software company1 2 3 4 5 5 5 5 1 5 5 5 5 3 1 3 2 2 2 Whoever wrote the software must have had a good reason for displaying alerts1 I won't visit the site2 1 1 2 2 1 4 5 2 2 2 none 2 2 1 1 1 1 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 3 1 2 This would get on my nerves. It's enough if I'm told once4 6 It's not going to help if I'm getting irritated, annoyed, frustrated. These messages are quite helpful. Looking for someone else who is responsible does not solve the issue.1 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 8 Mac OS X standard mail client1 1 2 1 1 5 2 3 1 3 1 1 1 2 1 2 3 2 2
8091123 ######## ######## 196.44.131.220 Economics & Finance2 7 65 1 2 3 4 5 6 3 1 3 1 1 3 false mails & student USB sticks1 2 4 5 5 1 2 5 2 4 3 1 1 3 2 2 2 Reminders to update1 Exit the program 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 2 2 2 None 2 1 4 3 3 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 1 2 1 3 2 1 1 2 Unknown to me 4 5 6 Distraction from work1 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 4 4 1 2 1 1 5 2 3 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3
8092949 ######## ######## 41.182.63.110 School of IT - Business Computing2 3 25 1 2 3 4 5 6 2 3 1 2 1 1 3 Got Virus from someoneâ€™s USB cause my antivirus was not updated.1 2 3 4 5 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 1 1 4 1 2 2 For me to take action2 Find my information somewhere else1 1 1 1 2 1 4 6 1 1 1 2 Personal life and job experience2 1 5 1 5 5 3 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 it's okay 5 6 Cause i use the machine1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 6 8 Pronto 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 1
8093738 ######## - 41.182.63.110 School of Management1 4 34
8094356 ######## - 129.12.130.159 Nature conservation1 5 34
8096296 ######## ######## 41.182.92.223 mathematiccs 2 5 40years 1 2 3 4 5 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 my computer was infected by a usb from a friend1 2 3 4 4 4 2 2 4 1 4 4 1 1 3 1 2 2 to inform 1 i use internet at home2 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 none 2 2 1 1 1 1 4 2 1 1 1 1 3 1 3 1 1 1 3 2 1 1 1 very annoying 3 2 i'm not patient 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 4 5 6 7 4 1 2 1 1 3 2 2 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 3
8110076 ######## ######## 196.44.131.220 Accounting Department.2 4 35 1 2 3 4 5 2 2 3 3 1 3 3 Virus on computers dont know the source.1 2 3 4 5 4 3 3 3 4 3 4 4 4 1 3 2 1 1 Security. 2 Continue if i NEED it.1 2 1 2 1 1 2 4 1 1 Social 2 1 3 3 3 4 2 1 1 1 2 3 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 Bored. 4 5 I am busy man. 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 4 4 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 2
8114606 ######## ######## 41.182.56.229 Finance -assets department2 7 36 1 3 4 5 6 3 3 1 1 1 1 3 Pc freez , could not open some documents some of them Disappear1 2 3 4 3 3 2 1 4 1 2 3 1 1 2 1 2 1 for secuity Purpose2 Ignore 1 1 1 2 1 1 4 6 1 1 2 contact details and business ideas2 1 5 3 3 2 1 2 1 1 2 3 3 2 3 1 3 1 2 2 1 2 3 good is a warning 5 7 there is a department respossible for that1 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 5 6 7 4 1 2 1 1 1 5 2 2 2 3 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 3
8115942 ######## ######## 41.182.33.213 SNRT Land Management1 3 27 1 2 3 6 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 did not happen yet1 4 4 2 1 1 4 3 3 3 2 1 3 1 2 2 To inform you of any risks possible1 exit the site 1 1 1 2 1 2 4 2 1 2 new  software and technology  social  networks simply jokes and inspirational  stories2 1 4 4 4 4 2 1 1 2 2 3 3 3 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 3 get irritated sometimes but must do it3 5 6 not clear to me 1 1 3 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 4 5 1 1 2 2 1 1 3 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2
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APPENDIX B1: CHECKLIST FOR ADOBE READER 
Security and user experience evaluation 
The purpose of the evaluation is to determine the awareness of and UX of the embedded security 
features in Adobe. 
Please select or fill in the most appropriate response. 
Post graduate study:  Research Area: 
 M  D USec InfoSec UX HCI Application 
Development, 
Application 
Evaluation 
        
Tasks 
Please perform the following seven tasks in Adobe and select the most appropriate category on 
the checklist presented in table 2. 
1. Password protect your document 
2. Restrict editing , grant edit permissions to 1 person 
3. Mark the document as final 
4. Sign the file  
5. Initialise every page 
6. Time stamp the file 
7. Encrypt your file 
8. Share the  file as read only 
9. Remove the protection 
Procedure 
Perform the nine tasks above and evaluate your security and experience. The following options 
may be used to evaluate the end user program user experience and security: 
 Yes: If one agrees with the checklist item in relation to the application. 
 No: If one disagrees with the checklist item in relation to the application. 
 NA (Not  Applicable): If one believes that the checklist  item is not applicable to  the 
website/application. 
Note 
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 Ext (extent):  used to measure  the  extent  of  aspect as a value between 1(very difficult) 
and 5 (very easy). 
 Comments:  available  for one  to  enter  additional  comments  relating  to the  specific 
checklist item and how it relates to the end user program  
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1. Visibility/Findable/locatable/ readily displayed – the security feature must be easily found 
Checklist Items Yes  No  N/A  Ext   Comments 
1.1. Can you easily  locate the security feature      
1.2. After completing a security action, do you get 
some form of feedback  
     
1.3. Can you disable the security feature?      
2. Motivating – the security feature must encourage users to re- use it again in future 
Checklist Items Yes  No  N/A  Ext   Comments 
2.1. Are you motivated to use it again      
2.2. Will you recommend it to others      
2.3. Does it satisfy your perceived goals      
3. Desirable– the security feature must be pleasant to use, and look at  
Checklist Items Yes   No  N/A Ext   Comments 
3.1. Is the presentation visually appealing?      
3.2. Is the feature pleasant to use?      
4. Useful- the security features must enable the user to achieve security goals willingly.   
Checklist Items Yes  No N/A Ext   Comments 
4.1. Helps me to be secure      
4.2. They protect my work      
4.3. It does everything I would expect it to do.      
5.  Learnability/ understandable, ease of use – the system should ensure that security actions are 
easy to learn and remember 
Checklist Items Yes  No N/A  Ext   Comments 
5.1. The security features have been grouped into 
logical zones, and have headings been used to 
distinguish them from other program features 
     
5.2. I learned how to use the security feature easily      
5.3. The security features are easy to remember      
5.4. Menus make obvious which security items are 
selected 
     
5.5. The program protect you from making errors      
5.6. Security-related information is presented in a 
standardized manner 
     
6. Aesthetics and Minimalist Design – the system should offer users relevant information 
relating to their security actions 
Checklist Items Yes   No    N/A  Ext  Comments 
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6.1. Only the security information essential to 
decision making is displayed on the screen? 
     
6.2. All security icons in a set are visually and 
conceptually distinct 
     
6.3. Security labels are brief, familiar and 
descriptive? 
     
7.  Exciting/emotion/perception – the program should excitement and good perceptions/ 
emotions 
Checklist Items Yes   No    N/A Ext   Comments 
7.1. You feel excited about the security features      
7.2. You perceive them as good      
7.3. Security task evoke positive emotions in you      
7.4. The security-related error messages are 
accurate in their descriptions? 
     
7.5. It was enjoyable to perform security functions      
8. Satisfaction – the system should ensure that users have a good experience when using 
security and that they are in control 
Checklist Items  Yes   No N/A  Ext   Comments 
8.1. Security features are easy to work with      
8.2. You feel disturbed when you perform security 
tasks 
     
8.3. Security-related prompts imply that you are in 
control? 
     
8.4. You are satisfied with the security      
9. User Suitability – the system should provide options for users with diverse levels of skill and 
experience in security 
Checklist Items Yes   No  N/A  Ext   Comments 
9.1. Do the security features support both novice 
and expert users; are multiple levels of 
security error messages detail available? 
     
9.2. Can you easily change the level of security 
detail? 
     
9.3. Can you easily change between novice and 
expert levels? 
     
9.4. Can you customize security to meet your 
individual preferences? 
     
10. Comfortable to use /User Language – the system should use plain language that users can 
understand with regards to security 
Checklist Items Yes  No N/A Ext  Comments 
10.1. Are security actions named consistently 
across all prompts in the program? 
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10.2. Is security information accurate, 
complete and understandable? 
     
10.3. Are security messages stated in clear 
and simple language, where used? 
     
10.4. Is security jargon avoided?      
11. User Assistance/ Help – the system should make security help apparent for users 
Checklist Items Yes   No N/A Ext   Comments 
11.1. Is there a security help function visible 
(e.g. a key labelled “Security Help”)? 
     
11.2. Is the security information provided 
relevant? 
     
11.3. Can users easily switch between 
security help and their work? 
     
11.4. Do instructions follow the sequence of 
user security actions? 
     
11.5. Does the system provide users with 
updated security educational opportunities, if 
they desire it? 
     
12. Efficiency the security feature must complete the user’s goal in a timely and accurate manner 
12.1. Was it easy to enforce security?      
12.2. It takes long to compete the tasks      
12.3.       
13. Accessible – the security feature must be reachable to accomplish a security objective 
Checklist Items Yes   No  N/A  Ext   Comments 
13.1. Does not present technical or physical 
barriers 
     
13.2. Readily accessible      
14. Effective - the extent to which the security feature fulfils the users’ expectations with ease . 
Checklist Items Yes   No  N/A  Ext   Comments 
14.1. Does what it supposed to do      
14.2. Fulfils my security needs      
15. Usable- the security features must allow the user to do what they want to do in the way they 
expect to do it without difficulty, hesitancy, or queries 
Checklist Items Yes   No  N/A  Ext   Comments 
15.1. Is it convenient to use       
15.2. It is simple to use      
15.3. Is it doing the expected      
16. Valuable/ impact of use  – the security feature should relate to the user goals in a beneficial 
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way  
Checklist Items Yes   No  N/A  Ext   Comments 
16.1. It secures my documents      
16.2. You are not losing information      
16.3. Your files are not edited by wrong 
people? 
     
16.4. It does not waste my time?      
16.5. Assures you of the file author?      
17. Security – the system needs to consider integrity, availability, confidentiality, auditing and 
non-repudiation 
Checklist Items Yes  No N/A   Ext   Comments 
17.1. The information is only accessible to 
authorised users 
     
17.2. Protected or confidential information 
can be accessed only with valid authentication 
     
17.3. The program encrypts the whole file      
17.4. You can update or delete document 
properties information 
     
17.5. The program notifies you of your 
access privileges? 
     
17.6. The program protects all files 
downloaded 
     
17.7. Does the program disable macros?      
17.8. Are notification messages relating to 
security displayed to the user before access to 
the system is granted? 
     
17.9. Are the controls for sharing readily 
available? 
     
17.10. Does the program install required 
software updates automatically and notify you 
about this action? 
     
17.11. Does the program display options to 
assist in the reporting of security incidents? 
     
17.12. Does the program notify you of any 
vulnerability associated with not applying 
security? 
     
17.13. Does the program notify you about auto 
recovery? 
     
18. Awareness/Expected security features must be expected the programs, users should be aware 
of their existence 
18.1. Does the system provide awareness and 
educate you on how to complete tasks? 
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18.2. Do you expect the security features?      
18.3. Are you aware of the location of the 
security features in the program? 
     
18.4. Are you aware of the limitations of the 
security? 
     
18.5. Are you aware of the effect of applying 
security? 
     
18.6. Are you educated on proper security 
usage? 
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APPENDIX B2: CHECKLIST FOR MS WORD 
Security and user experience evaluation 
The purpose of the evaluation is to determine the awareness of and UX of the embedded security 
features in MS Word. 
Please select or fill in the most appropriate response. 
Post graduate study:  Research Area: 
 M  D USec InfoSec UX HCI Application 
Development, 
Application 
Evaluation 
 x x  x x   
Tasks 
Please perform the following seven tasks in MS Word and select the most appropriate category 
on the checklist presented in the table below. 
10. Password protect your document 
11. Restrict editing , grant edit permissions to 1 person 
12. Mark the document as final 
13. Sign the file  
14. Encrypt your file – similar to password protect document 
15. Share the  file as read only 
16. Remove the protection – could not remove password 
Procedure 
Perform the seven tasks above and evaluate your security and experience. The following options 
may be used to evaluate the end user program user experience and security: 
 Yes: If one agrees with the checklist item in relation to the application. 
 No: If one disagrees with the checklist item in relation to the application. 
 NA (Not  Applicable): If one believes that the checklist  item is not applicable to  the 
website/application. 
Note 
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 Ext (extent):  used  to  measure  the  extent  of  aspect as a value between 1(very 
difficult) and 5 (very easy). 
 Comments:  available  for one  to  enter  additional  comments  relating  to the  specific 
checklist item and how it relates to the end user program  
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19. Visibility/Findable/locatable/ readily displayed – the security feature must be easily found 
Checklist Items Yes  No  N/A  Ext   Comments 
19.1. Can you easily  locate the security 
feature 
     
19.2. After completing a security action, do 
you get some form of feedback  
     
19.3. Can you disable the security?      
20. Motivating – the security feature must encourage users to re- use it again in future 
Checklist Items Yes  No  N/A  Ext   Comments 
20.1. Are you motivated to use it again      
20.2. Will you recommend it to others      
20.3. Does it satisfy your perceived goals      
21. Desirable– the security feature must be pleasant to use, and look at  
Checklist Items Yes   No  N/A Ext   Comments 
21.1. Is the presentation visually appealing?      
21.2. Is the feature pleasant to use?      
22. Useful- the security features must enable the user to achieve security goals willingly.   
Checklist Items Yes  No N/A Ext   Comments 
22.1. Helps me to be secure      
22.2. They protect my work      
22.3. It does everything I would expect it to 
do. 
     
23.  Learnability/ understandable, ease of use – the system should ensure that security actions are 
easy to learn and remember 
Checklist Items Yes  No N/A  Ext   Comments 
23.1. The security features have been 
grouped into logical zones, and have headings 
been used to distinguish them from other 
program features 
     
23.2. I learned how to use the security feature 
easily 
     
23.3. The security features are easy to 
remember 
     
23.4. Menus make obvious which security 
items are selected 
     
23.5. The program protect you from making 
errors 
     
23.6. Security-related information is 
presented in a standardized manner 
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24. Aesthetics and Minimalist Design – the system should offer users relevant information 
relating to their security actions 
Checklist Items Yes   No    N/A  Ext  Comments 
24.1. Only the security information essential 
to decision making is displayed on the screen? 
     
24.2. All security icons in a set are visually 
and conceptually distinct 
     
24.3. Security labels are brief, familiar and 
descriptive? 
     
25.  Exciting/emotion/perception – the program should excitement and good perceptions/ 
emotions 
Checklist Items Yes   No    N/A Ext   Comments 
25.1. You feel excited about the security 
features 
     
25.2. You perceive them as good      
25.3. Security task evoke positive emotions 
in you 
     
25.4. The security-related error messages are 
accurate in their descriptions? 
     
25.5. It was enjoyable to perform security 
functions 
     
26. Satisfaction – the system should ensure that users have a good experience when using 
security and that they are in control 
Checklist Items  Yes   No N/A  Ext   Comments 
26.1. Security features are easy to work with      
26.2. You feel disturbed when you perform 
security tasks 
     
26.3. Security-related prompts imply that you 
are in control? 
     
26.4. You are satisfied with the security      
27. User Suitability – the system should provide options for users with diverse levels of skill and 
experience in security 
Checklist Items Yes   No  N/A  Ext   Comments 
27.1. Do the security features support both 
novice and expert users; are multiple levels of 
security error messages detail available? 
     
27.2. Can you easily change the level of 
security detail? 
     
27.3. Can you easily change between novice 
and expert levels? 
     
27.4. Can you customize security to meet 
your individual preferences? 
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28. Comfortable to use /User Language – the system should use plain language that users can 
understand with regards to security 
Checklist Items Yes  No N/A Ext  Comments 
28.1. Are security actions named consistently 
across all prompts in the program? 
     
28.2. Is security information accurate, 
complete and understandable? 
     
28.3. Are security messages stated in clear 
and simple language, where used? 
     
28.4. Is security jargon avoided?      
29. User Assistance/ Help – the system should make security help apparent for users 
Checklist Items Yes   No N/A Ext   Comments 
29.1. Is there a security help function visible 
(e.g. a key labelled “Security Help”)? 
     
29.2. Is the security information provided 
relevant? 
     
29.3. Can users easily switch between 
security help and their work? 
     
29.4. Do instructions follow the sequence of 
user security actions? 
     
29.5. Does the system provide users with 
updated security educational opportunities, if 
they desire it? 
     
30. Efficiency the security feature must complete the user’s goal in a timely and accurate manner 
30.1. Was it easy to enforce security?      
30.2. It takes long to compete the tasks      
30.3.       
31. Accessible – the security feature must be reachable to accomplish a security objective 
Checklist Items Yes   No  N/A  Ext   Comments 
31.1. Does not present technical or physical 
barriers 
     
31.2. Readily accessible      
32. Effective - the extent to which the security feature fulfils the users’ expectations with ease . 
Checklist Items Yes   No  N/A  Ext   Comments 
32.1. Does what it supposed to do      
32.2. Fulfils my security needs      
33. Usable- the security features must allow the user to do what they want to do in the way they 
expect to do it without difficulty, hesitancy, or queries 
Checklist Items Yes   No  N/A  Ext   Comments 
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33.1. Is it convenient to use       
33.2. It is simple to use      
33.3. Is it doing the expected      
34. Valuable/ impact of use  – the security feature should relate to the user goals in a beneficial 
way  
Checklist Items Yes   No  N/A  Ext   Comments 
34.1. It secures my documents      
34.2. You are not losing information      
34.3. Your files are not edited by wrong 
people? 
     
34.4. It does not waste my time?      
34.5. Assures you of the file author?      
35. Security – the system needs to consider integrity, availability, confidentiality, auditing and 
non-repudiation 
Checklist Items Yes  No N/A   Ext   Comments 
35.1. The information is only accessible to 
authorised users 
     
35.2. Protected or confidential information 
can be accessed only with valid authentication 
     
35.3. The program encrypts the whole file      
35.4. You can update or delete document 
properties information 
     
35.5. The program notifies you of your 
access privileges? 
     
35.6. The program protects all files 
downloaded 
     
35.7. Does the program disable macros?      
35.8. Are notification messages relating to 
security displayed to the user before access to 
the system is granted? 
     
35.9. Are the controls for sharing readily 
available? 
     
35.10. Does the program install required 
software updates automatically and notify you 
about this action? 
     
35.11. Does the program display options to 
assist in the reporting of security incidents? 
     
35.12. Does the program notify you of any 
vulnerability associated with not applying 
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security? 
35.13. Does the program notify you about auto 
recovery? 
 x    
36. Awareness/Expected security features must be expected the programs, users should be aware 
of their existence 
36.1. Does the system provide awareness and 
educate you on how to complete tasks? 
     
36.2. Do you expect the security features?      
36.3. Are you aware of the location of the 
security features in the program? 
     
36.4. Are you aware of the limitations of the 
security? 
     
36.5. Are you aware of the effect of applying 
security? 
     
36.6. Are you educated on proper security 
usage? 
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APPENDIX B3: CROSS COMPARISON OF ADOBE AND MS WORD 
Visibility/Findable/locatable/readily displayed; the security feature must be easily found 
 Adobe Word 
Can you easily  locate the security feature 9/14 12/15 
After completing a security action, do you get some form of feedback 10/14 12/15 
Can you disable the security? 10/14 9/14 
Motivating-  the security feature must encourage users to re- use it again in future 
Are you motivated to use it again 9/14 10/15 
Will you recommend it to others 10/14 12/15 
Does it satisfy your perceived goals 8/14 11/15 
Desirable- the security feature must be pleasant to use, and look at 
Is the presentation visually appealing? 8/13 9/15 
Is the feature pleasant to use? 7/13 9/15 
Useful- the security features must enable the user to achieve security goals willingly. 
Helps me to be secure 11/14 12/15 
They protect my work 11/14 14/15 
It does everything I would expect it to do 5/14 7/15 
Learnability/understandable, ease of use -the system should ensure that security actions are 
easy to learn and remember 
The security features have been grouped into logical zones, and have 
headings been used to distinguish them from other program features 
9/14 13/15 
I learned how to use the security feature easily 10/14 11/15 
The security features are easy to remember 8/14 12/15 
Menus make obvious which security items are selected 7/14 10/15 
The program protect you from making errors 7/14 5/15 
5.6. Security-related information is presented in a standardized 
manner 
9/14 8/15 
Aesthetics and Minimalist Design; the system should offer users relevant information 
relating to their security actions 
Only the security information essential to decision making is 5/14 10/14 
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displayed on the screen? 
All security icons in a set are visually and conceptually distinct 9/14 8/15 
Security labels are brief, familiar and descriptive? 9/14 12/15 
Exciting/emotion/perception- the program should excitement and good perceptions/ 
emotions 
You feel excited about the security features 8/14 6/15 
You perceive them as good 11/14 12/15 
Security task evoke positive emotions in you 10/14 8/15 
The security-related error messages are accurate in their descriptions? 11/14 11/15 
It was enjoyable to perform security functions 8/14 9/15 
Satisfaction- the system should ensure that users have a good experience when using 
security and that they are in control 
Security features are easy to work with 8/14 9/15 
You feel disturbed when you perform security tasks 2/14 3/15 
Security-related prompts imply that you are in control? 11/14 9/15 
You are satisfied with the security 8/14 11/14 
User Suitability - the system should provide options for users with diverse levels of skill and 
experience in security 
Do the security features support both novice and expert users; are 
multiple levels of security error messages detail available? 
5/14 7/15 
Can you easily change the level of security detail? 7/14 7/15 
Can you easily change between novice and expert levels? 3/14 3/15 
Can you customize security to meet your individual preferences? 8/14 11/15 
Comfortable to use /User Language -the system should use plain language that users can 
understand with regards to security 
Are security actions named consistently across all prompts in the 
program? 
8/13 10/15 
Is security information accurate, complete and understandable? 8/13 10/15 
Are security messages stated in clear and simple language, where 
used? 
8/13 10/15 
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Is security jargon avoided? 6/13 9/14 
User Assistance/ Help - the system should make security help apparent for users 
Is there a security help function visible (e.g. a key labelled “Security 
Help”)? 
6/14 4/15 
Is the security information provided relevant? 10/14 11/15 
Can users easily switch between security help and their work? 8/14 8/15 
Do instructions follow the sequence of user security actions? 10/14 9/15 
Does the system provide users with updated security educational 
opportunities, if they desire it? 
3/14 3/15 
Efficiency the security feature must complete the user’s goal in a timely and accurate 
manner 
Was it easy to enforce security? 5/14 9/14 
It takes long to compete the tasks 5/14 6/14 
Accessible- the security feature must be reachable to accomplish a security objective 
Does not present technical or physical barriers 11/14 12/14 
Readily accessible 10/14 10/14 
Effective- the extent to which the security feature fulfils the users’ expectations with ease. 
Does what it supposed to do 9/14 13/14 
Fulfils my security needs 814 11/14 
Usable- the security features must allow the user to do what they want to do in the way they 
expect to do it without difficulty, hesitancy, or queries 
Is it convenient to use 9/14 12/15 
It is simple to use 8/14 13/15 
Is it doing the expected 10/14 13/15 
It secures my documents 10/14 14/14 
You are not losing information 8/14 12/14 
Your files are not edited by wrong people? 9/14 12/14 
It does not waste my time? 11/14 8/14 
Assures you of the file author? 8/14 7/11 
Security- the system needs to consider integrity, availability, confidentiality, auditing and 
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non-repudiation 
The information is only accessible to authorised users 12/14 12/14 
Protected or confidential can information be accessed only with valid 
authentication 
12/14 13/15 
The program encrypts the whole file 11/14 9/15 
You can update or delete document properties information 9/14 13/15 
The program notifies you of your access privileges? 8/14 11/15 
The program protects all files downloaded 6/14 7/15 
Does the program disable macros? 2/14 5/15 
Are notification messages relating to security displayed to the user 
before access to the system is granted? 
7/14 10/15 
Are the controls for sharing readily available? 6/14 9/15 
Does the program install required software updates automatically and 
notify you about this action? 
7/14 6/15 
Does the program display options to assist in the reporting of security 
incidents? 
5/14 6/15 
Does the program notify you of any vulnerability associated with not 
applying security? 
4/14 4/15 
Does the program notify you about auto recovery? 5/14 8/14 
Awareness/Expected security features must be expected the programs, users should be 
aware of their 
existence 
Does the system provide awareness and educate you on how to 
complete tasks? 
3/14 3/15 
Do you expect the security features? 9/14 12/14 
Are you aware of the location of the security features in the program? 12/14 13/15 
Are you aware of the limitations of the security? 8/14 8/15 
Are you aware of the effect of applying security? 14/14 15/15 
Are you educated on proper security usage? 10/14 11/15 
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Abstract 
The widespread use of personal computers and other devices 
based on Information and Communication Technology (ICT) for 
networking and communication via the Internet exposes the end 
users to cybercriminals. Security systems and security features 
that interact with users via alerts, dialogue boxes and action 
buttons (such as update notices and other warnings) are 
embedded in operating systems and application programs in 
order to protect electronic information. Human behaviour and 
attitudes towards security features determine the user experience 
during the implementation of Information Security. Cyber 
criminals are primarily targeting the human aspect of security, 
since end users are easier to manipulate. In order to effectively 
secure information, the fields of Usable security and User 
experience should be integrated in the design and use of security 
features. This paper presents the findings of an online survey 
carried out to investigate attitudes towards, behaviour with and 
experience of embedded security features among members of staff 
in a tertiary education institution. User experience was measured 
by enumerating general security awareness, policy awareness and 
implementation, as well as user behaviour and emotions 
associated with security interaction. This paper reports on the 
findings of this survey. The researchers envisage that the findings 
can lead to the practical development and implementation of a 
framework for secure user experience. 
Keywords- user experience; user behaviour; security feature; 
end user application program. 
I .  INTRODUCTION  
Technology is shaping global behaviour by dictating how 
players must behave in order to survive the information 
technology age. Almost every job and communication now 
depends on information technology and is carried out with the 
aid of some application programs. Advancements in both 
system design and communication technologies have presented 
an opportunity for all to be interconnected. More end users are 
now connected to the Internet, including cybercriminals. This is 
enabled by the use of a variety of devices, some of which are 
mobile devices. Computers are now an integral component in 
homes and businesses, including in academic institutions like 
Professor Darelle Van Greunen  
Faculty of Engineering, Built Enviroment and ICT, School  
of ICT, Institute for ICT Advancement, Nelson Mandela  
Metropolitan University  
Port Elizabeth, South Africa  
Darelle.vanGreunen@nmmu.ac.za  
the one that was studied. Due to readily available network 
access, Africa has realised high Internet connectivity, and has 
an increasing number of novice end users connected to the 
World Wide Web. Namibia is rated as having an Internet user 
growth rate of 6.9% from 2000 as reported in the 2010- 2011 
period [1]. With the launching of the West Africa Cable 
System (WACS), it is anticipated that Internet connection 
rates will drop allowing more Namibians to connect. This 
poses a security concern for the nation as cyber criminals will 
also find it easier to connect and also they will be presented 
with easier targets. To protect the end user’s information, End 
user application programs have built in security features 
which interact with users to protect their information. 
Information security protects individual and organisation 
security from cyber criminals. 
This paper presents the findings of an online survey carried 
out to investigate attitudes towards, behaviour with and 
experience of embedded security features among members of 
staff in a tertiary education institution. User experience was 
measured by enumerating general security awareness, policy 
awareness and implementation, as well as user behaviour and 
emotions associated with security interaction. The structure of 
the paper will be: User experience, Usable security, Case study, 
results and discussion, recommendations and conclusion. 
II. USER EXPERIENCE 
A. Definition 
User experience (UX) is an individual’s perceptions and 
responses as a result of use or anticipated use of a product, 
system or service [2]. For our studies we will adopt the 
alternative definition by [3] which defines UX as: 
“a consequence of a user’s internal state (e.g. 
predispositions, expectations, needs, motivation, mood, etc.), 
the characteristics of the designed system (e.g. complexity, 
purpose, usability, functionality, etc.) and the context (or the 
environment) within which the interaction occurs (e.g. 
organisational/social setting, meaningfulness of the activity, 
voluntariness of use, etc.)”. 
978-1-4799-0808-0/13/$31.00 ©2013 IEEE 
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It is a discipline that falls in the field of Human-computer 
Interaction (HCI). User experience design (UXD) focuses on 
the emotional aspects of human experience such as happiness, 
although it is closely related to User-Centered Design (UCD) 
methods, which target human performance enhancement [4]. 
Since user experience refers to the overall perceptions of end 
users (effectiveness, efficiency, emotional satisfaction, quality 
of relationship with service entity) as they interact with a 
product or service [5], it is important that the design focuses on 
embracing all these factors in the security features. 
A. End user experience 
End users’ perception of application program quality is 
based on their experience of interaction, as well as on those 
application program qualities that give rise to effective use and 
pleasure [6]. In order to have the complete picture of end user 
experience, it is necessary to consider the user’s characteristics 
(such as skills, background, personality, motives and cultural 
values), product qualities (usability, appeal, behaviour) and the 
environment in which the interaction takes place [7], [3]. 
B. Usage Factors 
Herzog and Shahmehri [8] realised that program security 
has features that influence the behaviour of users towards the 
execution or implementation of such features. It is important 
that designers focus on how to affect the user in a positive 
way. Studies conducted by [9], [10] show that it is possible to 
realign security and usability with careful attention to UCD 
principles, and make security usable. The question is: what 
characteristics does an application program have and how do 
they affect the user? Also: what characteristics does a user 
have that influence their experience with security features? 
We can look at how the environment, security culture and 
duties of the application program user shape their emotions 
when confronted with a dialogue that requires them to act in a 
secure manner. 
Hassenzahl [3] came up with a model of UX which 
describes the designer’s as well as the user’s perspectives of 
product features. A designer has an intended product character 
on development, and puts up guidelines for the user to follow in 
order to get the desired experience. However because the user 
has characteristics that shapes how they perceive the product, 
the actual product character they encounter is different from the 
intended, in turn this evokes different consequences. We need 
to evaluate the extent of positive or negative feelings that can be 
experienced by end users in a particular environment, during 
and after interaction with the product. We also need to explore 
and how that influences further usage [6]. The evaluation helps 
us to determine how the interaction with security features can 
be guided to ensure a “degree to which specified users can 
achieve actual usability, safety, and satisfaction in use in a 
specified context of use” [11]. 
In order to evaluate the effect of a program’s security 
feature on UX, various criteria that influence the overall UX 
can be used. Some important aspects are security policies, 
usability (convenience, efficiency, understandable, visibility) 
[12] user knowledge of security threats and solution and/or 
mitigation strategies related to their application programs. 
Giovanni [13] states that end user behaviour is directly linked 
to emotional satisfaction. It is against these factors that the 
researchers designed a survey to capture information on users’ 
awareness of ICT security policies, their knowledge of 
security threats and solutions, the feelings invoked by 
interaction with security features and the behaviour that 
results from the feeling. 
III. USABLE SECURITY 
Usable Security (USec) also known as HCI security is the 
field that deals with human issues and Information Security, 
focusing on the design of security that is usable. It is defined as 
“A set of attributes that bear on the effort needed for use, and 
on the individual assessment of such use, by a stated or implied 
set of users” [2]. 
A. Characteristics 
The characteristics of USec include learnability, 
understandability, operability, efficiency, effectiveness and 
user satisfaction [14], [5]. Furnell [10] Investigated desirable 
characteristics of security such as locatable, understandable, 
convenient and visible; and realised that too usable can mean 
easy to compromise. A need to establish a balance between 
usability and complexity therefore exits. Furnell [10] also 
noted that there is need for more to be done to understand 
users’ needs and address them. 
As far back as 2005, [9] identified that realigning security 
and usability with careful attention to user centered design 
principles, security and usability can be synergetic. This area 
falls under the fields of InfoSec and HCI. It is important that 
we examine human behaviour towards security in our quest to 
address problems associated with end user security. The field 
of HCI is concerned with the design, evaluation and 
implementation of interactive computing systems for human 
use. Literature has shown that the human element is now the 
key to breaking or securing the information system. To secure 
the information, the security features presented to the end users 
must be usable in a way that appeals to them. 
Whitman and Mattord [15] define poor usability as the 
tendency of end users to always prefer the easier option, when 
confronted with a choice between the official way of doing a 
job and the easier unofficial way. For example, whenever a 
new program update is available, the computer will prompt the 
user to update through an alert but will include an option to 
ignore or cancel. Choosing ‘yes’ implies that there will be 
more choices to make in future, while choosing to ignore the 
prompt to update will require the user to only click once 
without any further prompting. 
The work done so far has not addressed the issues 
influencing the security of end user experience while 
interacting with these features. Previous work has focused on 
ensuring that security features are designed to be usable. The 
number of breaches associated with poor usage or no usage of 
security features is on the rise. Efforts to provide technically 
robust security solutions are fruitless if the beneficiary is not 
able to use them. We have investigated the factors that 
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Figure 1: UX with security interactions 
influence user experience with program security features, and 
propose the model at Figure 1 that can be used to address the 
missing link between usable program security and user 
experiences. Much has been done to realign security design 
with usability. However, a lot still needs to be done to enhance 
or cultivate a positive experience with usable security. 
Yeratziotis et al [16] used usability criteria to evaluate two 
online health systems. The criterion included trust, ease of use, 
terminology, ease of learning, feedback, awareness, errors, help 
and documentation. Yeratziotis et al [16] concluded that 
designers require tools that assist them to improve USec, in 
light of the fact that users need usable features to assist them in 
effectively securing their information. 
This article presents the factors that influence end users to 
behave in the manner which they do. Assuming that the 
application program designers are focusing on embedding 
usable security features, what is left is to ensure that the end 
users secure their own information as well as that of the 
organisation. 
B.  End user application programs 
These are the application programs that end users employ 
to perform daily tasks on their computers. The most popular 
used application programs as documented by [12] are web 
browsers (Internet Explorer), email client (Outlook Express) 
and word processors (Microsoft Word). In another Adobe PDF 
Reader, QuickTime, Adobe Flash and Microsoft Office were 
also identified as popular application programs [17]. 
C.  Security and security features 
End user application programs have embedded security 
features such as the update service, password options, 
permissions, encryption, sharing security and other program-
specific features. In a survey by [12], it was found that 73% of 
respondents used passwords even though the operating system 
under study (Windows XP) has logon as a security feature. 
Furthermore users are supposed to use passwords for online 
activities and to protect their information. 
End users make use of application programs to access 
desired services on their devices and on the Web. Application 
programs have thus become the most used software in the  
information technology (IT) age, presenting cybercriminals 
with yet another means of accessing and manipulating user 
information [15], [17]. Software developers have embedded 
security features and components in end user application 
programs, in order to interact with end user to protect their 
information [12]. However, many end users regard security as 
an administrative function that should be handled by IT 
experts. As such they usually ignore security-related 
responsibilities, due to the complex nature of security and the 
fact that it is not perceived to be the user’s duty [8]. 
IV. CASE STUDY 
A case study approach was followed based on the 
approaches defined by [18], [19], [20]. According to these 
authors case study research is a detailed inquiry of an issue 
used to evaluate the authenticity of the problem and allows 
researchers to gather realistic data of the phenomenon being 
investigated in social and behavioural scientific research. 
A. Academic Institution 
For the purpose of this research, a case study of the 
Polytechnic of Namibia (academic institution in Namibia) was 
conducted. The Institution is located in the nation’s capital city 
Windhoek. It has a student enrolment of 13400 per annum and 
employs 670 full time staff. Every staff member has a desktop 
or personal computer (PC) and/or laptop allocated to them for 
their daily work. The student laboratories and library are 
equipped with PCs which are used for practical sessions as well 
as for information search on the internet and on e-library 
resources. Each PC has a Windows or Ubuntu operating system 
installed for the daily business activities. Laboratories mainly 
use Windows, although in some departments Centos, Ubuntu, 
or MAC OS are used. Typical application software includes 
Microsoft Office, Internet browsers, integrated tertiary system 
(ITS), document readers (Acrobat), anti-virus software 
(Kaspersky lab), and email clients (mainly Thunderbird). 
B. Materials and methods 
An exploratory case study design was used as it allows 
researchers to gather holistic characteristics of real 
occurrences, such as group behaviours, within a 
population[18]. A purposive, non-probabilistic method of 
sampling was 
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Figure 2: Sample question 
used, targeting the sample population staff members and 
aiming for a minimum of 30 responses. Qualitative data 
analysis was used. It requires rigorous analysis of the data, and 
a sample of 30 is therefore sufficient [21]. 
The study area was unambiguously described in the context 
of the case, as well as in terms of the objectives and actions to 
be taken [22]. The context in this case is shaped by the 
organisational security culture and support mechanisms that 
are in place. The researchers therefore looked at policing of 
and adherence to policies, as well as at security awareness. 
The data that were gathered were classified according to 
exhibited patterns or characteristics, to allow for effective 
analysis. The classification was based on research aims and 
objectives. After classification of the data, we established 
connections among different categories. The categories form 
the concepts or variables for the formulation of the theoretical 
framework, and for the relationships that form the connections. 
Meanings were logically inferred from literature. Description, 
contextualisation, classification, processing and linking of 
gathered data were adopted. 
C. Procedure 
A survey was conducted in order to understand how the 
community handles security issues related to electronic 
information. In order to get an overall understanding of 
Information Security problems resulting from inadequate end 
user support, we gathered information about: end users’ 
knowledge of the security threats to which they are exposed 
when they connect to networks; awareness of computer 
security policies in the organisation; experiences with security 
interaction; security technology/solutions usage among the 
community members; the application programs used for 
primary tasks at work/job; knowledge of security features 
embedded in application programs and operating systems; and 
behaviour towards security alerts.An example of a question 
which was asked is shown in Figure 2. The end users would 
tick an appropriate level of knowledge for a policy in place. 
The objectives of the study were presented to the 
respondents in a cover letter. Based on this information, they 
made a voluntary informed choice whether or not to 
participate in the survey. Thus purposive and self-selecting 
sampling techniques were used. The responses were treated 
anonymously and in a confidential manner, thus ensuring that 
upon reporting or publishing no link could be made to the 
population studied. 
Semi structured interviews were carried out with 5 
technical and 5 non-technical employees, in order to gain an 
understanding of the nature of the representatives of the 
population. Questions were open- ended so as to allow 
respondents to provide us with an insight into the situation. For 
further analysis, an online survey was designed to collect data 
from a population of about 670 end users using E-surveys Pro. 
The survey tool was pre-tested with seven users, after which it 
was deployed to all population members by means of a 
broadcast email containing the link. The online survey is quick 
and inexpensive to administer. It furthermore saves time in 
analysis as the data can be electronically analysed using 
statistical tools. 
D. Participant selection 
The participants in this research comprised of lecturers, 
administrators and other professionals who make up the 
university community. The institution has 670 full time 
employees. The population was chosen in order to reflect a 
diversity of users from different backgrounds and professions, 
who use similar application programs for similar purposes to 
achieve different objectives. Students were not included as the 
study was aimed at reflecting on a typical composition of 
employees in organisation. 
Out of the 53 respondents who completed the survey, 23 
were female and 30 were male hence there was no gender bias. 
The respondent composition was representative of the 
university employee population, and spreading across the 
different faculties and centres in the institution. 
D. Data Analysis method 
Responses from a sample of respondents (53) were 
analysed for patterns that demonstrate how the users think and 
feel about embedded security features in the application 
programs that they use. After this analysis, we recommended 
mechanisms to ensure positive experiences for users while 
using the security features. 
To evaluate UX we followed a hierarchical approach 
described by [13] which presents three stages, namely: 
 Using general knowledge to provide a basic sense of end user 
program security awareness and usage; 
 Understanding user behaviour to determine what users are 
doing and where a problem exists; and 
 Influencing users by determining if a security feature is 
compelling through measuring the emotion associated with the 
feature. 
To gauge the security culture of the organisation, general 
security information was gathered. The information captured 
the understanding of security, threats and solutions as well as 
whether the end users were implementing them or not. We 
then assessed the behaviour of end users with security feature/ 
technology and the reasons for the specific behaviour. In order 
to fully comprehend the situation, the emotions of users 
associated with their interactions were also analysed. 
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V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
A.  Overview 
The results are based on an inductive analysis of: security 
threats and solution awareness; user behaviour while interacting 
with security features; user attitudes and feelings towards 
security and the security policies that are in place. The 
interpretations are supported by extracts of actual responses. 
A critical review of the literature has established that 
Information Security problems are largely due to a user’s 
behaviour towards security features and perceptions of program 
security. 
The survey findings indicate that many factors such as a 
lack of knowledge, awareness, prioritisation of work targets and 
misconception of security threats affect the experience of the 
end user with security. This experience in turn influences the 
tendency not to secure information. The following sections 
present results according to the sections of the questionnaire. 
1. Systems Implemented 
Table 1 shows that in our study population, the computer is 
mainly used as a tool for communication, for this task 
Thunderbird and Pronto Webmail are implemented. A variety 
of tools are used for research varying for the different 
disciplines and individual preferences. For Internet browsing 
several browsers are implemented including the default 
Windows browser Internet Explorer, Mozilla Firefox, Opera 
and Google Chrome. ELearning is implemented using Moodle 
and library services are electronic. Organisational 
Administration at all levels is implemented on the Integrated 
Tertiary system (ITS). The application programs used are 
mainly Microsoft products and open source software. 
TABLE 1:PRIMARY USE OF THE COMPUTER 
  
$ Always $ Sometime 
$ Not At 
All 
Communication 87 13 0 
Research 85 15 0 
Teaching 57 38 4 
Administration 51 47 2 
Internet  
Browsing 83 17 0 
Internet  
Banking 53 30 17 
Downloads 40 34 26 
Music, Skype,  
Games 17 51 32 
Other 17 47 36 
TABLE 2: PERCENTAGE PROGRAM USAGE 
  $ 
Always 
$Sometimes 
$ Not  
at all 
Word processor 86 10 4 
SpreadSheets 62 36 2 
Presentation 62 36 2 
Graphics 20 56 24 
Project  
management 4 30 66 
Document  
readers 50 28 22 
Database  
management 18 42 40 
Email 100 0 0 
Web browsers 92 6 2 
ITS 68 30 2 
Other 26 52 22 
 
 2. Frequently used Application Programs 
The most popular application programs are email clients 
which are used by 100% of respondents, followed by Web 
browsers at 92%, and word processors at 86%. ITS is used by 
68% of respondents, followed by spread sheets and presentation 
software both at 62%. The document readers are used by 50% of 
the respondents, whilst the remaining programs are seldom used, 
as is shown in Table 2. The findings favourably compare with 
those articulated by [12], [17]. 
A diversity of email clients are in use, which is contrary to 
the expectation. The organisation under study uses 
CommuniGate pro (Pronto webmail) and Thunderbird as email 
clients. Findings indicate the use of several other email clients 
including Windows Live mail. Nine per cent of respondents 
selected other email clients and specified Pronto, which implies 
that there are 17 respondents (35%) using CommuniGate. 
Sixty-five per cent of respondents do not know that they use 
Pronto on a daily basis. 
B. Factors 
This section presents the findings about the factors which 
were studied. 
 1. Knowledge of security threats 
The users are generally aware of the Information Security 
threats to which they are exposed., The survey showed 
awareness as high as 94% for hacking and as low as 30% for 
social engineering, other threats such as phishing, spam, 
spyware, viruses and worms were in the range of 74% to 92%. 
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Figure 3: User feelings torwards acting on security messages 
However, only 13% of the respondents knew that they had 
been hacked, 24% were not sure and the remaining 63% knew 
they had not been hacked. Hacking is the act of gaining access 
to electronic information illegally [15]. It is quite likely that 
they do not understand how hacking is carried out, and that 
they can therefore not detect it. Of the 92% who are aware of 
what spam is, 64% knew that they have been victims thereof. 
The same trend is observed for all the other threats. 
Further enquiry showed that 68% of the users were aware 
that their email programs handle spam. With this level of 
awareness, it is tempting to assume that they know how to 
handle their emails. However, 44% would open emails from 
unfamiliar sources and 29% opens all attachments that they 
receive. 
Despite the fact that passwords are one of the most used 
security methods, and that users (over 70%) know how to 
implement them, 40% of users will disclose their passwords to 
the “support” personnel when confronted with a problem. 
Support is in these cases offered telephonically or via remote 
desktop managers. Users do not have a perception of the 
implications of disclosing their passwords. This indicates that 
there is no user training on Information Security, as is 
confirmed by 92% of the participants. 
2. Security Policy awareness 
Policy awareness is the key to successful implementation of 
security systems, in this study at most 29% of the participants 
know of the policies that exist in the organisation. Twenty-nine 
percent know about the password policy, followed by 23% of 
respondents that are aware of the Internet policy. The general 
computer usage policy is known by 21% of the sample 
population, and only 13% have knowledge of the wireless 
policy. Ironically, every staff member has a computer for their 
work, and all academic staff also have a laptop that connects 
both to the wired and wireless networks in the organisation. Out 
of those who know about policies, 45% learnt about them from 
the Rights office and the rest from a colleague or friend. These 
results show that users are not aware of the existence and 
proper usage of policies, and that the application thereof is 
hence not executed. User behaviour further indicates that there 
is no adherence to policies when users are confronted with 
computer-related problems. The official process is to seek help 
from Computer Services. However, about 42% of users seek 
help from the most untrusted sources of information such as the 
Internet, friends or colleagues. The general computer usage 
policy states that all sensitive information should be encrypted; 
however, the survey shows that only 15% of the respondents 
use the facility. 
3. User experience with security interaction 
The end users acknowledge that they receive security alerts 
and that they appreciate receiving system feedback. Security 
features from the point of view of the designers are meant to be 
usable. However, 63% of respondents have negative feelings 
with respect to notifications, especially when they are required 
to act on them (58%). Figure 3 shows some of the feelings that 
they experience with these interactions (such as disruptive, 
irritating and annoying). 
4. Security technology/Solution Usage 
Anti-virus programs and passwords are the most used 
protection mechanisms with a prevalence of 72%, followed by 
firewalls. Updates are only implemented by 34% of 
respondents, which means that systems are left vulnerable to 
current and new attacks targeting known vulnerabilities. On 
further enquiry on users perform their updates, 70% of users 
identify with auto updates. The most shocking realisation is 
the fact that end users do not back up their information, with 
only 23% doing it. 
The findings show that 46% of the participants configure 
security options. However, 68% are knowledgeable of the 
existence of spam filters in their email programs, possibly 
centrally configured for them by the system administrators. 
Other features such as encryption mechanisms for emails and 
files (digital signature, certificates same status) are rarely 
used. The security features interact with users through alerts, 
warnings and dialogue boxes in order to protect their 
information. A comparable survey carried out in 2006 also 
shows disturbing low usage of security technologies [12]. 
5. Embedded security feature knowledge 
Only 46% of respondents have configured security options 
in their application programs. The idea of encrypting the 
information that is sent out via emails is virtually unknown, 
with only 4% using this feature. Embedded security is not 
being used as often as is necessary, and the absence thereof is 
making users an easy target for cybercriminals. 
6. Behaviour towards security interactions 
User behaviour is influenced by many factors such as lack 
of knowledge, prioritisation of their work targets and 
misconception of security threats [8]. The survey has 
confirmed the same facts. The majority of users make 
informed decisions (i.e. they actually read the screen before 
making a choice). 
However, 18% ignore such information or just click in 
order to get rid of the message. When it comes to passwords, 
users seem to be more careful, although they are still 
susceptible to social engineering attacks. Users easily trust 
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anyone who claims to be technical support, with their login 
credentials (40% of respondents). They are cautious about 
email attachments, although they do trust emails from 
unknown sources. 
When confronted with a computer problem, end users trust 
the insecure Internet (29% of respondents) for help, while 
12.5% of respondents trust their colleagues to offer a solution. 
This exposes them to internal threats as well as to hackers. End 
users generally do not update their application programs as 
often as required with 27% of respondents doing it often, 53% 
when prompted by the software or technician, and 18.5% 
sometimes or never. 
About 8% of respondents disable security programs from 
running on their PC and 17% disable alerts, but that the 
majority of respondents allow such application programs to 
run. Those who disable alerts do so because they feel negative 
about them. They feel irritated, annoyed, frustrated, or 
indifferent. Respondents also feel that their work is disrupted, 
or that it is the technician’s responsibility to deal with security 
alerts. However, even among those who claim that it is their 
responsibility to look after security, there are some users who 
disable the alerts. This contradiction indicates that there is no 
alignment of behaviour to feelings (see Table 3). 
There are mixed feelings about Web sensing, which 
manifests as a message that notifies the user that the page they 
are trying to access has been blocked by the organisation. Most 
respondents will navigate away from the site and do nothing 
about it. A few would contact the Webmaster. The patterns 
show that they are aware of restrictions to visit certain sites. If 
access to a genuine business related website is restricted, they 
act on it. However, the majority feels that it is appropriate for 
organisations to block some sites. 
Another concern is the fact that many end users allow add-
ons from the Internet to run on their computers, coupled with 
the fact that most of them have administrative rights (86% of 
respondents) on their machines. This poses a great security 
risk. Viruses and other malicious software can be executed 
remotely on their machines. Respondents download and 
install software from the Internet without making use of 
secure connections. Sixty per cent of respondents trust 
browser auto completion. This action might unknowingly lead 
them to a hacker’s site. 
7. Technology Acceptance 
End users accept the use of a computer as a tool for 
accomplishing their daily tasks. However, they do not trust 
technicians with their information. Despite their comfort with 
technology they do not trust updates or new versions because it 
takes a lot of time to learn, because it moves them away from 
their comfort zone, or because of a fear of the unknown. 
However, some respondents are indifferent and will do as 
asked when prompted to update. 
TABLE 3: FEELING ABOUT NOTIFICATIONS AND ERROR HANDLING 
 
C.  Discussion 
The results show that users are not trained with respect to 
security threats, solutions and secure behaviour while using 
information and communication technologies (ICT) to do their 
work. The organisation has policies in place to govern user 
behaviour with respect to ICT. However, end users have a low 
awareness of the existence of security policies and violate 
them by means of their behaviour. A large number of the 
participants download and install software programs from the 
Internet as they wish. 
The results outlined above have several implications for 
Information Security. Considering the fact that all users have 
at least one computer connected to the Internet for their job, it 
is very important that all facets of Information Security [23] 
are addressed. However, due to lack of end user training, 
policies are violated exposing the participants to hacking 
attacks. End users (71% of respondents) download and install 
from the unsafe Internet. This can lead them to download 
malicious programs such as viruses, worms, Trojan horses, 
logic bombs and many others that will alter and destroy their 
information asset if executed. Since most users (87% of 
respondents) have administrative rights, it is quite easy for the 
compromised computers to be used to propagate the 
destruction of information in the organisation. The application 
programs that are most popularly used in the case site are rated 
as the most vulnerable by security experts [17]. This means 
that, with the human as the known weak link, attacks can be 
launched against the site via these application programs. There 
is evidence of poor information backup practices, with only 
22% of respondents that are always performing this task. In the 
event of a cyber-attack, this would be very detrimental. Every 
computer has a super administrator password that is 
maintained by the technical team. However, when confronted 
with a problem, the participants give away their passwords to 
supposed helpdesk personnel. This is even done telephonically. 
This practice exposes users to social engineering attacks. In an 
academic institution a lot of sensitive information is at stake, 
including student records. 
Poor security-related decisions and behaviour with an 
overall negative experience with Information Security are 
common, leaving application programs vulnerable to 
exploitation by cyber criminals. 
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS 
As interventions we recommend user training on 
computer security, ensuring that security policies are 
in place as well as the promotion of security-
conscious behaviour. 
Improving information security means 
improving the users’ attitudes towards security 
features in the application programs that they use for 
their work. In order to improve the user experience 
with security features, users must be aware of 
security threats and solutions; they must know the 
benefits of using the features and must interact with 
the security features as required of them. 
We recommend the UX model at Figure 1 with 
security awareness as the basis of feelings. Feelings 
shape attitudes and perceptions, which in turn 
influence behaviour. Negative behaviour with 
respect to security features will result in a negative 
experience with technology, and hence result in 
insecurity. This means that the user does not find the 
application programs usable for the job, resulting in 
information loss and/or compromise. Users will only 
be able to interact with embedded features if they 
feel good about it (the security will be usable). 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The research has highlighted problems that face 
end users while using computers to process, store and 
transmit personal or organisational information. The 
findings reflect a scenario in which there is a support 
mechanism from the organisation. It can be inferred 
that in scenarios where individuals are not supported, 
they experience more negative encounters with 
security. Based on the findings it is necessary to 
develop a framework for secure user experiences. 
The framework will ensure that users correctly 
interact while having a positive experience with built-
in security features. 
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Abstract 
Information security is at the heart of every organisation or individual who uses 
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) devices to socialize or for 
business. Security aims to ensure that users experience the three main goals of 
security: confidentiality, integrity and accountability (CIA). Despite the importance 
of security, very few organisations have proper plans to create awareness among 
their employees. Information security requires the user to be aware of the 
existence of security features on their electronic devices and to be able to use 
them appropriately. In a quest to establish the underlying reasons for increased 
exploitation despite the efforts in security solutions design, the focus is on 
awareness as a major factor influencing human behaviour. Online surveys were 
conducted to investigate security awareness levels in a case site. The case study 
was at an institution of higher and tertiary education in Namibia. Document review 
on security trends and approaches from selected leading industries was also 
done. Results show that most users are not aware of security policies operational 
in their organisation. In this paper we outline the security metrics that guide in 
formulating security awareness strategies. 
Keywords 
Security awareness, metrics, policy awareness 
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Introduction 
Security awareness is the ability of a user to understand and implement security policies 
in programmes or organisations (Hubbard, 2002) According to Wilson and Hash (2003) 
awareness is meant to enable users to identify IT security concerns and to behave 
appropriately. Security depends mainly on user behaviour as most of the security actions 
depend on end user choices to act or not to act on security messages. To protect 
information and IT infrastructure the organisations need to have policies in place and to 
educate the users about them. Successful implementation and evaluation of security 
depends on the success of user education. NIST 8800-12 agrees that security 
responsibility awareness for users as well as training them on security best practices will 
change user behaviour (2007). 
Most organisations have security policies; however, their users are not aware of the 
policies or the meaning and implications of implementing them. An extract from 
ISO/IEC17799:2005 section 8.2.2 on Information security awareness, education and 
training recommends that all end users ought to receive suitable awareness training and 
regular updates in organizational policies and procedures, as applicable to their job 
function. 
Primarily, computer users log onto a computer system to communicate for social or 
business purposes, to share information and to get information from the World Wide Web. 
Among the people who communicate or share information or make information available 
for other users to download are cyber criminals. Cyber criminals capitalize on user 
behaviour when they access information on the web (2005). 
Access to information has evolved and nowadays includes: the cloud and mobile devices 
of all sorts. To access information conveniently users tend to use removable devices 
(currently, usb devices), and multiple mobile devices. We argue that this provides 
convenience as the users are empowered to access their information always, anywhere. 
Furthermore, applications are designed to enhance the user interaction with technology. 
However, this convenience comes with a price as each device has its own inherent 
security weakness. Is the user aware of these weaknesses and of ways to protect 
themselves? The focus of this paper is to identify the main security threats which users 
should be aware of and to rank the risk they pose to the users. The importance of security 
policy, security awareness and human factors that can be used as metrics to enumerate 
the security in an organisation are discussed. The paper aims to answer a 3 research 
questions. The main research question is: How can the security metrics be used to come 
up with a security awareness strategy for a higher and tertiary institution? The research 
sub questions include: 
What is the security awareness level among the case site community? 
Which metrics can be used to measure the security awareness baseline? 
This paper presents security metrics which can be used to evaluate the baseline security 
awareness of individual users before implementing awareness programs. The structure of 
the paper presents background information on information security awareness and 
security threats, objectives, methodology, findings, recommendations and conclusions. 
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Information Security Overview 
The most important components of Information security are technology, process, policy 
and culture. ISO/IEC 27002 defines 12 security domains, namely: security policy, asset 
management, organizing information security, human resources, physical and 
environment, communication and operations management, access control, information 
system acquisition, development and maintenance, information security incident 
management, business continuity management and compliance. The 12 security domains 
are important when defining security metrics and coming up with security awareness 
strategies. We have borrowed from the domains in drawing up the security awareness 
metric that is the human resources component. 
The importance of awareness cannot be ignored if security is a goal. Security awareness 
deals with the human resources security domain of the ISO/IEC 27002 guideline or code 
of practice. Furnell, Jusoh, and Katsabas (2005) made recommendations for improving 
user security, including user training on: application security and how best to use it, 
security threats one is exposed to when one connects to a network and how to manage 
those. Current research trends still allude to the fact that the human element is still the 
weakest link in InfoSec (Ernst & Young, 2014; Delloitte, 2013; SANS, 2013). The 
understanding of the human element could assist in defining the security metrics and 
awareness strategy. The Global Security survey by PWC (2014) confirms that the human 
aspect of security is the major risk. The same company in 2013 suggested three means 
that could be used to improve employee awareness as mentioned here: 
 Attitudes and Perceptions - beliefs and opinions regarding the value and urgency of 
information security 
 Behaviour - action taken to mitigate Information Security risk 
 Knowledge, Skills and Abilities - insight into information security policies, 
procedures, and controls, roles/ responsibilities and business impact 
Awareness, skills and abilities build perceptions and attitudes, which influence behavior and, in 
turn, consistent behavior can influence the overall security landscape for the organization. Figure 
1 shows how these three factors influence the overall information security. Understanding the 
relationship of the human factors of InfoSec could help in the drawing up of the metric as it informs 
the relationship. 
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Figure 1: Security awareness impact on other security aspects 
Security threats until 2016 have among them mobile devices as a way of penetrating 
enterprise security (Durbin, Steve; Olasvsrud, Thor, 2014). The reason for this is that: 
“the rapid development cycle and lack of security considerations around mobile apps 
make them a prime target for cybercriminals and hackers seeking a way into the 
enterprise” (Durbin, 2014). Nowadays, most people in the community can afford cell 
phones (smart phones, tablet PCs and other mobile devices) and as such, are bound to 
use them for e-commerce. Since the security on these devices is weak more hacktivism 
and malicious software will threaten InfoSec. 
The Vision 2030 for Namibia has set a target to make available the latest, most 
affordable, modern and adequate ICT infrastructure to facilitate economic development 
and competiveness through innovation, research and development from the current level 
of 5.5 to 6.0 by 2017 (NDP4 page 77-8). The aim is to make Namibia a knowledge-based 
society by 2030 through reducing the digital divide between communities by ensuring the 
availability of broadband Internet in rural communities. NDP4: ICT provides fast access to 
information, which is a prerequisite for literacy and knowledge creation. These 
technologies are the modes of delivery for information economy (Government of Namibia, 
2012). 
Owing to affordability business processes will be conducted using smartphones or mobile 
devices (Durbin, 2014). These devices have a reputation of not being very secure, which 
presents an easier way for cyber criminals to get access into the enterprise by using them. 
The initiative to reduce the digital bridge and to enhance communication can also result in 
more InfoSec breaches. As the use of technology improves, precautions need to be taken 
to secure the beneficiaries. 
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Durbin and Olasvsrud (2014) recommend the incorporation of user devices into existing 
standards for access management, and that one should begin to promote education and 
awareness of BYOx (Bring Your Own Anything) risk in innovative ways. 
Security Threats 
An information security threat is an object that has potential to endanger information by 
exploiting vulnerabilities (Whitman & Mattord, 2011; Stallings, 2007). Table1 summarizes 
threats to InfoSec 
Acts of human error or failure Mistakes or accidents 
Espionage or trespass Unauthorized access or data collection 
Information extortion Blackmail or disclosure 
Software attacks Viruses, Denial of service (DoS)  
Table 1: Common threats to InfoSec 
If users are to protect themselves fully from these threats they need to be knowledgeable 
about them. A study carried out by Huang, Rau and Salvendy (2007) concluded that 
perceptions of information security threats could be described by means of six factors, 
namely: knowledge, impact, severity, controllability, possibility and awareness. Awareness 
is the beginning of knowledge. In order to educate users about security there is a need to 
raise their awareness first. The learning continuum presented by NIST 800-16 shows that 
awareness should be attained before training, as it prepares users for training by altering 
attitudes to realize the significance of security and the penalties of its failure (1998). It is 
therefore very important to address the root of the security challenges by ensuring that 
users are aware of threats before equipping them with the skills to protect themselves. 
Security awareness trends 
Security awareness refers to sharing information by educating and training users about 
risks to data, especially risks to the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of data, and 
about knowing what to do to protect data (Peltier, 2005), Companies worldwide are 
integrating security awareness programs in their business process to reduce the risk of 
losing information (PWC, 2014). Much has been said about how to measure the success 
of an awareness program; however, it is important for every organisation to identify their 
unique measures as well as other factors such as organizational culture and environmental 
influence awareness. 
For effective evaluation of security risk, metrics for a security awareness baseline should 
be identified. According to Hayden (2010) “Security metrics should be about choosing the 
best methods to determine what you need to know about security so that you can 
understand and improve your operational processes, within the resource constraints you 
face” The research focuses on identifying metrics that can be used to measure the impact 
of security awareness on user behaviour and information security. 
Awareness will empower users to make the right choices (Navarro, 2007). Security can be 
assessed by answering the following questions: 
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 Does the organization have security policies enforced? 
 Do employees know the security policies? 
 What are the practices and technologies in place that can help to detect a 
security breach? 
 Do employees know what to do if they detect a security violation? 
Ernst &Young carried out a survey in 2013 on emerging technologies and trends and 
found out that successful security needs improvement, expansion and innovation in 
awareness programs in order to foster more proactive behaviour than reactive behaviour 
among users. Their survey results showed that respondents were more confident in the 
capabilities of current technologies in use because they are familiar with and confident of 
their capabilities. Organisations were cited as tending to place more importance on current 
technology rather than on emerging or future trends. This leaves the organisations 
unprepared to cope with the rapid changes in the IT field, hence poor proactive awareness 
programs (Ernst & Young, 2013; PWC 2014). 
In a similar study by PWC it was found that cloud computing and BYOD are being 
implemented before being secured (2014). Such strides in technology are driven by 
advanced technical people and, as such, it would be expected that such issues should 
not be there; however, human behaviour is always playing a pivotal role in the success of 
security. According to Gary Loveland, a new model of InfoSec, motivated by knowledge 
of threats, assets, and the motives and targets of potential adversaries, is necessary to 
address current security challenges (PWC, 2014). Since security implementation is 
through policies it is necessary to define what a policy is. The next section will focus on 
that. 
Security Policies 
“A policy is typically a document that outlines specific requirements or rules that must be 
met. In the information/network security realm, policies are usually point-specific, covering 
a single area.” (SANS, n.d.) 
They are perceived as the main means by which organisations officially set out their 
position concerning information security activities (Brotby & Hinson, 2013).Properly 
implemented, policies can mitigate threats especially those that are due to human aspects. 
As they address user behaviour, it is therefore important that they are specific and 
understandable. Since policies are point specific, it means that an organisation can have 
several policies to address their diverse ICT needs. 
Security awareness approach 
Survey data collected from a case site was analysed qualitatively, based on the findings 
that emerged. According to Yin (2009); Bhattacherjee (2012); Crinson and Leontowitsch 
(2011) case study research is a detailed inquiry of an issue used to evaluate the 
authenticity of the problem and allows researchers to gather realistic data of the 
phenomenon being investigated in social and behavioral scientific research. 
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Case site 
A case study of the Polytechnic of Namibia (an academic institution in Namibia) was 
used for this paper. The Institution is located in the capital city of the nation, Windhoek. It 
has a student enrolment of 13400 per annum and employs 670 full-time staff. Every staff 
member has a desktop or personal computer (PC) and/or laptop allocated to him/her for 
daily work. The student laboratories and library are equipped with PCs, which are used 
for practical sessions as well as for information search on the internet and on e-library 
resources. 
Materials and methods 
A purposive, non-probabilistic method of sampling was used, targeting the sample 
population of staff members and aiming for a minimum of 30 responses. 
Qualitative data analysis was used. 
We therefore looked at the policing of and adherence to policies, as well as at security 
awareness. 
The data gathered were classified according to exhibited patterns or characteristics, to 
allow for effective analysis. The classification was based on research aims and objectives. 
After classification of the data, we established connections among different categories. 
The categories form the concepts or variables for the formulation of the theoretical 
framework, and for the relationships that form the connections. Meanings were logically 
inferred from literature. Description, contextualization, classification, processing and linking 
of gathered data were adopted. 
Procedure 
A survey was conducted in order to understand the security awareness levels in the case 
site. The population (site) was purposefully chosen to show the diversity of users from 
different backgrounds and professions, who use similar security features to achieve 
different outcomes. Purposive sampling is useful for circumstances where there is need to 
study a targeted sample in minimal time and proportion is not the key aspect. It is the most 
appropriate for selecting cases that are very informative (Saunders et al., 2009). 
Information about the knowledge of end users of the security threats to which they are 
exposed when they connect to networks; awareness of computer security policies in the 
organisation; and behaviour towards security alerts was gathered. 
The objectives of the study were presented to the respondents in a cover letter. Based on 
this information, they made a voluntary informed choice whether or not to participate in 
the survey. Thus, purposive and self-selecting sampling techniques were used. Self-
selection involves the participant volunteering to take part in the research and data was 
collected from those who responded. The responses were treated anonymously and in a 
confidential manner, to ensure that no link could be made to the participants who 
responded, on publishing the findings. 
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An online survey was designed to collect data from a population of about 670 end users 
using E-surveys Pro. The survey tool was pre-tested with seven users, after which it was 
deployed to all population members by means of a broadcast email containing the link. 
The online survey is quick and inexpensive to administer Furthermore; it saves time in 
analysis as the data can be analysed electronically using statistical tools. 
Participant selection 
The participants in this study comprised lecturers, administrators and other professionals 
who make up the university community. Participants were chosen for this qualitative 
experience evaluation because they possessed the common experience of avoiding the 
use of security features for one reason or the other. The institution has 670 full-time 
employees. The population was chosen in order to reflect a diversity of users from 
different backgrounds and professions, who use similar application programs for similar 
purposes to achieve different objectives. Students were not included as the study was 
aimed at reflecting on a typical work environment. 
The respondent composition was representative of the university employee population and 
was spread across the different faculties and centers in the institution. Table 2 below 
presents the respondents’ affiliations. 
Department Participants 
School of Information Technology 18 
School Of Business Management 8 
School of Communication, Media & 
Legal Studies 
2 
School of Engineering 2 
School of Natural resources 3 
School of Health & Applied Sciences 1 
Bureau of Computer Services 2 
Centre of Open and Long life Learning 4 
Centre of Teaching and learning 1 
Centre of entrepreneurial development 1 
Registrar 1 
Library 1 
Auxiliary Services 1 
Payroll, Finance and Accounting 3 
Human Resources 2 
Namibian German Logistics 1 
Security (Campus Control) 1  
Table 2:Respondents affiliation 
Data Analysis method 
Responses from 53 participants who completed the survey out of 58 respondents were 
analysed for patterns that demonstrate how much the users think they know about 
information security. To gauge the security culture of the organisation, general security 
information was gathered. The information captured the understanding of security, threats 
and solutions, as well as whether the end users were implementing them or not. Then the 
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behaviour of end users with security feature/ technology and the reasons for the 
specific behaviour was assessed. 
After this analysis, the results were used to develop security awareness metrics using the 
steps outlined in the next section. The data collected helped in understanding the security 
metrics required at PON. 
Security metric program development process 
Security metrics provide information about IT security including costs and risks (asset 
value, threat and vulnerability are elements of overall risk) and must be based on a 
rigorous approach for security measurements and applied understanding seeking 
information security (Hayden, 2010). Useful metrics reflect the degree to which security 
goals such as data confidentiality are being met and they drive actions taken to improve 
the overall security program of an organisation. They can also identify the risk levels of not 
implementing certain measures and can be used to raise the levels of awareness within 
the organisation (Payne, 2006).According to Hayden (2010) security is the result of human 
activity. Hence, in this study the focus was more on measuring the third element of risk-
vulnerability. Facets of vulnerability include the degree of understanding of security issues 
among computer users. Based on the results presented in the previous section, metrics 
were developed using the Goal-Question method. For instance, the metric is policy 
awareness. The question asked is: to what extent do you know the following policies? The 
goal is to measure policy awareness level. The following are the 7 steps involved in 
developing a security metrics program and in this paper the focus was on the first three 
(Payne, 2006): 
1. Define the metrics program objectives and goals (provide metrics that clearly communicate 
how user interaction with security can be improved. Goals: to base the metrics program on 
improving awareness within our organisation; to communicate effectively the metrics to all 
stake-holders, including end users) 
2. Decide on which metrics to generate using either a framework, top-down or bottom-up 
approach to determine which metrics could be desirable to use. Start with goals, 
measurements to generate the metrics. The bottom up approach in Table 3 was 
adopted using the analysis of the survey results. 
Bottom-Up Approach 
Identify measurements that can be 
collected for this process 
% of people who are not aware of security poli-  
cies in the organisation.  
% of people who are aware of security threats  
and solutions 
Determine metrics that can be gen- 
erated from the measurements 
Train and improve the number of people aware of  
security policies, threats and solutions since last  
survey period. 
Determine the association between  
derived metrics and established  
objectives of the overall security  
program 
To increase security policy, threat and solution  
awareness among end users 
Table 3: Bottom-up approach adopted from Payne(2006) 
3. Develop strategies for generating the metrics (How will the data be collected?- Source 
(antivirus logs, user surveys), method of collection (survey, log analysis), frequency of 
collection, data analysis techniques, metric generation) 
4. Establish the benchmarks and targets 
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5. Determine how the metrics will be reported 
6. Create an action plan and act on it 
7. Establish a formal program review/refinement cycle. 
Findings and discussions 
Security policies active in the organisation (Polytechnic of Namibia 
(PON) 
The following policies exist in the case site: 
1. Acceptable ICT use which is meant for all ICT users in the organisation. It is 
meant to spell out the tolerable use of computer equipment at PON to ensure that 
the infrastructure is protected from “risks including virus attacks, compromise of 
network systems and services, disclosure of confidential information and legal 
issues” (Polytecnic of Namibia, 2008). 
2. Password Policy which defines a procedure for creating and protecting strong 
passwords, and the regularity of change. 
3. Remote access, which is applicable to all users remotely accessing the PON 
network with either a PON-owned or personally-owned computer, laptop, 
workstation or Palm device. Used to connect to the PON network for work-
related activities. 
4. Virtual Private Network which specifies how to use Remote Access through IPsec 
or L2TP Virtual Private Network 
5. (VPN) connections to the Polytechnic of Namibia (PON) corporate network. 
6. Wireless communication which forbids connecting to the Polytechnic of Namibia 
(PON) networks through unsecured wireless communication mechanisms and 
stipulates that access can only be granted by the ICT department. 
All these policies are really good, but does the implementation create the right 
atmosphere? Security policies are hardly known to the users, and therefore not used as 
shown in Table 4. Using risk factor assignment to questions; no knowledge of security 
policies presents a high risk factor for InfoSec and the higher the knowledge thereof the 
low the risk. Findings reflect: 
To what extent do you know these policies? (1 is not at all and 5 is very well) 
  12   3 4 5 Response Total 
Password 11 2 11 12 15 51 
Wireless 14 9 14 7 7 51 
General computer usage 13 4 14 9 11 51 
Internet 14 4 9 12 12 51  
Table 4: Typical question 
Response 1 is a very high risk factor (rated at 5) and 5 is the lowest risk factor (rated at 1). 
Generally the risk of policy knowledge is moderate to significant as the respondents are not 
knowledgeable of policies in the organization. According to practical lecturers and the 
technicians orally interviewed, students do not have enough storage on campus servers 
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and accessible PCs, coupled with the fact that their user accounts have mandatory user 
profiles. A mandatory user profile loses user information/data upon log off. This 
encourages the use of removable devices among staff and students as they share 
materials. Survey results reflect that 81of the respondents use memory sticks to share 
information. Memory sticks and email are the main means of sharing information. Other 
methods such as network, Google docs and Dropbox are just not popular. Emails and 
memory sticks are well known for propagating the spread of viruses. As a consequence of 
this, infections are rife in their labs and propagate to the production network. The anti-virus 
logs analysed show an infection rate of 85 virus infections in every hundred cases of 
malicious detections; the remainder being Trojan horses. 
Security Policy awareness 
A low policy awareness ranging between13% and 29% for the different policies is evident 
as presented in Figure 3. Figure 3 shows that of those who know about policies, 45% 
learnt about them from a colleague or friend. Some have never heard about the policies 
yet they use the policies very well. 
 
Figure 2: Where users learn about security policies 
Users are generally not educated with regard to the existence of the policies, and they 
generally do learn about them from inappropriate sources. The findings reflect that there is 
no adherence to the policies as shown by the behaviour when confronted with a computer-
related problem. The official way is to seek help from the Computer Services, yet about 
42% seek it from the most untrusted source of information such as the Internet, or a friend 
or colleague. The general computer usage policy states that all sensitive information 
should be encrypted; yet the survey shows that only 15% of the respondents use the 
facility. This finding is a significant risk to information security. 
Security Policy usage 
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  Heard 
of 
% 
Hacking 50 94 
Phishing 45 85 
Spam 49 92 
Spyware 41 77 
Virus 48 91 
Worm 41 77 
Social Engineering 16 30 
 
Of the 51 respondents, 31 (65%) know and follow the requirements of the policies 
as shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 3: Knowledge of policy requirements 
Section 4.2.2 of the Acceptable ICT use policy states that users must ensure the security 
of all passwords and that they are not to share accounts. The survey reveals that when 
confronted with a problem 40%, will disclose their passwords to the “support” personnel. 
The support can be offered telephonically or using remote desktop managers. They do 
not have any perception of the implications of disclosing their passwords. The risk 
associated with knowledge of policy requirements is moderate. 
Security awareness levels at PON 
There is no user to train users on information security as confirmed by 92% of the 
participants. However, some users are aware of some security aspects as shown by findings. 
Table 5 shows the responses from 53 participants to the question: Have you ever heard of 
the following? (Tick all that apply) 
Table 5: Knowledge of security threats 
Generally, there is high security threat awareness even with no training. Using risk 
assignments, this shows that the security in the organisation is at low risk. Further enquiry 
shows that 23% of the same respondents do not know if they have been hacked or not, 
57% do not know if they have been victims of social engineering as presented in Figure 5. 
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Figure 4: Have you been a victim of any of the threats? 
End users (71%) download and install from the unsafe internet. This can lead them to 
download malicious programs such as viruses, worms, Trojan horses, logic bombs and 
many others, which will alter and destroy their information asset if executed. Since most 
(87%) have administrative rights it is quite easy for the compromised computers to be 
used to propagate the destruction of information in the organisation. 
There is evidence of poor information backup practices, with only 22% performing the task 
always. In the event of a cyber-attack this will be very detrimental. Every computer has an 
administrator password which is maintained by the technical team. However, when 
confronted with a problem the participants give away their passwords to supposed 
helpdesk personnel, even telephonically. This practice exposes them to social engineering 
attacks. In an academic institution a lot is at stake, including student records. Summing up 
the findings there is moderate to significant risk posed by the awareness levels on 
information security. 
Security metrics vs awareness 
Based on the findings there is a need to develop and implement a security awareness 
program in the case site. Currently, the organisation is at level 1 of the security 
awareness roadmap depicted in figure 6. 
 
Figure 5: Security awareness roadmap adopted from SANS (2012) 
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The stages of implementing a security awareness program involve establishing a baseline, 
acting and then evaluating the impact. The security awareness metrics for establishing the 
baseline using the Goal-Question-Method presented in Table 6 is proposed: 
Metric What is measured How it is measured Details 
Awareness survey Number of users who: 
know about security 
policies, use policies, 
violate policies, know 
about security threats, 
breaches and solutions 
Survey 
Tracking user behavior  
related to access policies 
To what extend do users 
know/ understand or use 
security tools, features or 
policies? 
User behavior Number of users who  
behave negatively with  
security 
Survey What is the current status  
in the case site? 
Computer infections How many computers are 
infected? 
Antivirus logs Are the infections  
behavior related?  
Table 6: Security awareness metrics 
For one to be able to design effective security awareness there is a need to carry out an 
awareness survey to establish a baseline. The baseline will serve as a reference or 
comparison point for measuring the impact of awareness campaigns. It is important to 
know what computer users know already. The findings reflect the absence of user training. 
This is a direct measure of metric 1.The second metric from Table 6 is user behavior 
which should align to policy and best practices, the number of users behaving negatively 
can inform an organization on the need to draw up a security awareness plan. It is 
important to ant to have an understanding of what users do on the ICT resources. Thirdly, 
there is a need to know the computer attacks that affect the users, the frequency and how 
they impact on information and technology usage. Analysis of antivirus and system logs 
can reflect on the most prevalent infections, the sources, when it occurred and the number 
of devices affected. The source of infection and propagation mechanisms of breaches can 
inform what needs to be changed in terms of behavior and know-how. 
Conclusion 
The analysis of the collected data established that the policy awareness levels in the site 
were very low posing moderate to significant security risk for the case site. There is a need 
for a security awareness program to be designed and implemented especially addressing 
policy issues first since policies are the basis for defining best practices for human behavior 
with security-related issues. The awareness levels informed the identification of security 
metrics that can be used to establish the baseline state of security in a tertiary institution 
with security policies but no security awareness programs in place. This research identified 
what users need to be aware of namely security threats; policies and how to implement 
them in order to minimise the risk of vulnerability to information security threats; solutions 
and best practices. These are key indicators of the security risk levels. 
The metrics extend existing work on security awareness by providing a measurement 
scheme for the first and second levels of the awareness roadmap. Information security 
officers can make informed decisions on areas of priority for the organisation and can 
thereby focus their programs on high priority areas first. The overall effectiveness of 
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awareness intervention can be enumerated using suitable security awareness metrics 
after the implementation of the awareness program. In this paper it is argued that 
institutions of higher education can improve employee interaction with security features 
through security awareness programs which can be evaluated using well-defined 
security metrics as proposed. Security awareness, the number and frequency of 
computer infections as well as user behavior can be used to enumerate the baseline 
security in an environment. There is a need for developing a security awareness model 
that can be used to focus on critical security awareness aspects for improving user 
behavior with security. Future research will also focus on evaluating the applicability of 
these metrics to other environments other than academic instructions as security 
awareness is a global issue not confined to academia. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
DEVELOPING USER SECURITY METRICS  
TOWARDS AWARENESS CREATION 
FUNGAI BHUNU SHAVA  
DARELLE VAN GREUNEN 
Introduction 
Developing countries are currently experiencing a transformation in the use of Information Technology (IT). These 
countries are adopting ICT and greatly increasing their use of ICT and the Internet. They have expectations for the 
positive impact of their investment, but it is not always clear what the level of security awareness is amongst the end 
users. Developing countries are emerging ICT nations and their populations are emerging online. Such users are 
often perceived as easy targets as they have limited security awareness in the digital environment. 
Security awareness refers to the extent to which a user can understand and implement security policies in programs 
or organizations (Hubbard 2002). According to Wilson and Hash (2003), awareness empowers users to identify IT 
security concerns and to behave appropriately. Security occurs as a result of user behavior as most of the security 
actions depend on end user choices to act or not to act on security messages. To protect information and IT 
infrastructure the organizations need to design and implement policies as well as to educate users about them. 
Successful implementation and evaluation of security depends on the success of user education. According to the 
NIST 800-12 special publication, user security responsibility awareness as well as security best practice training can 
enhance secure user behavior (NIST 1995:143). 
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Most organizations have security policies; however, their users are not 
aware of the policies or the meaning and implications of implementing 
them. An extract from ISO/IEC17799: 2005 Section 8.2.2 on information 
security awareness, education and training recommends that all end users 
should receive suitable awareness training and regular updates in 
organizational policies and procedures, as applicable to their job function. 
Primarily, computer users log on to a computer system to socialize or 
conduct business, to share information and to access information from the 
World Wide Web. Among the people who participate in information 
communication or sharing or making information available for other users 
to download are cyber criminals. Cyber criminals always capitalize on user 
actions online to launch their attacks. 
Access to information is continuously evolving and currently includes: the 
cloud and mobile devices of all sorts (Internet of Things). For convenient 
information access, storage and sharing users tend to use removable 
devices (currently, USB devices), and multiple mobile devices. We argue 
that this provides convenience as the users are empowered to access their 
information always, anywhere. Furthermore, applications are designed to 
enhance the user interaction with such technology. However, this 
convenience comes with risks as each device has its peculiar inherent 
security weakness. Are the users cognizant of these weaknesses and of 
means to protect themselves? The motivation of this chapter is to identify 
the main security threats that users ought to be conscious of and to rank 
the risks they pose to the users. The significance of security policy, 
security awareness and human factors that can be used to enumerate the 
security posture in an organization is discussed. The goals of security 
center on the security triad: confidentiality, integrity and availability. This 
chapter aims to answer three research questions. The main research 
question is: How can security metrics be used to come up with a security 
awareness strategy for a higher or tertiary institution in a developing 
country? The research sub-questions include: 
 What is the security awareness level among the case site 
community in a typical developing country? 
 Which metrics can be used to measure the security awareness 
baseline? 
This chapter examines the adoption of end user security features by 
developing nations that are rapidly deploying information and 
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communication technologies. It studied a higher education institution in 
Namibia to draw lessons of the situation and potential methods of 
improving the situation. Based on the findings, security metrics are 
presented that can be used to evaluate the baseline security awareness of 
individual users in a developing country context before implementing 
awareness programs. The structure of the chapter presents background 
information on information security awareness and security threats, 
objectives, methodology, findings, recommendations and conclusions. 
Information Security Overview 
The most important comments with regard to information security are: 
technology, process, policy and culture (Guyot 2003). ISO/IEC 27002 
defines 12 security domains, namely: risk assessment, security policy, asset 
management, organizing information security, human resources, physical 
and environment, communication and operations management, access 
control, information systems acquisition, development and maintenance, 
information security incident management, business continuity 
management and compliance. 
The latest version is the ISO27002: 2013 with 14 domains. The new 
domains are cryptography and supplier relationships, and the existing 
domain communications and operations management were divided into 
two domains, namely operations and communications security (ISO/IEC 
2013). The security domains are vital when outlining security metrics and 
coming up with security awareness strategies. We have focused on the 
human resources security to be able to draw up the security awareness 
metrics. 
The importance of awareness cannot be ignored if security is a goal. 
Security awareness deals with the human resources security domain of the 
ISO/IEC 27002 guideline or code of practice. Furnell, Jusoh and Katsabas 
(2005) made recommendations for improving user security, including user 
training on: application security and how best to use it, security threats one 
is exposed to when one connects to a network, and how to manage those. 
Current research trends allude to the fact that the human element is still the 
weakest link in InfoSec (Ernst and Young 2013; Deloitte 2013; SANS 
2013). The understanding of the human element could assist in defining the 
security metrics and awareness strategy. The Global Security survey 
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by PWC (2014) confirms that the human aspect of security is its major 
risk. The same company in 2013 suggested three ways that could be used 
to improve employee awareness: 
 Attitudes and Perceptions - beliefs and opinions regarding the 
 value and urgency of information security 
 Behavior - action taken to mitigate information security risk 
 Knowledge, Skills and Abilities - insight into information 
 security policies, procedures, and controls, roles/ responsibilities 
and business impact. 
The link among these three ways is shown in Figure 10-1. Awareness is 
the basis of knowledge, skills and abilities. These, in turn, build 
perceptions and attitudes, which influence behavior. Security conscious 
behavior and choices can be influenced through awareness strategies 
targeting security related education (Kajzer et al. 2014). Consistent 
positive behavior can impact the overall security landscape for the 
organization in the right direction. 
[Figure 10-1. How to influence user behavior] 
Figure 10-2 shows how these three factors influence overall information 
security. Understanding the relationship of the human factors of InfoSec 
could help in the drawing up of the metric as it informs the relationship. 
[Figure 10-2. Security awareness impact on other security aspects] 
Security threats predictions until the year 2016 had among them mobile 
devices as a way of penetrating enterprise security (Durbin and Olasvsrud 
2014). The reason for this was attributed to that fact that mobile 
applications are hurriedly developed without security considerations hence 
they are targeted as an entry point in enterprises (Durbin 2013). Nowadays, 
most people in the community can afford cell phones (smart phones, tablet 
PCs and other mobile devices) and as such, are most likely to use them for 
e-commerce. Since the security on these devices is weak, more hacktivism 
and malicious software will continue to threaten InfoSec. 
Vision 2030 for Namibia has set a target to make available the latest, most 
affordable, modern and adequate ICT infrastructure to facilitate economic 
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development and competiveness through innovation, research and 
development from the current level of 5.5 to 6.0 by 2017 (NDP4 2012:77-
78). The aim is to make Namibia a knowledge-based society by 2030 
through reducing the digital divide between communities by ensuring the 
availability of broadband Internet in rural communities. Namibia 
Development Plan 4 (NDP4): ICT provides fast access to information, 
which is a prerequisite for literacy and knowledge creation. These 
technologies are the modes of delivery for information economy 
(Government of Namibia 2012). 
Owing to affordability, business processes will be conducted using 
smartphones or mobile devices (Durbin and Olasvsrud 2014). These 
devices have a reputation of not being very secure, which presents an 
easier way for cyber criminals to get access into the enterprise by using 
them. The initiative to reduce the digital bridge and to enhance 
communication can also result in more InfoSec breaches. As the use of 
technology improves, precautions need to be taken to secure its 
beneficiaries. 
Durbin and Olasvsrud (2014) recommend the incorporation of user devices 
into existing standards for access management, and that one should begin 
to promote education and awareness of BYOx (Bring Your Own Anything) 
risk in innovative ways. 
Security Threats 
An information security threat is an object that has the potential to 
endanger information by exploiting vulnerabilities (Whitman and Mattord 
2011; Stallings 2007). Threats to InfoSec can be classified either as acts 
of human error or failure, or as mistakes/accidents as summarized in 
Table 10-1. 
Acts of human error or failure Mistakes or accidents 
Espionage or trespass Unauthorized access or data collection 
Information extortion Blackmail or disclosure 
Software attacks Viruses, Denial of service (DoS) 
Table 10-1. Security threats 
293 
 
206 
CHAPTER TEN 
For users to protect themselves from these threats they should be educated 
about them. Perceptions of information security threats can be defined by 
using the following six factors, namely: knowledge, impact, severity, 
controllability, possibility and awareness (Huang, Rau and Salvendy 
2007). Knowledge originates from awareness. As such, user awareness of 
security should be addressed first if users are to be educated regarding 
security. The NIST 800-16 (1998) learning continuum begins with 
awareness before training, as a way of getting the user ready for training by 
shifting attitudes to recognizing the importance of security and the 
consequences of its failure. For a secure organization, it is vital to ensure 
user awareness of security threats and challenges before providing them 
with the skills to defend themselves. 
Security awareness trends 
Security awareness encompasses sharing information through instructing 
and teaching users about risks to data and information, focusing on risks 
to confidentiality, integrity, or availability of data, and knowledge of 
actions to use in order to protect data (Peltier 2005). The global trend is 
for companies to incorporate security awareness programs in their 
business process to reduce the risk of information loss (PWC 2014). Much 
effort has been directed to measuring the success of awareness programs; 
however, every organization has unique measures influenced by its 
organizational culture and by environmental influences on security 
awareness. 
Metrics for a security awareness reference point need to be known to 
enable effective assessment of security risk. According to Hayden (2010, 
27) “Security metrics should be about choosing the best methods to 
determine what you need to know about security so that you can 
understand and improve your operational processes, within the resource 
constraints you face”. In this chapter, emphasis is on identifying metrics 
that can be used to measure the impact of security awareness on user 
behavior and information security. 
According to Navarro (2007) security awareness will empower users to 
make the right choices. Security can be assessed by answering the 
following questions: 
 Does the organization have enforced security policies? 
 Do employees know the security policies? 
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 What are the practices and technologies in place that can help to detect a 
 security breach? 
 Do employees know what to do if they detect a security violation? 
Ernst and Young (2013) carried out a survey on emerging technologies and 
trends and found out that successful security needs improvement, 
expansion and innovation in awareness programs in order to foster more 
proactive behavior than reactive behavior among users. Their survey results 
showed that respondents were more confident in the capabilities of current 
technologies in use because they are familiar with and confident of their 
capabilities. Organizations were cited as tending to place more importance 
on current technology rather than on emerging or future trends. This leaves 
the organizations unprepared to cope with the rapid changes in the IT field, 
hence poor proactive awareness programs (Ernst and Young 2013; PWC 
2014). 
In a similar study by PWC (2014), it was found that cloud computing and 
BYOD are being implemented before being secured. Such strides in 
technology are driven by advanced technical people and, as such, it would 
be expected that such issues should not be there; however, human behavior 
always plays a pivotal role in the success of security. According to Gary 
Loveland, a new model of InfoSec, motivated by knowledge of threats, 
assets, and the motives and targets of potential adversaries, is necessary to 
address current security challenges (PWC 2014). Since security 
implementation is achieved through policies, it is necessary to define what 
a policy is. The next section will focus on that. 
Security Policies 
“A policy is typically a document that outlines specific requirements or 
rules that must be met. In the information/network security realm, policies 
are usually point-specific, covering a single area.” (SANS n.d.). 
Policies are perceived to be the foremost way for organizations to define 
their stance on information security activities formally (Brotby and Hinson 
2013). If implemented appropriately, policies can mitigate threats resultant 
from human aspects. Policies deal with user behavior; as such they must be 
specific and understandable. As policies are point specific, an 
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organization can have several policies, each focusing on one element of 
their varied ICT needs. 
Security awareness approach 
According to (Spitzner, Lance 2012), if no awareness program is in place 
then the focus should first be placed on compliance, which addresses the 
implementation of standards, promoting user awareness and change 
through an awareness program tailored for the organizational needs; on 
long-term sustainment, which addresses how to improve the organizational 
posture continually through unceasing improvement; and on metrics, 
which measure the effectiveness of the awareness program. Survey data 
collected from a case site was analyzed qualitatively. Based on the findings 
that emerged, security metrics were proposed. According to Yin (2009); 
Bhattacherjee (2012); as well as Crinson and Leontowitsch (2011), case 
study research is the detailed inquiry of an issue used to evaluate the 
authenticity of the problem and it allows researchers to gather realistic data 
of the phenomenon being investigated in social and behavioral scientific 
research. 
Case site 
A case study of the Polytechnic of Namibia (an academic institution in 
Namibia) was conducted. The Institution is located in the capital city of 
the nation, Windhoek. It has a student enrolment of 13'400 and employs 
670 full-time staff. Every staff member has a desktop or personal 
computer (PC) and/or laptop allocated to him/her for daily work. The 
student laboratories and library are equipped with PCs used for practical 
sessions as well as for information search on the Internet and on e-library 
resources. 
Materials and methods 
Using a purposive, non-probabilistic method of sampling, the aim was to 
receive a minimum of 30 responses from the target population of staff 
members. We considered the policing of and adherence to policies, as well 
as at security awareness. 
To allow for effective analysis, the data classification was implemented 
according to exhibited patterns or characteristics. The classification 
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focused on research aims and objectives. After classification of the data, 
connections were established among different categories. The categories 
form the concepts or variables for the formulation of the theoretical 
framework, and for the relationships that form the connections. Meanings 
were logically inferred from literature. Description, contextualization, 
classification, processing and linking of gathered data were adopted. 
Procedure 
A survey was conducted in order to understand the security awareness 
levels in the case site. The population (site) was purposefully chosen to 
show the diversity of users from different backgrounds and professions, 
who use similar security features to achieve different outcomes. Purposive 
sampling is useful for circumstances where there is a need to study a 
targeted sample in minimal time and where proportion is not the key 
aspect. It is most appropriate for selecting cases that are very informative 
(Saunders et al. 2009). Information was gathered regarding the knowledge 
of end users of the security threats to which they are exposed when they 
connect to networks; awareness of computer security policies in the 
organization; and behavior towards security alerts. 
The objectives of the study were presented to the respondents in a covering 
letter. Based on this information, they made a voluntary informed choice 
whether or not to participate in the survey. Thus, purposive and self-
selecting sampling techniques were used. Self-selection involves the 
participant volunteering to take part in the research. Data was collected 
from those who responded. The responses were treated anonymously and 
in a confidential manner, to ensure that no link could be made to the 
participants who responded, on publication of the findings. 
An online survey was designed to collect data from a population of about 
670 end users using E-surveys Pro. The survey tool was pre-tested with 
seven users, after which it was deployed to all population members by 
means of a broadcast email containing the link. The online survey is quick 
and inexpensive to administer. Furthermore, it saves time in analysis as the 
data can be analyzed electronically using statistical tools. 
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Participant selection 
The participants in this study comprised lecturers, administrators and 
other professionals who make up the university community. Participants 
were chosen for this qualitative experience evaluation because they 
possessed the common experience of avoiding the use of security features 
for one reason or another. The institution has 670 full-time employees. 
The population was chosen in order to reflect a diversity of users from 
different backgrounds and professions, who use similar application 
programs for similar purposes in order to achieve different objectives. 
Students were not included as the study was aimed at reflecting on a 
typical work environment. 
The respondent composition was representative of the university employee 
population and was spread across the different faculties and centers in the 
institution. Table 10-2 below presents the affiliations of the respondents. 
Department Participants 
School of Information Technology 18 
School of Business Management 8 
School of Communication, Media and Legal 
Studies 
2 
School of Engineering 2 
School of Natural Resources 3 
School of Health and Applied Sciences 1 
Bureau of Computer Services 2 
Centre of Open and Long Life Learning 4 
Centre of Teaching and Learning 1 
Centre of Entrepreneurial Development 1 
Registrar 1 
Library 1 
Auxiliary Services 1 
Payroll, Finance and Accounting 3 
Human Resources 2 
Namibian German Logistics 1 
Security (Campus Control) 1 
Table 10-2. Affiliations of respondents  
Data Analysis method 
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Responses from 53 participants who completed the survey out of 58 
respondents were analyzed for patterns that demonstrate how much the 
users think they know about information security. To gauge the security 
culture of the organization, general security information was gathered. The 
information captured the understanding of security, threats and solutions, 
as well as whether the end users were implementing them or not. Then the 
behavior of end users was assessed with security feature/ technology and 
the reasons for the specific behavior. 
After this analysis, the results were used to develop security awareness 
metrics using the steps outlined in the next section. The data collected 
helped in understanding the security metrics required at the case site. 
Security metric development process 
Security metrics provide information about IT security, including costs and 
risks (asset value, threat and vulnerability are elements of overall risk), and 
must be based on a rigorous approach for security measurements and 
applied understanding seeking information security (Hayden 2010). 
Worthwhile metrics reflect the degree to which security goals are being 
achieved and they motivate actions taken to advance the security program 
of an organization. They can also pinpoint the risk levels of not 
implementing certain actions and can be used to improve the levels of 
awareness within the organization (Payne 2006). According to Hayden 
(2010), security occurs as a result of human activity. This study focused on 
measuring the human element of risk- vulnerability. Dimensions of 
vulnerability include the level of understanding of security concerns by 
computer users. Based on the results presented in the previous section, 
metrics were developed using the Goal-Question method. For instance, the 
metric is user behavior. The question asked is: how do you behave when 
confronted with a security dialogue? The goal is to measure user behavior 
with security dialogue boxes. The following are the seven steps involved in 
developing a security metrics program. In this chapter the focus was on the 
first three (Payne 2006): 
1. Define the metrics program objectives and goals (provide metrics that 
clearly communicate how user interaction with security can be improved. 
Goals: to base the metrics program on improving awareness within our 
organization; to communicate effectively the metrics to all stake-holders, 
including end users). 
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2. Decide on metrics to be produced by means of a framework, top-down or 
bottom-up approach and identify metrics which would be appropriate to 
use. First, define the goals; then come up with measurements to generate 
the metrics. The bottom-up approach as described by Payne (2006) in 
Table 10-3 was adopted after analyzing the survey results. 
3. Develop strategies for generating the metrics (How will the data be 
collected and how often? - Source (antivirus logs, user surveys), method 
of collection (survey, log analysis), frequency of collection, data analysis 
techniques, metric generation). 
4. Establish benchmarks and targets. 
5. Decide how the metrics will be reported. 
6. Make an action plan and implement it. 
7. Establish a formal program review/refinement cycle. 
 
Bottom-Up Approach 
Identify measurements that 
can be collected for this 
process 
The percentage of users unaware of security 
policies in the organization; security threats and 
solutions; the ratio of users who behave securely 
Define metrics that can be 
generated from the 
measurements 
The number of users knowledgeable of security 
policies; threats and solutions from the last 
dated survey; people who behave securely and 
successful security breaches recorded in logs. 
Determine the association 
between resulting metrics and 
established objectives of the 
overall security program 
To increase security policy, threat and 
solution awareness among end users 
Table 10-3. Bottom-up approach employed for analysis of results  
Findings and discussions 
Security policies active in the organization 
The analysis of documentation at the case site revealed a list of policies for 
implementation. The following policies exist in the case site: 
1. Acceptable ICT use describes the acceptable use of ICT 
equipment in the institution to guarantee that the organization is 
safe from “risks including virus attacks, compromise of network 
systems and services, disclosure of confidential information and 
legal issues” which is meant for all ICT users in the organization. 
It is meant to spell out acceptable use of ICT resources 
(Polytechnic of Namibia, 2008). 
2. Password Policy defining practice for constructing and safe 
guarding strong passwords, and the frequency of change. 
300  
214 
DEVELOPING USER SECURITY METRICS TOWARDS AWARENESS CREATION 
3. Remote access, for all employees accessing the institution’s 
network off-campus with either a company-owned or personal 
computer, laptop, workstation or mobile device for work-related 
activities. 
4. Virtual Private Network (VPN) which prescribes how to use 
Remote Access through IPsec or L2TP VPN connections to the 
organization’s corporate network. 
5. Wireless communication that prohibits connecting to the 
organization’s networks through unsafe mobile communication 
devices and specifies that access can only be approved by the ICT 
department. 
The policies are well articulated; however, the effect of their 
implementation on user experience is unknown. Users barely know the 
security policies; hence, they do not use them as expected. Table 10-4 
shows the usage statistics from the survey data answering the question: 
“To what extent do you know these policies? (1 is not at all and 5 is very 
well)” 
  1 2 3 4 5 Response 
Total 
Password 11 2 11 12 15 51 
Wireless 14 9 14 7 7 51 
General Computer usage 13 4 14 9 11 51 
Internet 14 4 9 12 12 51 
Table 10-4. Knowledge of policies 
 
Extent 1 shows a significant risk rated at five (5), and Extent 5 is the least 
risk rated at one (1). In general, the risk of policy knowledge is moderate 
(3.04) as the participants have average to low knowledge of policies in the 
organization. Computer practical lectures and computer laboratory 
technicians who were orally interviewed alluded that students are not 
allocated enough memory on campus servers and end user PCs, and they 
have mandatory user accounts. A mandatory user profile does not store 
user information/data when they log off. This promotes the use of 
removable devices among computer users as they share and save 
materials. From the survey results, 81% of the respondents use memory 
sticks for information sharing, after emails. Other methods of information 
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sharing such as network, Google docs and DropBox are just not popular. 
Emails and memory sticks are well known to be good vectors for 
distributing viruses. As a result of this, malicious code is a significant 
problem in computer laboratories and extends to the staff network. Anti-
virus logs show a virus infection rate of 85 in every hundred cases of 
detections; 15 out of 100 are Trojan horses. 
Using risk factor assignment to questions where no knowledge of security 
policies presents a high risk factor for InfoSec and the higher the 
knowledge thereof the lower the risk. Table 15-5 shows the calculated 
awareness risk value for various policies in the organization. 
 
Policy Average risk 
value 
Awareness  
risk value 
Risk rating 
Password 171/51= 3.35 50 Elevated 
Wireless 137/51=2.69 40 Elevated 
General 
Computer Usage 
154/51=3.02 45 Elevated 
Internet 157/51= 3.08 46 Elevated 
Overall 3.04 45 Elevated 
Table 15-5. Calculated risk rating for security policy awareness  
Security Policy awareness 
Policy awareness as low as 13% to a slightly higher 29% for the different 
policies is indicated in the results. Figure 10-3 shows how those 
knowledgeable about policies learnt about them. Interestingly, among those 
who responded some were not aware of the policies, yet they responded 
positively on usage. 
[Figure 10-3. Where users learn about security policies] 
There is a need for user education with regard to policy existence, to ensure 
that those who know about them have learnt from correct sources. The 
findings show that there is no compliance to policies as reflected by user 
behavior when challenged with computer issues. The procedural way to 
respond is to find assistance from the respective department; however, 
about 42% source help from unsecure sources, including Internet, friends or 
colleagues. According to the general computer usage policy, all sensitive 
information must be encrypted. The reality is that as few as 15% of the 
respondents use the facility. The status quo poses a significant risk to the 
organizational security. 
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Security Policy usage 
Of the 51 respondents, 31 (65%) know and follow the requirements of the 
policies as shown in Figure 10-4. Others claim to know about policies but 
do not follow the requirements. 
[Figure 10-4. Knowledge of policy requirements] 
Section 4.2.2 of the Acceptable ICT use policy speaks about the 
responsibility of users regarding password security and account sharing. 
However, survey findings show that when confronted with a problem, 
40% will share their passwords with the “support” personnel. The support 
can be telephonic or remote using remote desktop managers. Users do not 
have an understanding of the implications of sharing their passwords. The 
risk associated with knowledge of policy requirements is average. 
Security awareness levels in the organization 
There is no user training on information security as reported by 92% of 
the respondents. However, some users know some security aspects as 
reflected in the findings. Table 15-6 shows the responses from 53 
participants to the question: “Have you ever heard of the following? 
(Tick all that apply)”. 
 
  Heard of % Risk level 
Hacking 50 94 14 
Phishing 45 85 13 
Spam 49 92 14 
Spyware 41 77 12 
Virus 48 91 14 
Worm 41 77 12 
Social Engineering 16 30 45 
Overall     18 
Table 15-6. Knowledge of security threats and associated risk 
rating  
Table 15-6 shows a significant level of security threat awareness except on 
social engineering, despite users being untrained. Using risk calculations, 
the security risk of the organization is low. However responses to other 
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related questions show that 23% of the same respondents do not know if 
they have been victims of hacking or not, while 57% do not know if they 
have been socially engineered as shown in Figure 15-5. 
[Figure 15-5. Victims of security threats] 
User behavior influences the overall security status of an organization. As 
part of the survey, we gathered information on security interaction behavior. 
When presented with a security dialogue, the majority of users actually read 
the message before clicking on an option, except for 18% who disregard the 
message and select options as a way of removing the dialogue box. 
Password security is high; however, they are vulnerable to social 
engineering attacks as 40% of respondents, easily trust technical support 
staff with their login credentials. Email security behavior is good, but can 
still be improved regarding handling emails from unknown sources. 
Technical help source poses a moderate risk, as 29% of respondents seek 
advice from the Internet and 12.5% from their colleagues. Software 
updates are rarely done as reflected in Table 15-7. This can open 
backdoors for cyber-attacks. End users have a tendency to allow add-ons 
from the Internet to execute on their machines. All these actions for users 
with administrative rights (87% of respondents) are a significant risk and 
need to be addressed. This also explains the high manifestations of viruses 
and other malicious software. 
 
  Not at  
all 
Rarely Sometimes Often Always Response  
Total 
Antivirus 1 0 6 8 38 53 
Firewall 6 4 6 11 26 53 
Antimalware 25 7 6 5 10 53 
Intrusion 
Detection 
System 
28 8 8 4 5 53 
Passwords 3 0 3 9 38 53 
Patches 25 7 7 4 10 53 
Updates 5 7 9 14 18 53 
Backup 5 5 17 14 12 53 
Encryption 24 12 7 6 4 53 
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Table 15-7. Frequency of use of specific security technologies 
There is low information backup awareness. The study showed that only 
22% always perform it. The organization has moderate to significant risk 
posed by the awareness levels on information security behavior. 
 
Security metrics vs awareness 
 
Based on the findings, there is a need to develop and implement a security 
awareness program in the case site. Currently, the organization is at level 1 
of the security awareness roadmap as described by SANS (2012). The 
security awareness roadmap has different levels with the first level stated 
as non-existent, followed by compliance focused. The third level speaks to 
promoting awareness and change that in turn leads to long term 
sustainment that results in metrics at the final level 5. 
The stages of implementing a security awareness program involve 
establishing a baseline, acting and then evaluating the impact. Based on 
the findings, we propose specific security awareness metrics for 
establishing the baseline (see Table 15-8). We used the Goal-Question-
Method to derive the metrics. 
 
Metric What is  
measured? 
How it is  
measured 
Details 
Awareness  
survey 
Number of users who: 
know about security 
policies; use policies; 
violate policies; know 
about security threats, 
breaches and 
solutions 
Survey 
Tracking 
user 
behavior 
related to 
access 
policies 
To what extent 
do users know/ 
understand or 
use security 
tools, features or 
policies? 
User behavior Number of users who 
behave negatively with 
security 
Survey What is the current 
status at the case 
site? 
Computer 
infections 
How many computers 
are infected? 
Antivirus 
logs 
Are the infections 
behavior related? 
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Table 15-8. Security awareness metrics 
 
 
For one to be able to design effective security awareness there is a need to 
carry out an awareness survey to establish a baseline. The baseline will 
serve as a reference or comparison point for measuring the impact of 
awareness campaigns. It is important to know what computer users know 
already. The findings reflect the absence of user training. This is a direct 
measure of metric 1. 
The second metric from Table 15-8 is user behavior, which should align to 
policy and best practices. The number of users behaving negatively can 
inform an organization of the need to draw up a security awareness plan. It 
is important to have an understanding of what users do with the ICT 
resources. Thirdly, there is a need to know the computer attacks that affect 
the users, their frequency and how these impact information and 
technology usage. Analysis of antivirus and system logs can reflect on the 
most prevalent infections, the sources, when they occurred and the number 
of devices affected. The source of infection and the propagation 
mechanisms of breaches can inform what needs to be changed in terms of 
behavior and know-how. 
Conclusion 
The findings of the study show that policy and secure behavior awareness 
levels in the site are very low, presenting moderate to significant security 
threats for the organization. There is a need for a security awareness 
program to be designed and implemented not only in the developed world 
but also in the emerging countries. Such programs should target policy and 
secure behavior first and foremost. Policies form the foundation for 
security implementation and they define the rules and procedure of how 
end users should behave as well as the associated consequences of policy 
violation. Based on the awareness levels, security metrics for establishing 
the security baseline in the tertiary institution were identified. These can 
now be used by similar institutions in developing countries to determine 
the level of security awareness within different establishments. 
The findings indicated that the institution has good security policies, but 
no security awareness programs in place. This research identified what end 
users need to be aware of, namely: security threats; policies and 
procedures of implementation as a way of reducing the risk of cyber-  
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attacks; solutions and best practices. The identified metrics are crucial 
pointers to security risk levels. The study outputs (metrics) extend the 
body of knowledge on security awareness by proposing a measurement 
scheme for levels 1 and 2 of the security awareness roadmap by SANS 
(2012). The metrics will enable security officers to make informed 
decisions to focus on priority areas of organizational security. 
The overall value of awareness mediation can be calculated using suitable 
security awareness metrics after implementing a suitable awareness 
program. In this study we argue that tertiary education institutions can 
improve information security postures by influencing user behavior with 
security features through tailored security awareness programs. The 
awareness programs are assessed using the proposed security metrics. 
Baseline security can be assessed using user awareness of security issues, 
threats and solution; the amount and rate of occurrence of computer 
infections; and user behavior. 
This study found that policy makers in developing countries need better 
guidance on how to create awareness amongst their end users. There is a 
need for a better understanding of the security challenges in those nations. 
The challenges faced need to be better articulated and the situation 
analyzed for ways to respond to the challenges and where further research 
is needed. This study contributed towards a security awareness model that 
focuses on critical security awareness aspects for improving user behavior 
with security. Future research will focus on evaluating the applicability of 
these metrics to non-academic institutions in Namibia. 
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